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Abstract
This thesis is an investigation of China's territorial disputes, with a focus on how Beijing has 
behaved in these. With 1989 as its cut-off point the thesis considers unresolved land-border disputes
and maritime disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Employing the concepts of 
“status quo” and “revisionist” the thesis aims to uncover which description best fits China's 
approach to territorial disputes in the time period under consideration.
Its findings are that China in its land-border disputes have overwhelmingly displayed status quo 
behavior. Six out of eight of these disputes have been solved amicably with no major change of 
territory or usage of military means. Of the two unresolved disputes, with India and Bhutan, only 
the latter may fit the description as limited-aims revisionism by Beijing, although it is a case lacking
in detailed information. As for the maritime domain the thesis finds possible revisionism in China's 
disputes with Japan over the Senkaku Islands and Southeast Asian states over the Spratly Islands 
and Scarborough Shoal. However, action reaction dynamics complicates the picture and suggests 
that to the extent the limited-aims revisionist label fits these cases it is of a more reactive than 
proactive kind.
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1. Introduction
For the last few decades China has been on the rise. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
stagnation of Japan's economic miracle, China took over the baton of international focus and has 
held on to it ever since. As one observer put it, “China – what’s in it for us?” has become a 
frequently posed question, and there is no shortage of answers on offer.1 What does seem clear, 
however, is that the backdrop of a global economic crisis and what seems to be a limited but 
ongoing closing of the power gap between Beijing and Washington has led to a general impression 
that we might be entering the twilight hours of the current geopolitical arrangements. Whether or 
not such an assessment is premature remains to be seen, but for the time being the China's rise and 
its implications are likely to remain in the spotlight.
This thesis addresses one aspect related to the implications of China's growth, namely how it
approaches territorial disputes. History has taught us to expect that a rising power will seek “to 
extend its territorial control,” and for this reason China's approach to territorial disputes is one 
aspects of its behavior from which we can draw some inferences about its attitude to the status quo.2
China's exclusion from the Westphalian system until the fateful “century of humiliation,” starting in 
the mid-19th century, further implies a traditionally ambiguous relation to clear-cut boundaries and 
sovereignty, for as has been noted its “traditional frontiers were often not lines but zones of 
intermixture between Chinese settlement and the customary habitats of nomadic peoples owing a 
vague allegiance to the Chinese emperor.”3 For those border treaties that were eventually signed, the
“unequal” and imperial qualities they carried meant that they were guaranteed to be future objects 
of contention. It was therefore little surprise that the Chinese Communist Party, after coming to 
power, “declared that it would re-examine treaties concluded by its predecessors with foreign 
powers, and either 'recognize, abrogate, revise or renegotiate them'.”4
Focusing on the distinction between “status quo” and “revisionist” states, I look at how 
China has behaved in a number of land border and maritime disputes since 1989. This is relevant 
for a number of reasons, not least because China has more neighbors than any other state,5 and 
because territorial disputes have proved over time to be one of the types of political issues most 
1 Perry Anderson, “Sino-Americana,” London Review of Books 34, no. 3 (2012), accessed October 17, 2013, 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n03/perry-anderson/sino-americana.
2 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 106.
3 Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), 273.
4 Francis Watson, The Frontiers of China (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966), 9.
5 Stephen Kotkin, “Series Editor's Preface,” in Beijing's Power and China's Borders: Twenty Neighbors in Asia, ed. 
Bruce A. Elleman et al. (Armonk: New York, 2013), xi.
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likely to lead to large-scale use of force.6 I will examine the eight land-border disputes that 
remained unsolved as of 1989, and the disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea. My 
findings are that China's behavior has mostly not been challenging the status quo, but that this is 
more clear-cut as far as the land-border disputes are concerned than when it comes to China's 
maritime disputes.
1.1 Research question and hypotheses
This thesis aims to establish whether today's China is more of a status quo or revisionist power. The 
research question is as follows:
“Is China today behaving more like a status quo power or a revisionist power?”
The time frame under consideration is from 1989 and up until the end of 2013 – the “today” should 
thus not be taken too literally.7 The focus is on China's behavior in its territorial disputes. One 
clarification is in order regarding the cut-off point: while territorial disputes settled before 1989 will
be excluded from this thesis those resolved later (or that have yet to be resolved) will not be treated 
as if whatever happened before that year is irrelevant. Thus, the historical context is taken into 
account. The present is obviously connected to the past to some degree; China's leaders did not 
suddenly wake up on January 1, 1989, ready to face its territorial disputes with completely fresh 
eyes, having forgotten both the history of its disputes and previously attempted negotiations (or lack
thereof). Context is important, and arguably considering previous negotiations makes more sense 
than leaving them out. But the emphasis lies on what has happened after 1989.8
The reason for limiting the scope to territorial disputes is both practical and theoretically 
grounded. Space considerations necessitate selectivity, and focusing on China's behavior in its own 
6 Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1998), 10 (fn. 25).
7 As was noted by a scholar critical of the “new assertiveness” meme that has been prominent in writings on China 
recently there is a danger in keeping the time frame under consideration too short, in that it is prone to result in “the 
tendency to assume that what observers witness now is new, different and unconnected to the past.” Alastair Iain 
Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 33.
8 Any selected cut-off point will have a hint of arbitrariness to it, but arguably 1989 makes a lot of sense. Starting 
with the Tiananmen square protests and their eventual crackdown China's international environment changed to one
of partial isolation and was shortly followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, ringing in the end of the Cold War 
and bipolarity, and the gradual emergence of a unipolar system that arguably remains to this day. (It is true that 
early in the post-Cold War-era a common view in China was that a multipolar world was around the corner, but by 
the later part of the 90s the admittance “that the transition to multipolarity has been postponed” was increasingly 
taking hold. Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Honolulu: University Press of the 
Pacific, 2005), 58.)
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neighborhood allows a fairly thorough look at the relevant cases. Had I gone for a more global 
outlook and tried to include other factors of the “status quo” a more scattered approach would have 
been necessary. The theoretical reason is that we would expect China to show its “true colors” close
to home sooner than on the global stage. This point is open to dispute, but offensive realism (which 
is used to support Hypothesis 2 in this thesis) predicts a rising power to aim for regional hegemony 
before it takes on bigger tasks. If one agrees that the strength of power projection decreases with 
distance this is a logical implication; it would indeed be strange for a revisionist power to attempt to
dominate far away places before having secured preeminence in its own region(s), at least in a 
world where simple colonial conquest is less relevant than it once was.
With these specifications out of the way we can move on to the hypotheses of the thesis. 
Hypothesis 1:
“China is behaving more like a regional status quo power.”
Hypothesis 2:
“China is behaving more like a regional revisionist power.”
The two hypotheses are both grounded in realist theory. Hypothesis 1 draws on insights from 
defensive realism while Hypothesis 2 is based on offensive realism. The theoretical underpinnings 
of the hypotheses will be dealt with after the following section on methodology.
1.2 Methodology
This thesis is a qualitative multi-case study. The “case” concept has been subject to some confusion.
King et al. state that they use the word “observation” and that they reserve the use of “case” to mean
a full case study.  George and Bennett argue that this leads to ambiguities.9 To be clear, then, 
regardless of whether one prefers the term “observation” or “case” I include several of them, and so 
while I am focusing on one state I am looking at several observations/cases that are relevant to the 
research question.
9 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 52-53; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 17 (fn. 29).
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The case study approach has its potential pitfalls but also appropriate uses and unique 
strengths. Starting with the challenges case studies present, a common concern is that they are unfit 
for generalization.10  For instance, Van Evera notes that the single-case study is poorly equipped to 
test the antecedent conditions of a theory due to the lack of variance on the dependent variable. 
This, however, can be overcome by expanding the number of cases under consideration (ideally this
will also mean that there is variation on the dependent variable), and should thus be less of an issue 
in a multi-case study such as this one.11 As will become clear later on the cases under consideration 
here do vary on the dependent variable. 
It should also be noted that the focus of my thesis is not theory development or theory 
testing as such. Rather, I am looking at a case of intrinsic importance (with policy implications), 
with the aim of making sound descriptive inferences. Simply put, “Inference is the process of using 
the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know.”12 What we don't know here refers to the 
research question, “Is China today behaving more like a status quo power or a revisionist power?” 
By going through the facts we “already know,” i.e. data that are relevant to the observational 
implications of the theories from which we have derived our hypotheses, we may draw such 
inferences.13 As regards China today, describing whether it is behaving more as a status quo or 
revisionist state is important as it allows us to draw inferences regarding its current and future 
behavior.
In other words, this potential weakness would be more urgent if I aimed to explain what sort 
of conditions lead to revisionist behavior in general, instead of answering whether China is 
behaving more as a status quo or revisionist power. The relevance of this study, then, is to a large 
extent limited to (post-Cold War) China, thereby making the issue of generalizability less urgent.
A second and more fundamental issue is that cases under consideration in a study “might not
be able to discriminate between which of two or more competing explanations fits best.”14 This is a 
difficult problem to fully overcome when the theories from which the researcher has derived his 
hypotheses share many of the same assumptions and may be open to different interpretations. 
George and Bennett suggest that the researcher look for crucial cases (cases which if in line with or 
10 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 53.
11 Ibid., 54.
12 King et al., Designing Social Inquiry, 46.
13 King, Keohane and Verba disagree “with those who denigrate 'mere' description. Even if explanation – connecting 
causes and effects – is the ultimate goal, description has a central role in all explanation, and it is fundamentally 
important in and of itself. It is not description versus explanation that distinguishes scientific from other research; it 
is whether systematic inference is conducted according to valid procedures.” Designing Social Inquiry, 34. It is 
important to emphasize that descriptive inference goes beyond data collection; it requires significantly more 
analysis of the phenomenon we study and its components. Ibid., 56.
14 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science, 30.
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contradicting one of the hypotheses would strongly support or impugn it)15. By the nature of the 
issue, the clearer a case fits one of the hypotheses the better. And in less clear cases it is important 
to be open about ambiguities. As long as this is kept in mind, this problem should also be mitigated.
Thus, the first of these two challenges is not too relevant for my thesis because the study 
includes several cases and has variation on the dependent variable. The second one is more of a 
warning to keep in mind when analyzing the cases under consideration, but as long as one is open 
about the level of certainty regarding findings it should not present too much of an issue.
Moving to the strengths of the case study method that are relevant to this thesis, the biggest 
one in my view is that it makes conceptual validity more attainable and is useful for both 
discovering and measuring indicators of the concept in focus.16 The status quo/revisionist 
dichotomy is one of some controversy (to be discussed below) and is hard to quantitatively 
operationalize and measure. A qualitative approach with more attention given to each case is 
beneficial for capturing context and nuances, something that easily gets lost in statistical 
approaches.17 
There will always be a trade-off between the number of cases and attention to detail. I am, 
however, confident that I have not included so many cases as to leave any of them superficially 
treated and not so few as to have little ground for drawing valid inferences. While I was (to varying 
degrees) familiar with some of the cases discussed here before I embarked on writing this thesis, 
there were several I had little or no knowledge about. In terms of case selection I have taken 
precautions to avoid selection bias and exclusion of relevant cases. This has been made easier by 
limiting the focus to China's behavior in its own neighborhood, in that I have been able to include 
almost all the territorial disputes that were still unresolved in 1989.18
1.3 Theory
The theories discussed below, defensive and offensive realism, are more of umbrella terms than 
cohesive theories clearly identified with one author.19 I should state at the outset that by defensive 
15 Ibid., 9.
16 Ibid., 19.
17 That is not to say that the question at hand could not be answered in a statistical way, but many of the cases would 
in any case require a more qualitative approach before it would be appropriate to code them as either instances of 
revisionist or stats quo behavior. Thus there is definitely a complementarity of the different methodological 
approaches, as George and Bennet point out. Ibid., 34-35.
18 The only (still unresolved) land-border dispute I am aware of that will not be covered here is China's dispute with 
North Korea (of which very little is known, other than that it involves the Changbai Mountain). It is left out due to 
space considerations. See Daniel Gomà Pinilla, “Border Disputes between China and North Korea,” China 
Perspectives 52 (2004): 1-8.
19 Although Mearsheimer has made the most cohesive statement of offensive realism he did not invent the term, and is
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and offensive realism I am thinking of their systemic variants, where the focus is first and foremost 
on the structural level. In other words, writings that fall under the branch of neoclassical realism are
not included.20 It is true that there is some controversy surrounding the applicability of structural 
realism to the study of foreign policy,21 but as Colin Elman points out many scholars have used 
structural realism for such purposes with good results.22 Elman argues that “scholars who restrict 
themselves to making probabilistic [rather then determinate] predictions have no grounds for 
refusing to make foreign-policy predictions.”23 Thus, relying on neorealist theories to draw 
hypotheses about the behavior of individual states need not be problematic so long as we can 
identify clear observable implications that follow from the internal logic of the theories we rely on.
 
1.3.1 Defensive realism
Defensive realism starts with the assumption that states are primarily concerned with security. 
While this is not something disputed by offensive realism there is a marked difference in how the 
two strains of realism see this preoccupation manifested in practice. Put simply, defensive realists 
argue that there is such a thing as too much power and that pursuing it endlessly will be 
self-defeating. 
Thus, Waltz, contrasting his theory of neorealism with Morgenthau's realpolitik, stated that 
“neorealism sees power as a possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too 
little or too much of it. ... In crucial situations, however, the ultimate concern of states is not for 
power, but for security.”24 A drive toward power beyond a certain level is counterproductive in the 
sense that its inherently threatening quality leads to counterbalancing by other states. Thus, 
increasing power does not mean the same as increasing security once such an increase spurs a 
not alone in that camp. According to Taliaferro the terms “aggressive realism” (offensive realism) and “defensive 
realism” were first employed by Jack Snyder in Myths of Empire (1991). Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking 
under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000/01): 128 (fn. 1).
20 This is contrary to Taliaferro, who includes both neorealist and neoclassical realist writings in his discussion of 
defensive and offensive realism. Ibid., 135.
21 Waltz himself was adamant that his was a theory of international politics, not foreign policy. Kenneth N. Waltz, 
“International Politics is not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 54-57.
22 For a list of examples, see Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” 
Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 10 (fn. 9). In a more recent article Hancock and Lobell also point out that offensive
and defensive realism offer some behavioral generalizations, and put these to use in assessing whether or not China 
and Russia are likely to be revisionist states. Kathleen J. Hancock and Steven E. Lobell, “Realism and the Changing
International System: Will China and Russia Challenge the Status Quo?” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 8, 
no. 4 (2010): 146.
23 Ibid., 37. In fact, Mearsheimer himself has not shied away from making certain foreign policy predictions himself, 
even though his theory is usually considered structural realism.
24 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 
(1988): 616.
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coalition directed at oneself.
The international system is anarchic, ensuring that self-help is the only certain way to ensure
one's own safety. Full integration and functional specialization is not an option for states wanting to 
survive.25 However, while at the end of the day states can only rely on themselves to provide 
security there is a process of state socialization which contains an element of learning from history. 
As Waltz put it, “In international politics, success leads to failure” and although there have been 
several states throughout history for whom this lesson has “proved exceedingly difficult... to learn” 
it should nevertheless be a strong reminder for potential inheritors of the drive toward unlimited 
power-maximization.26 Thus, for defensive realists self-help and expansionism are not the same 
thing.
While the security dilemma (means taken by one state to increase its security leaves other 
states less secure) can spur arms races that nobody really wants, there are ways to mitigate its effect 
and signal benign intentions.27 Even if such measures can never fully surmount the suspicion 
fostered by anarchy defensive realists take a more optimistic view of the prospects for avoiding 
conflict than do offensive realists. As Jervis pointed out, the popular use of the Prisoner's Dilemma 
to illustrate the difficulties of cooperation in international relations may be somewhat 
oversimplifying things. Repeated plays (with the same actors) will make defection a less rational 
response than in the case of a single game.28 Applying this to the research question in focus here, we
could say that a China bent on major revisions would be working against itself by cheating others 
unless it somehow managed to fundamentally alter the status quo in a single move (thus ensuring 
that future plays would be under different circumstances).29
Defensive realists also pay attention to what is called the offense-defense balance. To what 
extent we can distinguish offensive from defensive weapons and whether it is more advantageous to
attack or to defend are the main determinants of this balance.30 If it is believed that offense has the 
advantage (wars will entail low costs and high benefits) conflict is more likely; the opposite is true 
if defense has the advantage.31 Technology and geography are important factors to determine the 
balance: buffer zones and natural barriers (mountains, large water bodies) are examples of 
25 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 105, 
127.
26 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” 625; Steven E. Lobell, “Structural 
Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism,” in The International Studies Encyclopedia, vol. X, ed. Robert 
Denemark (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 6662.
27 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 169.
28 Ibid., 171.
29 Of course this is a major oversimplification and is primarily intended to illustrate the logic at work. In real life it 
may not always be as easy to identify defection and cheating, or whether or not such behavior reflects reasonable 
and limited dissatisfaction or hostile and unlimited aims, as the game theoretical models assume.
30 Ibid., 186-87.
31 Ibid., 189-90.
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geography conducive to defense; nuclear weapons are technological innovations working toward 
the same end.32 While there is some disagreement about the offense-defense balance and its 
application, defensive realists commonly consider an offensive advantage to be relatively rare, 
“especially given the second strike capability of most nuclear powers.”33
Thus, while defensive realism in no way rules out the possibility of inter-state war, 
competition and power struggles it is less pessimistic than offensive realism regarding mitigating 
factors. The most important thing to note in regard to this thesis is the assumption that states are 
security-seekers that typically aim to avoid counter-balancing directed at themselves. They live in a 
nuclear world where the stakes attached to an expansionist foreign policy are high, and as defensive
positionalists they are more preoccupied with securing what they already have than to take risks for 
territorial enlargement, in others words as the rule states are status quo powers.34
1.3.2 Offensive realism
Hypothesis 2, that China is behaving more like a regional revisionist power, is derived from 
offensive realism. Far from being the only theory of international relations to predict revisionist 
behavior from a rising power, offensive realism was chosen here primarily because it is so blunt on 
this point. As Mearsheimer puts it, offensive realism “does not allow for status quo powers, except 
for the unusual state that achieves preponderance. Instead, the system is populated with great 
powers that have revisionist intentions at their core.”35 One the face of it, Mearsheimer seems to 
suggest that all states (small or large, rising or not) are revisionist, unless they have achieved global 
hegemony. 36 However, he later specifies that a regional hegemon can also be a status quo power on 
the condition that no other region of the world contains a hegemon of its own.37 In all other 
circumstances revisionism is the rule, not an exception.
32 Ibid., 194-197. Strictly speaking, nuclear weapons are not so much a defensive advantage as they are deterrents. In 
effect, however, they work much in the same way by reducing the likelihood of attack (since a strike would be 
massively retaliated). Ibid., 198.
33 Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism,” 6661. As Waltz pointed out, nuclear weapons are 
“absolute weapons,” a rather unique example of “A unit-level change [that] has dramatically reduced a structural 
effect.” Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” 627.
34 In fact the widespread assumption of states interested in keeping things as they are have led to neorealism (of the 
defensively oriented sort) being charged with a “status quo bias”. See Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism's 
Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996): 90-121.
35 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 29. 
“Human nature realism” is what Waltz famously referred to as “first image realism.” Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the 
State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
36 Ibid., 35. At the same time, Mearsheimer considers global hegemony an impossibility because of the large oceans 
of the world. Ibid., 41.
37 Ibid., 42. With the emergence of a peer competitor the heretofore sole status quo regional hegemon by necessity 
turns revisionist, and so status quo intentions are at best a short lived and unique phenomenon.
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The reason is not that states, or the human beings that populate them, are inherently evil. 
Offensive realism is ontologically different from what Mearsheimer calls “human nature realism” 
(exemplified by the writings of Hans Morgenthau) in that it sees the “tragedy” as a result of 
systemic forces.38 Where offensive and defensive realists part is first and foremost in their view on 
how states can best ensure their security. Offensive realism advices states to always maximize 
power when they can do so with reasonable prospects of success (not being defeated in the attempt),
whereas defensive realists, as we have seen, place greater emphasis on the importance of keeping 
power within limits.
In other words, offensive realism is all about amassing as much power as possible, 
“conquering and controlling land, which is the supreme political objective in a world of territorial 
states.”39 Underlying the theory are five main assumptions: 1) an international system characterized 
by anarchy; 2) the existence of offensive capabilities in all powers; 3) uncertainty regarding the 
intentions of other states; 4) survival as the primary goal of all states; and 5) actors characterized by 
rationality.40 While any one of these assumptions alone would not necessarily force states to act 
competitively their combination “create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act 
offensively with regard to each other” and the result is behavior characterized by “fear, self-help, 
and power-maximization.”41
Because states cannot put their faith in the goodwill of others and because there is no higher 
authority to penalize those who cheat the best way to survive is to amass power, to expand when 
possible, to improve one's relative power position. On the international stage everything is a 
zero-sum game where relative (not absolute) gains take the front seat.42 States are not content with 
what they have, even if they are relatively better off than their neighbors, because a relatively 
weaker state may still pose a challenge through superior strategy, and moreover because one can 
never be sure what the future holds. A state that has not yet achieved regional hegemony but forgoes
opportunities to expand is likely to regret its naiveté in a future where the tables have turned.43
This does not mean that offensive realism expects great powers to be in a constant state of 
war with everyone, never form alliances or enter into other forms of cooperation. Mearsheimer 
38 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 20-22.
39 Ibid., 86.
40 Ibid., 30-31.
41 Ibid., 32.
42 On the relative gains vs. absolute gains question defensive realists such as Waltz are on the same page as offensive 
realists. As Waltz put it, states are “compelled to ask not 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain more?'”  But for 
Waltz and other defensive realists it does not logically follow from the preoccupation with relative gains that states 
can never get enough power. If states balance against power then we should expect there to be a point of 
diminishing returns, where a state would in fact decrease its relative power through expansion rather than restraint 
because the result is counter-balancing. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105.
43 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 34-35.
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emphasizes that “great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they 
charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories.”44 As the assumption of rationality 
suggests, offensive realists expect states to think long and hard about their choices. This is an 
important point to keep in mind here, because if we took Hypothesis 2 to mean that China will go to
war over the smallest dispute we would obviously be greatly exaggerating what sort of situation 
offensive realism expects.45
It may seem that the historical record of the Pax Americana and earlier Pax Britannica does 
not bode well for the explanatory value of offensive realism with its focus on insatiable need for 
power. After all, neither the British empire nor the United States tried to conquer all of Europe 
during their heyday. Here the concept of “offshore balancers” enters the picture. According to 
Mearseimer's theory the stopping power of water is so great as to effectively rule out domination of 
continents by insular powers.46 Thus, the US “did not attempt to conquer territory in either Europe 
or Northeast Asia during the twentieth century because of the difficulty of projecting military forces
across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans against the great powers located in those regions.”47 Instead, 
the US (as the British empire had before) took on the task of keeping a potential rival at bay through
offshore balancing.48 Conversely, China is a continental power; it does not have the water buffer 
benefit of the US. Quite the contrary, it borders 14 states, at least two of which could be considered 
great powers in their own right (Russia and India).49
While offensive realists recognize that nuclear weapons have indeed made a large impact, 
they are not of the view that nukes and second strike capabilities have rendered war unthinkable or 
traditional military means unimportant.50 Mearsheimer argues that nuclear weapons make great 
44 Ibid., 37.
45 As Snyder points out, the difference between offensive and defensive realists when it comes to use of force is more 
about probabilities than absolute principles. He offers the suggestion that offensive realists may see use of force as 
favorable around 30 percent of the time, whereas defensive realists may see use of force as favorable only 20 
percent of the time. Jack Snyder, “Defensive Realism and the "New" History of World War I,” International 
Security 33, no.1 (2008): 183. Recall the second potential issue discussed in the methodology section above. The 
qualification by offensive realists that states are not always aggressive unfortunately makes this issue a real 
possibility, since identifying which explanation fits best with the evidence is not as clear-cut as one may have 
hoped. Still, from the observational implications discussed below it should be possible to more precisely identify 
which hypothesis fits better with the cases.
46 This is essentially the same point offense-defense theory makes regarding geography, see the above discussion of 
defensive realism. As for offense-defense theory more generally, Mearsheimer points out that it is difficult to 
measure and is skeptical of the claim that defense has the advantage. See Ibid., 39, 417 (fn. 28).
47 Ibid., 236.
48 The apparent counter-argument presented by Japanese imperialism in Asia is explained by pointing out the different
situation in Europe and Asia in the relevant periods of time: “In short, the Asian continent was open for penetration 
from abroad, which of course is why the European great powers had empires there. The European continent, on the 
other hand was effectively a giant fortress closed to conquest by distant great powers, like the United Kingdom and 
United States.” Ibid., 265.
49 According to Mearsheimer “The most dangerous states in the international system are continental powers with large
armies.” Ibid., 135.
50 This is essentially the same position defensive realists take, although in general offensive realism considers states to
be less risk averse than defensive realism does.
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power war less likely but still possible, that land power remains the most important means of 
acquiring power and that conventional wars have not disappeared in the nuclear world.51
A last point to note is that Mearsheimer sees Northeast Asia today as a system of balanced 
multipolarity (meaning that it contains more than three great powers, none of which dominate the 
region).52 This, according to his theory, is less stable than a bipolar system, but more stable than 
unbalanced multipolarity (one of the three or more great powers dominates the region). In other 
words, China will have some restraints to its power-maximization ambitions for the time being. 
Still, we should expect a gradual loosening of such restraints to have occurred (and keep occurring) 
with China's improved capabilities, and in general less restraint in dealing with weaker neighbors 
than with stronger ones.53
1.4 Defining status quo and revisionist behavior
What is the status quo, what constitutes revisionist behavior, and can we measure it?  
The last few years have seen no shortage of references to a status quo that is seemingly 
under threat by China, or more generally expressions of the view that China is not doing enough to 
prove such a threat unwarranted. Thus, Condoleezza Rice (at the time advisor to George W. Bush) 
wrote an article in Foreign Affairs at the turn of the millennium, claiming that “China is not a 'status
quo' power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor.”54 Her 
assessment was based on China's dissatisfaction with the Taiwan and South China Sea situations. 
Five years later, in a speech that was later to be frequently quoted, then Deputy Secretary of State 
Robert Zoellick called on China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” and while he did not 
explicitly accuse China of being revisionist it was suggested that the onus was on Beijing to prove 
its benign intentions: “many Americans worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a 
fire-breather … Many countries hope China will pursue a 'Peaceful Rise,' but none will bet their 
future on it.”55 More recently, in late November 2013 Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel described the 
51 Ibid., 130-33.
52 Ibid., 337, 381. According to Mearsheimer the great powers of Northeast Asia are China, Russia and the US. In a 
more recent article he includes India and Japan as “potentially dangerous neighbors”. John J. Mearsheimer, “The 
Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 
(2010), 389.
53 For instance Mearsheimer has written that, as an implication of his theory, we would expect China in due time to 
“develop its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, directed at the United States.” Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, 401; Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm”, 389.
54 Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (2000): 56.
55 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to National Committee on 
U.S. - China Relations , September 21, 2005, accessed October 18, 2013, 
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new Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that covers disputed islands in the East China 
Sea as a “destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region”, a sentiment echoed by Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.56 
On the other hand, adding confusion to the situation, China is perhaps just as often criticized
for its lack of willingness to push for change outside its own region. Recently, this has been 
happening during the “Arab Spring.” While China did not use its veto against action in Libya it has 
so far, along with Russia, made it clear that it will not allow a similar development in Syria, much 
to the chagrin of of those promoting humanitarian interventions.57 Arguing that it was time for 
China to change its stance on non-intervention, a journalist for the Wall Street Journal wrote that: 
“China's instinctive support for the status quo has left it flat-footed as events rapidly unfold. In one 
crisis after another, China has reacted to initiatives from Washington and other Western powers, 
despite its aspirations to be seen as a global peer of the U.S.”58 
From this we can draw two inferences. First, since China is criticized both for its alleged 
threat to the status quo in East Asia and for its unwillingness to aid the process of changing the 
status quo in other parts of the world, there is nothing that a priori determines whether a policy in 
support of or opposed to any given status quo is moral or not. While it may be more common to 
glorify than condemn the status quo there is nothing in the concept itself that suggests it should be 
treated as a value-loaded term. Perhaps because the post-WWII world has been remarkably peaceful
(relatively speaking), and partly due to the prominence of the “end of history” narrative,59 the term 
revisionism conversely seems to carry distinctly negative connotations.60 The most prominent 
revisionists of the Westphalian world, Napoleon and Hitler, are remembered as aggressors and 
tyrants (particularly the latter) for good reasons. But there is nothing intrinsically morally superior 
about defense of the status quo, a point made perhaps most saliently by E. H. Carr when he wrote 
http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf.
56 Chang-Ran Kim and Phil Stewart, “U.S., Japan slam China's 'destabilizing' move on East China Sea airspace,” 
Reuters, November 24, 2013, accessed December 6, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/24/us-china-japan-idUSBRE9AM02920131124; Martin Fackler, “Japan 
Answers China’s Warnings Over Islands’ Airspace,” The New York Times, November 25, 2013, accessed December 
6, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/world/asia/japan-answers-chinas-warnings-over-islands-airspace.html.
57 Julian Borger, “Libya no-fly resolution reveals global split in UN,” The Guardian, March 18, 2011, accessed 
October 27, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/18/libya-no-fly-resolution-split; Patrick Wintour, 
“Syria crisis: China joins Russia in opposing military strikes,” The Guardian, September 5, 2013, accessed October 
27, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/syria-china-russia-opposing-military-strikes.
58 Andrew Browne, “Beijing's Middle Eastern Dilemma,” The Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2013, accessed 
September 26, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324432404579050883945934914, my
emphasis.
59 Though it should be pointed out that Fukayama's argument was about ideology and institutions (the triumph of 
liberal democracy and capitalism), not the end of events or other sorts of changes as such. Francis Fukuyama, The 
End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), xi-xiii.
60 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), 176.
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that “It is profoundly misleading to represent the struggle between satisfied and dissatisfied Powers 
as a struggle between morality on one side and power on the other. It is a clash in which, whatever 
the moral issue, power politics are equally predominant on both sides.”61
The second inference is that it would be wrong to assume that the most powerful state in the 
system will always act with the goal of preserving the status quo in mind, even under the condition 
of unipolarity. While common logic may suggests that no state would be more likely to protect the 
status quo than its (supposed) main beneficiary there are a number of cases that have proved such 
predictions wrong.62 To use the examples from above we could say that from a US vantage point, 
perceived Chinese “unfinished business” in its own neighborhood is seen as potentially threatening 
to a “good status quo” (namely American primacy in the region, facilitating peace and stability). 
Conversely, the sort of change that was hoped for in Syria could turn a “negative status quo” into a 
new and better one (strengthen the position of the US and its regional partners, weakening Iran and 
Russia).63 The point here is not to suggest that the US is (or is not) a revisionist power today, only to
show that to a priori assume that any state will necessarily act in support of the status quo is 
mistaken, and that for this reason we cannot use the behavior of any state as a benchmark for 
identifying what constitutes status quo behavior.64
Even when avoiding these two false assumptions about these concepts, there is still room for
confusion. For one thing, few would agree that any sort of change to the status quo of any given 
moment constitutes revisionism. If so, revisionism would be a continuous, never-ending process; 
every time a nation produced a new rifle the status quo would in a minuscule way have been 
altered. So there is a question of the severity of change. Second, it is not always clear what the role 
of means employed to bring about revisions should play. Is the threat or actual use of military 
means necessary to brand behavior as revisionist? How about economic or cultural means? I will 
61 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 99. Barry Buzan suggests 
that the “tendency to sanctify the status quo relates strongly, of course, to the fact that most of the literature on 
international relations … has been written within the confines of two pre-eminent status quo powers, Britain and the
United States.” People, States and Fear, 176.
62 Robert Jervis aptly noted this paradoxical “hegemonic revisionism”, arguing that it followed from the central 
elements pursued by Washington's foreign policy that it “should be more closely modeled after Napoleon than after 
Talleyrand and Metternich.” Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly 29, 
no. 3 (2006): 9-10. For a similar argument suggesting the US may itself quality as a revisionist state, see Steve 
Chan, “Can't Get no Satisfaction? The Recognition of Revisionist States,” International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific 4, no. 2 (2004): 234.
63 Alternatively, from a more idealistic perspective, one could say that change to the status quo in the Arab world is 
considered a (potentially) good thing because the current status quo is one of (mostly) repressive and undemocratic 
regimes.
64 Johnston makes the same point with regard to the US and international norms. Alastair Ian Johnston, “Is China a 
Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 12 (fn. 22). One example of the equation of support for
US positions with status quo behavior is found in a recent work by David Shambaugh, where the fact that Beijing's 
and Washington's votes in the Security Council between 1989 and 1996 only coincided 17% of the time is used as 
evidence for Chinese alleged ambivalence toward the status quo during this time period. David Shambaugh, China 
Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), Kindle edition, 135.
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deal with these aspects below and specify how the concepts are understood in this thesis.
First, as noted above, to characterize all change as revisionist would be to render the concept
indistinguishable from “change”, and thus of little analytical value. It is often suggested that the 
change brought about needs to be a substantial one to qualify as revisionism. For instance, 
Morgenthau writes that:
[The policy of the status quo] is opposed to any change that would amount to a reversal of the power 
relations among two or more nations, reducing, for instance, A from a first-rate to a second-rate 
power and raising B to the eminent position A formerly held. Minor adjustments in the distribution 
of power, however, which leave intact the relative power positions of the nations concerned, are fully
compatible with a policy of the status quo.65
Likewise, Davidson defines a revisionist state as one intending “to change the distribution of goods 
(for example, territory) among the great powers.” The intended change must be an element of some 
magnitude in the foreign policy of the state, “[it] would be theoretically and empirically useless to 
categorize states with minor revisionist aims (for example, Japan and the Northern Territories) as 
revisionist or to categorize all states with professed revisionist aims as revisionists.”66 While I agree 
with Davidson's second point (that it is how a state acts, rather than what it says, that should be in 
focus), I find the emphasis he and Morgenthau places on the magnitude of the change to be 
somewhat unclear. As Johnston points out, such definitions do not offer much in the way of 
identifying “what a first-rate or second-rate power concretely looks like,” and would apparently 
allow for the state in question to expand at the expense of smaller countries without qualifying as a 
revisionist.67
Sometimes this problem is dealt with by introducing the concept of “limited-aims 
revisionism.” Schweller distinguishes limited-aims revisionists from unlimited-aims revisionists by 
describing the former as “typically regional powers that seek either compensatory territorial 
65 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1959), 39. Thus, a revisionist foreign policy (Morgenthau refers to revisionism as imperialism) is one that 
“aims at acquiring more power than it already has, through a reversal of existing power relations – whose foreign 
policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in power status”. Ibid., 36, my emphasis. Morgenthau holds the 
position that the intention of those in charge of the policy does not matter; in other words a state may think it 
pursues a status quo policy while in reality it is doing the opposite. Ibid., (fn. 3).
66 Jason W. Davidson, “The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39,” Security Studies 11, no. 4 (2002): 125-26. 
Davidson does not specify what sorts of goods he has in mind further than the example of territory. Furthermore, in 
his definition a state with revisionist aims is not a revisionist until those aims are in some way reflected in actual 
policy, or at least clearly articulated by its leadership.
67 Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 9. Indeed, such a definition would on the face of it allow China to have 
forcibly settled all its disputes with its smaller neighbors to its own advantage and still be labeled a status quo 
power, as long as the overall power relation between these would still remain the same.
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adjustments, recognition as an equal among the great powers, and/or changes in the rules and 
decision-making procedures within existing regimes.”68 By contrast, the  unlimited-aims revisionist 
will not be satisfied unless its every claim is fully accommodated. Borrowing this distinction, I will 
not require that the territorial changes brought about result in a reversal of power relations to qualify
as revisionism, but will distinguish revisionism of a more limited nature from the grander sort 
Morgenthau and Davidson has in mind. However, small changes brought about through other means
than military power (or threats of such power) or physical coercion are not considered revisionist. 
For our purposes here this implies that if China and other states resolve their disputes peacefully, 
even if territory ends up changing hands to China's (or the other state's) advantage, this is not 
considered revisionist behavior. If it was, there would be no room in international politics for minor 
territorial adjustments.
To some extent this has to do with legitimacy. At first glance this appear to contradict what 
was said above about “status quo” and “revisionist” not being moral categories. However, drawing 
on one of Kissinger's insights, “'Legitimacy' as here used should not be confused with justice. It 
means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and 
about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.”69 Minor territorial adjustments 
originating from boundary agreements may in fact enhance the larger territorial status quo because 
such agreements are consented to by both parties and thus imply that the door to further claims by 
either side has been closed.70 This means that I take concluded territorial settlements to be genuine 
by both parties, signaling a permanent acceptance of the borders they delineate (and thus a forfeit of
the opportunity to claim more territory from the counterpart later). As Vasquez has noted, “If the 
territorial divisions among neighbors are not challenged but accepted as legitimate, peaceful 
relations can govern. Most borders once satisfactorily settled remain so for long periods of time.”71 
If we allowed for the possibility that China in the future may break the territorial agreements it has 
signed with its neighbors we would essentially make it impossible to identify status quo behavior in
territorial disputes.
Not everyone agrees with giving means a prominent role in defining revisionist behavior. 
Morgenthau clearly separates revisionism (which in his definition is always in the form of goals) 
68 Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The 
Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999): 
19.
69 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 1.
70 It may be true, as Carr noted, that a treaty signed under duress and of “immoral” content is prone to being broken 
by the victim of its imposition. But unlike the earlier “unequal treaties” that were imposed on China during its 
“century of humiliation”, none of the agreements Beijing reached with its neighbors in the period under 
consideration here are comparable in nature. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 172-74.
71 John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 160.
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from the means employed to achieve the sought changes.72 Conversely,  for Johnston a state's 
consideration of military power as an essential instrument in bringing about its desired changes is 
an indicator of revisionism.73 Other than the conceptual justification offered above, there are two 
further reasons for why I intend to follow Johnston's example. First, it makes revisionism somewhat
easier to identify. Second, it seems to be common to include the employment of military means as a 
facet of revisionism in the real world.74 It may also be true that in general a state will be less likely 
to resort to threats or actual use of force unless the change it aims to bring about is of some 
significance, so that there will often be a correlation between the salience of the territory in question
and the likelihood that a disputant will resort to force to alter its status quo.75
It can be objected that the emphasis on military means underestimates the role economic and
cultural means can play in bringing about significant change. That may be true, but such means are 
not taken into account here, due to considerations of space and time, and because it would greatly 
complicate the analytical task at hand.76 Furthermore, change that can be traced back to economic 
and cultural interchange is more likely than the usage of military force to be legitimate, even if such
interchange is asymmetrical. Considering “economic means” of revisionism would, in an extreme 
example, open up the possibility of concluding that China is revisionist merely because of its 
impressive growth rates (which, when channeled into improved military capabilities will by default 
lead to a more advantageous position relative to states that cannot afford such improvements).77
72 In fact, he brands any inclusion of means to the definition of revisionism a misconception. “Military imperialism 
seeks military conquest; economic imperialism, economic exploitation of other peoples; cultural imperialism, the 
displacement of one culture by another – but always as means to the same imperialistic end. That end is always the 
overthrow of the status quo”. Morgenthau,  Politics Among Nations, 54.
73 Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”, 11.
74 Consider, for instance, how Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently pointed to “concerns that China is 
attempting to change the status quo by force, rather than by rule of law.” Gerard Baker and George Nishiyama, 
“Abe Says Japan Ready to Counter China's Power,” The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2013, accessed October 
29, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579157210861675436. Again, it may 
be objected that this merely points to the fact that these countries fear aggressive means more than they do changes 
to the status quo as such, but the fact that other researchers has included military means as a factor, and that 
operationalization of revisionism is difficult if it is left out, should justify the inclusion.
75 In line with this, Wolfers argued that “Goals of self-extension generally place an extremely high premium on the 
resort to power as a means. The chances of bringing about any major change in the international status quo by 
means other than power or even violence are slim indeed.” Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on 
International Politics (Baltimore: John Hopins Press, 1962), 95.
76 For similar reasons I do not focus on domestic politics as a source of status quo or revisionist behavior. For an 
example of a definition where “domestic values and structures” play an important role see Barry Buzan, People, 
States and Fear, 178-79.
77 As for culture, much has been written about the role of Confucius Institutes and China's soft power push. While 
there are diverging opinions regarding how efficiently China is able to wield cultural influence, in general most 
scholars seem to agree that for the time being it remains limited. See for instance Shambaugh,  China Goes Global:
The Partial Power, 266; James F. Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in 
Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power,” Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (2009): 662-65. More generally, Michael Barr points out 
that much of the literature on soft power dealing with China is guilty of the “vehicle fallacy,” confusing spending 
on areas typically associated with soft power as actually wielding it. A second common misconception is to confuse
economic inducements with soft power. Michael Barr, Who's Afraid of China? The Challenge of Chinese Soft 
Power (London: Zed Books, 2011), 16-17.
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To sum up the discussion above, this thesis does not require that the changes brought about 
by a state fundamentally alters the status quo for it to qualify as revisionist, but at the same time 
does not consider adjustments that have been brought about through non-military means (and did 
not involve threats of using such means) to constitute revisionism. 
Thus, in this thesis revisionist behavior is understood as being aimed at changing the 
current distribution of territory, and toward this goal employment of military means is considered 
key. Conversely, status quo behavior is defined as being aimed in the main at maintaining and 
consolidating the current distribution of territory.
One could say that this thesis considers one side of the status quo coin, the most tangible 
one, concerning territorial control. The other side is the systemic level “rules of the game”.78 This 
distinction resembles Wolfers' between “possession goals” and “milieu goals.”79 What I am focusing
on here is possession goals, although limited to those related to territorial control. To satisfactorily 
deal with the “rules of the game” (or milieu goals) would require defining what the relevant rules 
are and to look at different variables. Due to space considerations I will leave that out of the thesis, 
and emphasize that my findings here cannot be used to say anything meaningful about China's 
approach to the “rules of the game.” That being said, the territorial aspect in focus here is important 
in itself.
1.5 Dependent variable and observable implications
As stated above Hypothesis 1 is that China is behaving more like a status quo power, whereas 
Hypothesis 2 is that China is behaving more like a revisionist power. The dependent variable under 
consideration is thus Chinese behavior and it is treated here as a dichotomy; it can take the two 
values of (i) behavior aimed at maintaining the status quo or (ii) behavior aimed at changing the 
status quo (revisionism). Because these values ultimate reflect intentions, which cannot be 
measured directly, it is necessary to state the observable implications each carry. This will make it 
78 Note that in the context of the maritime territorial disputes I will briefly discuss China's view of coastal state rights 
in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). This is because this directly impinges on the maritime disputes (particularly 
in the South China Sea). Systemic level rules of the game, however, will not be looked at.
79 Wolfers writes that “In directing its foreign policy toward the attainment of its possession goals, a nation is aiming 
at the enhancement or the preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value. … Here a nation 
finds itself competing with others for a share in values of limited supply; it is demanding that its share be left intact 
of be increased.” And regarding milieu goals, “Nations pursuing them are out not to defend or increase possessions 
they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries.” Of 
course, these two types of goals are not thought to be wholly independent of one another, “Milieu goals often may 
turn out to be nothing but a means or a way station toward some possession goal.” Wolfers, Discord and 
Collaboration, 73-74.
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clear what sort of behavior we will be looking for in the cases under study.80
Observable implications of Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 suggesting status quo behavior, 
would based on its theoretical underpinnings and our definition of the status quo predict the 
following features in China's behavior. First, we would expect to see a China that either seeks a 
consolidation of the current territorial distribution, or seeks limited improvements, i.e. 
improvements that are not so great as to upset the overall current distribution. In other words, China
should be more preoccupied with securing what it already possesses than to expand. This does not 
necessarily mean that China has to make concessions, but concessions would certainly support the 
status quo hypothesis. Furthermore, we would expect China to rely on non-military means in 
seeking to achieve its goals. Using its army to secure even small changes to the territorial status quo
would not be consistent with status quo intentions.
Observable implications of Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2, suggesting revisionist behavior, 
predicts the following features in China's behavior. First, we should expect to see China seize any 
chance of expanding as long as this can be done with a reasonable chance of success. This is 
particularly true as long as China has yet to reach a position of regional hegemony. This does not 
necessarily mean that China will use any possible means to see its claims met in the short term, but 
it will prefer a delaying strategy (stalling for time until it is able to get what it wants at an 
acceptable cost) rather than reaching a territorial settlement where both sides make concessions. 
Military means (or threats of such usage) may be employed if other instruments are not sufficient to
bring about a settlement granting China the territory it claims.
1.6 What the thesis will not cover
A few words about what will not be covered in this thesis is in order before we proceed to the cases 
under consideration. We have already noted that the focus is on disputed territory, but depending on 
how one defines “disputed” not all such territory will be considered. First of all, only disputes in 
which all claimants are sovereign states will be included. For this reason I do not cover areas that 
others might see as relevant, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Second, I also leave out Taiwan due to the 
very different nature of the conflict regarding that island. Third, what has been termed “latent 
disputes” will not be dealt with. Some clarifications will follow.
Regarding Tibet and Xinjiang, these are clearly restive areas where tensions frequently run 
high. Calls for more autonomy, self-determination, and sometimes outright independence, has been 
80 As stated by King, Keohane and Verba, the “observable implications of the theory must guide our data collection, 
and help distinguish relevant from irrelevant facts.”  Designing Social Inquiry, 28-29.
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frequent features since China established control of these areas during the Qing dynasty (Xinjiang)  
and the early years of the People's Republic (Tibet). But in the time that has passed since the initial 
conquest of these territories they have long since been consolidated and integrated into the larger 
nation state. Thus, I disagree with the position of Tang, who writes that “a state that is striving to 
maintain the spoils of its past aggression and conquest is no different from a state that is actively 
expanding or conquering.”81 Instead I take the position of Morgenthau, who wrote (with Great 
Britain after it had acquired a number of overseas territories in mind) that, “while it may make sense
to apply the term 'imperialism' to the domestic policies of an existing empire, it is confusing and 
misleading to apply the term to international policies of an essentially static and conservative 
character.”82 In this sense, while the original act of conquering these areas was revisionist,83 China's 
insistence on holding on to them today is in fact status quo behavior.84 No state actors dispute 
China's control over these territories today.
Taiwan is a less clear-cut case to leave out, because while the number of states with which 
the Republic of China has full diplomatic relations is only 22, it does arguably function as a de 
facto state (with some limitations).85 However, there are two strong reasons for leaving it out. The 
first has to do with the very nature of the conflict between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan: it is 
not so much a “territorial dispute” as it is a dispute over who has the right to rule all of China; 
whether all the Chinese territories are to be united under the People's Republic of China or the 
Republic of China. In other words, whereas the other disputes that will be dealt with in this thesis 
revolve around whether some specific areas belongs to this or that state, this dispute has more to do 
with the question of legitimacy left unresolved after an unfinished civil war. To this it may be 
objected that too much has changed in the last few decades; Taiwan is now a functional democracy, 
and while it has maintained the appearance of a commitment to eventual reunification (on its own 
terms) Taipei has since 1991 stopped emphasizing its right to rule all of China.86 Granted that this is 
true, it doesn't change the nature of this conflict and the fact that the international community 
overwhelmingly recognizes Taiwan as a part of China.
81 Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 25.
82 Morgenthau,  Politics Among Nations, 42.
83 Indeed, the very meaning of “Xinjiang” is “new frontier.” Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing 
Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 32.
84 One could quibble about just how much time must have passed after the acquisition of new territory before this new
reality is accepted as a part of the status quo, but in the cases of Tibet and Xinjiang one would be hard pressed to 
make the case that China has yet to consolidate its hold . That is not to say that calls for more autonomy are 
unwarranted, but this is a moral dimension that falls outside the scope of this thesis.
85 The number of states with which Taiwan has full diplomatic relations is from November 2013. Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China (Taiwan), “Foreign Affairs,” in The Republic of China Yearbook 2013, accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.ey.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=90586F8A7E5F4397.
86 Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 45.
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This brings us to the second reason for leaving out Taiwan from the thesis. Since we are 
interested here in drawing some inferences from China's behavior so as to be able to say whether or 
not it has been displaying revisionist ambitions, the very different status of the dispute between 
China and Taiwan suggests that using it for this purpose would be problematic. As Johnston has 
noted, “it is hard to generalize from how Chinese leaders have handled the Taiwan issue to their 
attitudes toward the long-term regional distributions of power … It is a dangerous exception, but an 
exception nonetheless.”87
Lastly, some might deem it appropriate to consider territory China has not (yet) officially 
laid claim to, but is perceived (by these observers) to harbor a longer-term intention to acquire. 
Perhaps the most commonly suggested territory grouped under this category is the Russian Far East,
regarding which there has long been a popular hypothesis that China will eventually regain much of
what it lost in “unequal treaties”. In one version of this narrative Beijing can simply sit back and let 
the demographic developments do its bidding.88 Notwithstanding the fact that figures for Chinese 
living in the Russian Far East these territories are extremely unreliable and that the “threat” seems 
very much to have been blown out of proportion, the fact remains that this argument rests on 
demographic determinism.89 Visa rules are enforced by both China and Russia,90 and while some 
may speculate that a change will occur over time by default this is highly speculative, and 
impossible to prove in the absence of evidence of a Chinese design to acquire these territories. 
Such notions belong to what has been termed “latent disputes”, which are open to all sorts of
speculation and ultimately cannot be proved or disproved.91 Territory that is not claimed, but 
thought by some to be coveted by China is thus not included here. With these clarifications out of 
the way we can proceed to look at the cases.
87 Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 48-49. M. Taylor Fravel makes the same point. See “International 
Relations Theory and China's Rise: Assessing China's Potential for Territorial Expansion,” International Studies 
Review 12, no. 4 (2010): 509.
88 For a discussion, see Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from 
Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: Univesity of Washington Press, 2001), 154.
89 According to one thorough treatment of the issue Chinese migration to the Russian Far East since 1991 has been 
“quite modest”, and “The number of Chinese visiting, working or living in Russia has been among the most wildly 
abused data points in a country known for statistical anomalies”. Maria Repnikova and Harley Balzer, “Chinese 
Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Comparative 
Urban Studies Project, The Eurasian Migration Papers, no. 3 (2009): 8, 13.
90 Ibid., 11.
91 I borrow this term from Huth, Standing Your Ground, 24. Huth similarly excluded latent disputes from his study.
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2. Disputes over land territory
2.1 Russia and Central Asia
2.1.1 Russia
Background
Geographical scale and history would lead us to expect solving China's territorial disputes with 
Russia to be a difficult task. For one thing the sheer length of the borders – both the eastern and 
western sections – is enormous.  As far as the western sector is concerned this changed with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (after which the length of the border disputed with Russia in this 
section was merely 54 kilometers),92 but the long stretch in the east remained intact. The resource 
endowment of Russia's Far East (part of which was gained through “unequal treaties,” as noted 
below) is not of small significance, containing (together with eastern Siberia) some “65 percent of 
Russia's prospective petroleum reserves, 85 percent of [Russia's] natural gas reserves, almost all its 
diamonds, 70 percent of its gold, and bountiful coal, timber, and numerous other resources.”93 
Furthermore, Russia's Far East contains plenty of arable land, much coveted by China where the 
arable land per person is a mere 0.11 hectares (compared to Russia's 0.85 hectares).94
Moreover, the history of Russian expansion was not a forgotten one. Much of it happened in 
the period of Chinese weakness later grievingly remembered as the “century of humiliation” and 
was formalized through “unequal treaties.” In 1858 the Russian Empire gained 158.000 square 
miles (the Treaty of Aigun); in 1860, at the end of the Second Opium War, 133.000 square miles 
more (the Treaty of Peking); and then in 1881 additionally 15.000 square miles (the Treaty of Saint 
Petersburg). Substantial chunks of theretofore Qing territory had switched hands, now a part of the 
Russian Empire (see Appendix 1, Figure 1 and Figure 2).95 In the east the territory gained by Russia,
located north of Amur and Ussuri rivers, had pushed China below water that would henceforth 
92 Yakov Zinberg, “The Vladivostok Curve: Subnational Intervention Into Russo-Chinese Border Agreements,” 
Boundary & Security Bulletin 4, no. 3 (1996): 78.
93 Mark Galeotti, “Sino-Russian Border Resolution,” in Beijing's Power and China's Borders: Twenty Neighbors in 
Asia, ed. Bruce A. Elleman et al. (Armonk: New York, 2013), 263.
94 Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China's Rise,” 515. This relates to the “lateral pressure” theory, which 
suggests that growing states  with a high population face the need for more space, land and resources to deal with 
prospective challenges and maintain the current trajectory. Ibid., 513.
95 Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 818
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provide a kind of fixed natural boundary.96
Russia had been somewhat more accommodating in the western regions (sections of Ili, 
occupied by Russia, were returned through the Treaty of Saint Petersburg),97 but continued to 
display an appetite for larger portions of Manchuria through the turn of the century.98 Emerging 
victorious from civil war half a century later, and having ended the “century of humiliation,” the 
CCP emphasized that China had stood up. But while promising that China was no longer to be a 
victim Mao did not initially press claims to have territory returned by the Soviet Union, as the latter 
was at this stage considered an important ally. Mao even allowed Stalin to continue leasing Port 
Arthur (Lüshun) and Dalian, which the Russian Empire had originally threatened a weak China to 
lease to it in 1898.99 However, this was to change following the gradual souring of relations after 
Stalin's death.
In the atmosphere of mistrust that came with the Sino-Soviet split, China became more 
explicit in denouncing Russia's territorial grabs of the late 19th century. In March 1963 China 
demanded that Moscow acknowledge that their frontier had come about through unequal treaties, 
and published a list of the territories the Qing dynasty had lost to its northern neighbor.100 A year 
later, in talks with a delegation from the Japanese Socialist Party, Mao reportedly said: “About a 
hundered years ago, the area to the east of Baikal became Russian territory and since then 
Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have become Soviet territory. We have not 
yet presented our bill for this list.”101 The Soviets replied by drawing parallels between Mao's 
statement and Hitler's concept of Lebensraum, and pointed out the hypocrisy in complaining about 
Russian imperialism while retaining much of the territory the Qing dynasty had gained through 
96 I say “kind of” because while large rivers often provide border delimitations between states (as do mountain ranges)
areas to the north of the Amur river were inhabited by Chinese prior to Russian expansion. The Russian 
anthropologist Middendorf, who was conducting a study on behalf of the Imperial Academy of Sciences before 
1845, had noted that “the northern bank of the Amur near the right bank of the Nen River … had been settled by the
Manchus since the seventeenth century. In addition, he found the area south of Amur, between the Sungari … and 
Ussuri rivers, to be densely populated by Manchus and Chinese.” Of course this did not change the strategical 
significance of controlling these territories for the Russians, for as one official had concluded, “whoever controls 
the left [northern] bank and the mouth of the Amur will control Siberia.” S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, 
Russia and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 34, 36-38.
97 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990),  220-21
98 In the midst of the Boxer Uprising Russia sent 200.000 troops to Manchuria with the expressed intent of bringing 
back order, achieving control of the whole territory within a few months. Hsü,  The Rise of Modern China, 492. Of 
course much of Manchuria was later taken by Japan, having won the Russo-Japanese war, and eventually regained 
by China after WWII. But the memory of Russian expansion was not easily forgotten.
99 Mao had expressed his wish that the Soviet Union leave Port Arthur in 1949, to which Stalin replied that it would 
be best if Moscow kept it until the US left Japan. Through the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual 
Assistance, signed on February 14, 1950, Mao agreed to let Moscow continue leasing the two ports until 1952. (The
Soviet lease for Port Arthur was later extended until 1955, for reasons related to the Korean War.) Kuisong Yang, 
“The Sino-Soviet Alliance and Nationalism: A Contradiction,” in The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 
(Zürich: Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), 2005): 2; Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2011), 117; Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, 220.
100 Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 819.
101 Quoted in Ibid.
22
precisely the same means.102
While it seems unlikely that Mao actually imagined regaining these territories,103 the rhetoric
he used did not reveal much of an acceptance of the territorial status quo. Just a month after the 
mentioned Chinese demand for a Soviet acknowledgement, China suggested the parties hold talks 
over their disputes. This may suggest that the accusations of Russian imperialism and past 
mistreatment had more to do with improving China's bargaining position than to legitimize an 
actual retaking of territory by force. According to one observer, already at this stage China 
communicated a willingness to negotiate on the basis of the “unequal treaties” it was formally 
opposed to, although it still wanted the Soviet Union to admit the imperialistic quality of these 
treaties.104 Talks began in 1964 (and appears to have laid much of the groundwork for the more 
successful talks in the early 90s) but came to a halt with the above mentioned comment by Mao, 
which led the Russians to believe China harbored substantial revisionist aims in its Far East.105 
The subsequent spiraling down of relations culminated in border clashes in March 1969. 
Brief but bloody battles between the two occurred on Zhenbao Island on March 2 and 15, the first 
reportedly initiated by China and the latter by the Soviet Union.106 No territorial change seems to 
have resulted from these clashes, but negotiations were effectively brought to a half after 
unsuccessful talks between the two sides between September and December in the same year.107
102 Ibid.
103 Robinson has noted that there was more agreement than divergence between the parties in the 60s, and that both 
“agreed that the degree of adjustment necessary was relatively small, mainly affecting riverine islands.” Thomas W.
Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The 
American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1180. And as noted by Yang, “Probably realizing that this 
discussion of territorial issues could be misread, Mao later found another opportunity to clarify what he meant. 
While meeting a group of guests from France on 10 September [1964], the CCP Chairman emphasized that by 
bringing up matters of the past he meant nothing more than taking the offensive through firing empty canons, so 
that Khrushchev would be scared for a moment.” Kuisong Yang, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From 
Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no.1 (2000): 23.
104 Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 65.
105 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 123. Apparently a draft border agreement had been worked out, but 
Khrushchev refused to sign it after Mao made his comment to the Japanese delegation. Mark Galeotti, 
“Sino-Russian Border Resolution,” 257
106 Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes, 66-67. There are several 
interpretations of these clashes, but most agree that China's motivations for initiating the March 2 clash were 
mainly defensive. Kissinger considers them instances of “offensive deterrence,” attributed to previous Soviet border
harassment. Fravel suggests that China felt increasingly vulnerable in its bargaining position in the territorial 
dispute, due to large Soviet troop deployment close to the eastern border sector, an assertive posture in areas of 
dispute and the recent proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine, whereby the Soviet Union reserved for itself the right
to intervene in other socialist countries. Kissinger, On China, 217; Fravel, Strong Borders, 203.
107 The talks apparently stalled due to the Chinese requirements that the Soviet Union retreat from river islands under 
dispute and admit the imperial nature of the older treaties. Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and 
China's Territorial Disputes, 69-72.
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Later developments
Having been essentially frozen for two decades, negotiations started to pick up their pace in the late 
eighties. The catalyst came with Gorbachev, who in his Vladivostok speech in 1986 urged an 
improved frontier situation and strengthened economic ties between the two sides.108 The 
competition against the US was hard on the Soviet economy, and having 600,000 troops tied down 
on the Chinese border became increasingly untenable. This seems to have been the main impetus 
behind Gorbachev's outreach.109 The General Secretary now made it clear that the Soviet Union was
ready to accept a demarcation based on the thalweg principle, a key Chinese requirement from 
previous talks.110 Two months later the parties had agreed on resuming negotiations, the first round 
of which was held in February 1987. Gorbachev visited China in 1989 (coinciding with the 
Tienanmen protests), after which the border negotiations picked up speed. On May 16, 1991, 
foreign ministers Qian Qichen and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh signed what was thus far the most 
substantial document produced by the negotiations, the eastern border agreement.111
From this agreement we can identify concessions by both parties. From the Soviet Union, 
having long since consolidated its hold over the territory ceded to it by the Qing dynasty, a strong 
defense of the territorial status quo was to be expected; that is a border settlement freezing the 
overall territorial distribution between the two states. In view of this, the acceptance of the thalweg 
principle was a concession in the sense that it necessarily would involve transfer of river islands to 
China (even though the actual allocation of ownership of islands and shoals was to be settled by a 
joint commission later, and as mentioned below China agreed to share the important Heixiazi Island
and Abagaitu Shoal, territories that would have gone exclusively to Beijing had the thalweg 
principle been applied here).112 Conversely, from China's perspective, its position had always been 
that the territorial status quo was the result of Russian expansionism, even though Beijing was 
108 It is also worth noting that China three years earlier had dropped the requirement that the Soviet Union admit the 
“unequal” character of the former treaties. Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's 
Territorial Disputes, 79-80.
109 Fravel, Strong State, 137.
110 The thalweg principle “defines river borders on the basis of the main channel of navigable rivers.” Akihiro 
Iwashita,  A 4,000 Kilometer Journey along the Sino-Russian Border (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido 
University, 2004), 17. Previously the Soviet Union's position had been that the border was drawn at the Chinese 
shore, thus making all river islands Russian territory. According to one observer China had first presented its 
insistence that the thalweg principle be used to decide the fate of ownership over river islands in March 1969, “the 
first time that the Chinese government had made an effort to draw on international law to bolster its claim to a 
disputed piece of territory.” Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes, 
76.
111 Iwashita,  A 4,000 Kilometer Journey, 10. The Soviet Union collapsed in December the same year, but the 
agreement was ratified without any revisions by Russia and China in February 1992. Zinberg, “The Vladivostok 
Curve,” 76.
112 Fravel, Strong Borders, 142
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willing to negotiate with a Moscow unwilling to admit as much.113 The very fact that Beijing had 
dropped its accusations of imperialism and was willing to sign an agreement that for all practical 
purposes would render any hope to get back most of what had been lost was in itself a concession.
Moreover, China dropped its former requirement of a complete border settlement, meaning 
one encompassing both the western and eastern sectors disputed. This concession was made in 
October 1989 – at the fourth negotiation round – only months after the crackdown of the student 
protests in Beijing, and may to some extent have reflected international isolation and an added 
impetus to reach a settlement.114 Still, it was a noteworthy concession, since it came before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (after which the western sector of the Sino-Russian border shrank 
immensely as a result of the newly independent Central Asian states), thus at a time where it would 
still be very much in China's interest to link the two sectors together in a comprehensive settlement.
Furthermore, China accepted the 1991 agreement even though it did not deal with the 
Abagaitu Shoal and Heixiazi, two specific areas that had been a brake to progress in previous 
negotiations and that China wanted to resolve together with the rest of the eastern sector (see the 
bottom sections of Appendix 1, Figure 1).115 Abagaitu Shoal was considered valuable due to its 
location, as “a knot between the land border at Abagaitui and a starting point of the river border, and
at a junction of the Hailar and Hunlun Rivers.”116 Heixiazi was similarly considered strategically 
significant, because it “fenced off Khabarovsk from China.” Both of these sectors would have 
belonged to China had the thalweg principle been applied (since they are located on the Chinese 
side of the deepest river channel).117 Heixiazi and Yinlong Islands, however, had been occupied by 
the Soviet Union since 1929, giving it a stronger negotiating position over these.118
According to Fravel there is a divergence in Chinese and Russian sources regarding the 
allocation of islands. Even the total number of islands (and how many square kilometers they 
comprise) diverges widely: “A Chinese source states that China received 765 disputed islands or 
approximately 53 percent of the total. A Russian source states that China received 1,281 of 2,444 
disputed river islands and shoals, or approximately 52 percent.”119 Both sides are in agreement over 
113 Thus, the “existing relevant treaties” the two sides agreed to base their settlement work on was the very “unequal 
treaties” that China previously had protested against. Ibid., 138
114 Ibid., 140-41.
115 Fravel, Strong Borders, 138. The Chinese name “Heixiazi” is sometimes used to refer to both Heixiazi Island 
(Bol'shoi Ussuriiskii in Russian) and Yinshe/Yinlong Island (Tarabarov in Russian), other times only the former. In 
any case, the Heixiazi area under dispute encompassed both of these neighboring islands. Iwashita,  A 4,000 
Kilometer Journey, 17.
116 Iwashita,  A 4,000 Kilometer Journey, 162.
117 Ibid.; Akihiro Iwashita, “The Influence of Local Russian Initiatives on Relations with China: Border Demarcation 
and Regional Partnership,” Acta Slavica Iaponica 19 (2002): 8.
118 Xiaokun Li, “China, Russia sign border agreement,” China Daily, July 22, 2008, accessed March 20, 2014, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/22/content_6865847.htm. I have not found any information on 
whether or not Abagaitu Shoal was occupied by any of the disputants.
119 Ibid., 142. Even though both sides had agreed on applying the thalweg principle to the river borders, it was not 
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the distribution in percentage terms, however, and since the area size these features make up are 
estimated at either 600 or 800 square kilometers,120 this means that China was allocated somewhere 
between 315 and 420 square kilometers of island and shoal territory.121 These river features were 
uninhabited, save for the presence of peripatetic fishermen.122
The demarcation period was a contentious one, particularly on the Russian side where local 
residents were angered by the territorial transfers that were under way. Menkeseli Island was 
significant in this respect; it had been used by Russian fishers and was according to the 1991 
agreement to be given to China.123 In light of the local Russian dissatisfaction authorities from the 
Chita oblast (a province of southeast Sibera, next to the Menkeseli region) suggested a solution, 
whereby the territory would be handed over to China as agreed but Russian locals would retain their
right to use the area. This “joint use” proposal was accepted by the Chinese, and applied to another 
contentious area, Ol’ginskii Island, as well.124 Since China through the 1991 agreement was entitled 
to these areas without any requirement of joint use, Beijing's willingness to accommodate the 
dissatisfaction of the Russain border population was a significant sign of goodwill, suggesting it 
cared more about reaching a final settlement than to secure as much territory for its own exclusive 
use as possible.
Furthermore, two areas (of 3 square kilometers each) close to Khasan and Lake Khanka in 
Primorsky Krai, according to the 1991 agreement supposed to go to China, were eventually divided 
between the two states (China receiving 50 and 74 percent, respectively) due to domestic anger in 
Russia.125 Another area (9 square kilometers) in Primorsky Krai, close to Ussuriik, went to China in 
is entireity. During a visit of Yeltsin to China, on November 9, 1997, the completion of the 
demarcation process was announced.126
Meanwhile, an agreement dealing with the western sector of the Sino-Russian dispute, now 
only a 54 kilometer long stretch of border, had been reached on September 3, 1994.127 Finally, the 
self-evident how to distribute all the islands: “many of the rivers in question are braided, meandering, and divided 
into multiple streams by the islands that were so often the bones of contention.” Mark Galeotti, “Sino-Russian 
Border Resolution”, 258.
120 Fravel, Strong Borders, 142, (fn. 69).
121 For the sake of simplicity I assume that China received 52.5 percentage of the allocated river features, the average 
from the Chinese and Russian sources Fravel mentions. At these scales half a percentage one way or the other does 
not amount to much of a difference.
122 Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes, 61.
123 Iwashita,  A 4,000 Kilometer Journey, 24.
124 Akihiro Iwashita, “An Inquiry for New Thinking on the Border Dispute: Backgrounds of 'Historic Success' for the 
Sino-Russian Negotiations,” in Siberia and the Russian Far East in the 21st Century: Partners in the "Community 
of Asia," ed. Akihiro Iwashita (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2005), 104-05.
125 Fravel, Strong Borders, 143.
126 Iwashita,  A 4,000 Kilometer Journey, 29.
127 Zinberg, “The Vladivostok Curve,” 78. None of the sources I have consulted mention anything about territory 
changing hands through this agreement. This short stretch or land between the Mongolia-Russia-China and 
Kazakhstan-Russia-China tripoints does not appear to feature anything highly salient, Chung writes that 
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two last outstanding issues of the eastern sector – the Abagaitu Shoal and Heixiazi – were resolved 
in an agreement between the two states in 2004. Again both sides compromised, dividing these 
areas between them.128 China compromised in the sense that according to the thalweg principle it 
would be entitled to both of these sectors all to itself. Russia compromised in that it agreed to divide
the Heixiazi sector, where it (unlike China) had maintained effective control since 1929. China 
received around 170 square kilometres (out of about 340 square kilometers) of Heixiazi Island and 
all 40 square kilometers of the neighboring Yinlong/Tarabarov Island.129  The final handover of half 
of Heiziaxi Island and all of Yinlong Island occurred in October 2008, settling the Sino-Russian 
border dispute for good.
2.1.2 Central Asia
As noted above, today's Central Asian states were parts of the Soviet Union (and under the Russian 
Empire parts of Russian Turkestan) until its collapse in 1991. Even though the countries of the 
region that border China – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – were all Soviet Republics, each
with a foreign ministry of their own, border disputes were prior to independence to be handled by 
Beijing and Moscow.130 And because Beijing (before conceding on this point in October 1989, as 
noted earlier) wanted a complete settlement –  encompassing both its western and eastern borders 
with the Soviet Union –  not much progress was made toward reaching an agreement until the 
unraveling of the communist neighbor. 
China's view of its western border with the Soviet Union was the same as its understanding 
of the eastern border, namely that it was a product of Russian imperialism.131 Most relevant in this 
demarcation was mostly “a technical problem,” and so it seems reasonable to assume that reaching an agreement on
what was left of the western sector was a comparatively (politically) uncomplicated affair. Demarcation was 
completed in 1997 with only two boundary markers set up (the rest demarcated by the region's watershed). Chung, 
Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes, 84; Fravel, Strong Borders, 143.
128 Ibid., 144.
129 “World’s biggest country becomes a little bit smaller,” RT News, October 14, 2008, accessed March 20, 2014, 
http://rt.com/news/worlds-biggest-country-becomes-a-little-bit-smaller/. I have not found an exact figure for the 
division of Abagaitu Shoal, but Xinhua News Agency describes the overall distribution that came out of the 2004 
agreement as “around fifty-fifty” which suggests that around 25 square kilometers (of the 50 square kilometeres 
Abagaitu Shoal comprises) went to each party. “China, Russia solve all border disputes,” Xinhua, June 2, 2005, 
accessed December 7, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/02/content_3037975.htm. The size figures 
for Yinlong Island and Abagaitu Shoal are from Iwashita,  A 4,000 Kilometer Journey, 17.
130 In the words of one observer, “The Soviet Union featured a strange combination of unprecedented 
overcentralization together with unprecedented legal rights for the republics.” Jerry F. Hough, Democratization and
Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997), 216-17. While the 
bordering Soviet Republics and China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region were allowed to negotiate directly on the 
issue of border trade all questions of higher importance were to be dealt with by the central authorities. Ablat 
Khodzhaev, “The Central Asian Policy of the People's Republic of China,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 7, 
no. 1 (2009): 13
131 Sudha Ramachandran, “China plays long game on border disputes,” Asia Times Online, January 27, 2011, accessed 
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regard was the 1860 Additional Treaty of Peking, which in Article II stipulated that “The borderline
to the west, undetermined up to now, now follows the line of the mountains, the courses of the great
rivers, and the existing layout of the Chinese checkpoints.”132 The treaty cemented Russian 
dominance over the “West Turkistan” that the Qing Empire regarded as its own (see Appendix 1, 
Figure 2).133 Of the more than 1,500,000 square kilometers that Mao would later claim Imperial 
Russia had stolen from China, around 910,000 of these were to be found in Central Asia. When 
negotiations between China and the Central Asian states started, however, China's claims were 
limited to around 34,000 square kilometers (with the Pamir Mountains in Tajikistan accounting for 
28,000 of these).134
The disputed western section of the Sino-Soviet border was inherited by Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. All other things being equal, one 
would expect China's bargaining position to have improved. There were now three states to 
negotiate with (four if we include the small part of the western sector that still belonged to Russia) 
so a complete settlement was out the question, but at the same time China's relative power vis-a-vis 
its newly independent neighbors was much greater than it had been relative to the Soviet Union.135 
Furthermore, by the time of the Soviet collapse China had been enjoying more than a decade of 
impressive growth, whereas the Central Asian states were (along with Azerbaijan) the poorest 
republics of the Soviet Union.136 In light of this the successful settlements with the Central Asian 
states, with China in each dispute accepting outcomes where it was granted less than half of what it 
had claimed, are noteworthy.
The settlements
Kazakhstan. China's border with Kazakhstan is 1,782 kilometers long. The territory in dispute 
between the two countries encompassed a total of about 2,240 square kilometers, most of which 
November 19, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA27Ad02.html.
132 “ADDITIONAL TREATY OF PEKING [BEIJING], 1860,” China's External Relations - A History, accessed 
November 19, 2013, http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/234. More specific border marks were specified 
through the Protocol of Chuguchak of 1864. “PROTOCOL OF CHUGUCHAK,” China's External Relations - A 
History, accessed November 20, 2013 http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/235.
133 Ablat Khodzhaev, “The Central Asian Policy of the People's Republic of China,” 10.
134 Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia: Domestic Order, Social Change, 
and the Chinese Factor (London: Hurst & Company, 2012), 14.
135 On the other hand, pulling the historical card would carry less weight now that the Soviet Union (seen as the heir of
the Russian Empire) had collapsed. But China did not emphasize Russian historical aggression in negotiations over 
the eastern sector, so it seems unlikely that it would have done so in the west even if the Soviet Union had not 
disintegrated and given way to independent Central Asian states.
136 Kenneth Liberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2004), 128; Richard Pomfret, “Introduction,” in The Central Asian Economies Since Independence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 3.
28
was in the possession of Kazakhstan.137 Negotiations made headway not long after Kazakhstan's 
independence, four rounds of talks were held between 1993 and 1994. In April 1994, during a visit 
of Li Peng, the two sides reached an agreement dealing with most of the disputed territory, 
“whereby both parties acknowledged the existing boundaries as permanent”.138 Because there were 
after this apparently around 950 square kilometers of territory still under discussion, the 1994 
agreement must have encompassed  approximately 1290 square kilometers. China reportedly gained
the source of the Korgas River, other areas were divided, and China “appears to have dropped 
claims to many other disputed sectors held by Kazakhstan.”139
Two more agreements would seal the fate of the last three disputed sectors. One sector 
(concerning the last 11 kilometers of border leading up to the Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan-China 
trijunction) was delineated through a supplementary agreement in September 1997; the last two 
(concerning 944 square kilometers of territory) were “divided evenly” through another 
supplementary agreement signed July 1998.140 The two sectors divided in 1998 were (i) the 
Sary-Childy River area and (ii) Chogan-Obo Valley and Bay-Murza Pass. Of the former China 
received 70 percent, of the latter 30 percent,141 in square kilometers these percentages translate into 
220.5 and 188.7 square kilometers respectively. Thus the 1998 agreement granted China 409.2 
square kilometers, or around 43% of these two sectors. Fravel writes that the overall share of 
territory (of the 2240 square kilometers originally under dispute) received by China was around 34 
percent, which means that it received a total of around 761.6 square kilometers. This means that the 
assurance of Kazakhstan's foreign minister that “The border runs along the line along which it has 
always run … Kazakhstan did not gain or lose anything” cannot have been literally true.142 
According to one source the “borderline was changed by 187 square kilometers” after the 1998 
agreement.143 Demarcation work was completed and a border protocol signed between the two 
137 Fravel, Strong Borders, 160. On two other pages in the same volume, 47 and 162, Fravel gives the number 2420 
square kilometers, but I assume these are typos as the number given in another source is  2235 square kilometers. 
Furthermore, this source suggests that there were “11 zones” under dispute whereas Fravel counts 15, but since the 
overall territory appears to be almost exactly the same (with a difference of 5 square kilometers) this divergence is 
unlikely to reflect anything more than a difference in how the authors (or the source material they have relied on) 
have grouped the areas under dispute into zones. Laruelle and Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia, 15. 
As for exactly how much of the disputed territory each side controlled, I have looked for precise figures without 
finding any.
138 Michael E. Clarke, Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia – A History (New York: Routledge, 2011), 113.
139 Fravel, Strong Borders 161. For China's concession (dropping several areas from its claim) Beijing received 
assurances by Kazakhstan that it was firmly opposed to “national splittism,” referring to the situations in Tibet and 
(particularly) Xinjiang.
140 Ibid.; “China ends Kazakh border dispute,” BBC, July 4, 1998, accessed November 20, 2013, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/126276.stm. For the 1997 supplementary agreement I have not been able to 
find any sources stating whether or not any side gained or lost anything along this short stretch of border.
141 Fravel, Strong Borders 162.
142 Quoted in Fravel, Strong Borders, 162.
143 Claes Levinsson and Ingvar Svanberg, “Kazakhstan-China Border Treade Thrives After Demarcation Treaty,” The 
CACI Analyst, February 16, 2000, accessed April 8, 2014, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/367.
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states in 2002.144
Kyrgyzstan. China and Kyrgyzstan share a border of 1,096 kilometers. Seven sectors in 
dispute with China were inherited by Kyrgyzstan, making up around 3,656 square kilometers.145 As 
was true for China's dispute with Kazakhstan, most of the territories were under the control of the 
newly independent state. And as with Kazakhstan negotiations had started shortly after the Soviet 
Union's disintegration.  In 1994 the two parties agreed to work toward a quick settlement of the 
dispute and one year later drafting was under way.146
By July 1996 much of the work was completed; an agreement encompassing all but one 
disputed sector was signed by the two sides.147 The sticking point was the Uzengi-Kush river basin, 
finally resolved in 1999 through a supplementary agreement. While China had originally demanded 
the lion's share of the Uzengi-Kush it settled with 30 percent in the end. According to one observer 
this area is difficult to access from the Kyrgyz side, hardly populated, and “the local people affected
by this loss of land to China were not concerned because the land was of poor quality (or so I was 
informed).”148 However, the areas China was granted in the Uzengi-Kush are rich in freshwater, 
which the author suggests was the main reason for China's interest in this sector. It is not completely
clear who actually controlled this part of the Uzengi-Kush prior to the agreement, as Fravel notes 
that “Although precise data are unavailable, China may have gained control over some of the 
Uzengi-Kush that it did not control before.”149 According to another source, China granted 
Kyrgyzstan Victory Peak and “two-thirds of the Khan Tengri peak” (the highest and second highest 
peaks of the Tian Shan mountains) in return for what it received of the Uzengi-Kush.150
Overall China was granted around 1,208 square kilometers, of which the area of the 
Uzengi-Kush alone constituted 950 square kilometers.151 In percentage terms China received around
33 percent while Kyrgyzstan received around 67 percent of the disputed territory.
Demarcation work started on June 5, 2001, but after only eight days a Kyrgyz parliamentary 
144 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, “China's Territorial and Boundary Affairs,” June 30, 
2003, accessed November 20, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/t22820.htm.
145 Fravel, Strong Borders, 163. Yitzhak Shichor suggests there were five disputed sectors, as do Laruelle and 
Peyrouse, yet the total size of the area under dispute appears to be about the same in the different accounts (Laruelle
and Peyrouse suggest 3,728 square kilometers). Again, as in the case of Kazakhstan, this is probably nothing more 
than different ways of grouping the areas, and is of little importance here. Yitzhak Shichor, “The Great Wall of 
Steel: Military and Strategy in Xinjiang,” in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004): 156; Laruelle and Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia, 15.
146 Fravel, Strong Borders, 163.
147 Shichor, “The Great Wall of Steel,” 156.
148 Ann McMillan, “Xinjiang and Central Asia: Interdependency – not integration,” in China, Xinjiang and Central 
Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction Into the 21st Century, ed. Colin Mackerras and Michael 
Clarke (New York: Routledge, 2009): 98. Besides glaciers providing freshwater, the Uzengi-Kush reportedly 
contains reserves of minerals such as tungsten. Laruelle and Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia, 16.
149 Fravel, Strong Borders, 164, my emphasis.
150 Laruelle and Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia, 16.
151 Fravel, Strong Borders, 164.; Shichor, “The Great Wall of Steel,” 156.
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resolution halted the process. There was clearly dissatisfaction in the Kyrgyz parliament about the 
fact president Akayev had kept the 1999 agreement with China a secret.152 The president was 
furthermore criticized through protests and demonstrations for his willingness to hand over parts of 
the disputed territory, unsuccessfully alleviated by Foreign Minister Imanaliev's reminder that 
Kyrgyzstan had kept the larger share of the territory in question.153 Demarcation eventually 
continued and was completed in July 2009.154
Tajikistan. The border between China and Tajikistan is 414 kilometers long. Tajikistan 
inherited only three disputed sectors, fewer than China's two other Central Asian neighbors. But 
what the dispute lacked in numbers was more than made up for by the size of one of the sectors. 
The Pamir Mountains, to the North of Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor, are vast; at around 28,000 
square kilometers the area is larger than any other that had been disputed by China and the Soviet 
Union.155 Largely the result of unclear specifications, a protocol (signed in 1884) to the Treaty of 
Saint Petersburg had “in effect created a wedge of no-man's-land emcompassing much of the 
Pamirs.”156 The strategic significance of the territory might have been greater while it was 
controlled by the (unfriendly) Soviet Union, for the mountains are close to the Karakoram Highway 
(linking Kashgar in China to Gilgit in Pakistan) which Beijing feared was made vulnerable by the 
Soviet presence nearby.157 This impression only increased with the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan and the Wakhan Corridor (sandwiched between the Pamirs and Northern Pakistan) in 
1979 and 1980 respectively.158 As for the post-Cold War situation it was allegedly only after 
independence that Tajikistan “took control of the land … but China had never accepted the 
ruling.”159
Resolving the dispute with Tajikistan took longer than Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan largely due
to the civil war Tajikistan had been going through since 1992. In 1997, the same year as a peace 
152 Ibid.
153 Alisher Khamidov, “Dispute Over China-Kyrgyz Border Demarcation Pits President vs. Parliament,” 
EurasiaNet.org, June 27, 2001, accessed November 20, 2013, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062801.shtml. Although demarcation continued and was 
eventually successfully completed, the settlement took its toll on the Akayev government, eventually contributing to
(although not the sole reason for) its collapse. Marat, “Kyrgyzstan: China's Regional Playground?”, 128.
154 Marat, “Kyrgyzstan: China's Regional Playground?”, 128.
155 John W. Garver, “The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute in the Pamir Mountains Region,” The China Quarterly 85 
(1981): 107. The other two sectors combined constituted 430 square kilometers. Fravel, Strong Borders, 165.
156 Garver, “The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute,” 112. The author suggests this ambiguity may well have been a 
deliberate ploy by the Russians, so as to facilitate expansion further southward in the future. As regards the 
territorial claim there allegedly existed some (unpublished) notes from 1894 where China recognized the territorial 
status quo (in order to secure Russian support against Japan). Russia later based its claim on these whereas China 
argued they were merely temporary agreements. Ibid., 115.
157 Michael E. Clarke, Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia, 76.
158 Ibid.; Garver, “The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute,” 112.
159 Miao Yu, “Tajikistan ratifies border agreement with China,” Global Times, January 14, 2001, accessed November 
21, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/diplomacy/2011-01/612563.html.
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agreement was produced, negotiations between Beijing and Dushanbe began.160 Unsurprisingly, 
finding a solution to the Pamirs tolerable to both parties provided the greatest challenge, but in 1999
the two states were ready to sign an agreement dealing with the two other contested sectors, 
Markansu Valley and Uzbel Pass, altogether making up 430 square kilometers of territory.161 China 
received 200 square kilometers of the Markansu Valley, whereas its claim to the Uzbel Pass was 
dropped.162
A year later both sides expressed their desire to speed up negotiations, and in May 2002 
China and Tajikistan reached an agreement dealing with the Pamir Mountains. China gained 992 
square kilometers, around 3.5% of the total area of the mountains (of which China had initially 
claimed all). A presidential spokesman of Tajikistan, responding to internal criticism, suggested that
the area granted China carried “no great value to Tajikistan” and was unpopulated.163 The 
government furthermore stated that the area of the Pamirs granted China is “mountainous and lacks 
natural resources,” and one observer describes the area as “not a vital portion of Tajik territory. Nor 
is it inherently an important area for strategic or commercial purposes for China.”164 Demarcation 
work was carried out in 2006 and 2008.165
Having successfully negotiated settlements with these three neighbors China's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs could in 2003 declare that “the final and complete solution of all the boundary 
issues with neighboring countries in Central Asia handed down from history” had been settled.166 In 
January 2011 the border agreement between China and Tajikistan was finally ratified by the 
legislature of the latter.167
2.1.3 Assessing the disputes
As has been shown above, all territorial disputes between China and its Russian and Central Asian 
neighbors have been solved completely and peacefully. China made concessions in all of them, and 
while the difference between Beijing's initial claims and the agreed upon divisions of territory 
varies with each case no major territorial swaps have taken place. One observer suggests that China 
160 Fravel, Strong Borders, 165.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.; Gregory Gleason, “Tajikistan-China Border Normalization,” in Beijing's Power and China's Borders: Twenty 
Neighbors in Asia, ed. Bruce A. Elleman et al. (Armonk: New York, 2013), 283.
163 Shichor, “The Great Wall of Steel,” 155.
164 Buzurgmehr Ansori, “Tajikistan defines border with China,” Central Asia Online, January 29, 2011, accessed 
November 20, 2013, http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2011/01/29/feature-01; Gregory
Gleason, “Tajikistan-China Border Normalization,” 283.
165 Miao Yu, “Tajikistan ratifies border agreement with China.” 
166 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, “China's Territorial and Boundary Affairs.”
167 Gregory Gleason, “Tajikistan-China Border Normalization,” 283.
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through the 1980s and 90s “consistently promoted a boundary reinforcing interpretation of the lines 
between China and her neighbors through the repetition of a set of largely status quo territorial 
claims”; so the fact that China agreed to settlements that granted it far less than it originally laid 
claim to should be recognized as a benign signal that it has prioritized consolidating and securing its
borders rather than aimed for a territorial enlargement.168 However, two commonly made 
counterpoints deserve to be considered. The first concerns the significance of the territories under 
dispute, the second how the claims dropped or shrunk by China in most instances concerned areas 
that were held by the other party to the dispute.
The first objection is more of a suggestion that the significance of China's willingness to 
settle these disputes should not be overstated. For instance, with the Sino-Russian dispute as an 
example, Michael Swaine suggests that “if the territorial dispute in question is both intrinsically 
trivial and marginal to China's larger interest, Beijing has sought to resolve it amicably in order to 
pursue its larger goals.”169 Swaine goes on to contrast this to China's strategy in “significant” 
territorial disputes (examples given are those with India, Japan and ASEAN states, which we will 
return to later), where he suggests that stalling for time has been the favored approach.170
It is hard to disagree with the main point; not all disputes concern equally significant 
territory, and, ceteris paribus, both sides should find it easier to make concessions and reach an 
agreement when the territory in question has little intrinsic value. On the other hand, there is a 
danger of circular logic if we take this to mean that a peaceful settlement of a territorial dispute by 
itself is proof that the disputed territory mattered little. In the case of the eastern sector dispute with 
Russia it may be true that the exact number of islands each side ended up controlling did not matter 
greatly, at least not so much as to overshadow the goal of improved relations in other areas of the 
Sino-Russian relationship. But the Russian Far East more generally certainly has intrinsic value in 
the sense of being resource rich territory. Furthermore, China settled for the agreement even though 
it did not grant it access to the Sea of Japan. If we acknowledge that a territorial settlement is 
important not only in the sense of the exact border demarcation it produces but also in the sense that
it signals an acceptance of this line as an absolute separator of sovereign rights, the successful 
border resolutions between China and its Russian and Central Asian neighbors become more 
significant.171 In the Russian case China in effect ruled out the possibility of reclaiming territory 
168 Allen Carlson, “Constructing the Dragon's Scales: China's Approach to Territorial Sovereignty and Border 
Relations,” in Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2004), 276. A possible exception was China's original claim to all of the Pamir Mountains, which constitute
around 20 percent of Tajikistan's total territory.
169 Michael D. Swaine, America's Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 36.
170 Ibid., 37.
171 As pointed out by Garver (in the context of Indian recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet), “Politically, once 
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north of the dividing rivers. This, of course, does not change the fact that other, yet to be resolved, 
disputes over territory might be seen as more important to Beijing.
The second objection is that for the most part China's disputes with Russia and the Central 
Asian states concerned territory China did not hold.172 When the disputed territory is sought (but not
held) by China and sought (in the sense of preserving control over) and held by the other party, the 
question becomes whether China's concessions are really concessions as all. Take the Kyrgyzstan 
case, where we noted that the Foreign Minister Imanaliev tried to reassure an angered public that 
Kyrgyzstan had kept more of the disputed territories than it had lost. The point of contention in the 
minds of protesters was the fact that territory had been ceded to China; reminders that Beijing's 
original claim was not fully accommodated by Bishkek did not alter that fact. 
To some extent the emphasis on the relative percentage of disputed territory granted to each 
contestant obscures the nature of the matter when it does not take into account who controlled the 
territory in question prior to an agreement (assuming that this question can actually be answered 
unambiguously). What we are working with here, however, is a China whose claims in disputes 
with Russia and its Central Asian neighbors have mostly been limited, concerned with territories it 
had once controlled (even if not always for a very long time or successfully integrated and 
assimilated), and resolved in agreement with the other party without threat or use of force (the 
Sino-Soviet border clashes of the pre-Gorbachev era notwithstanding). Furthermore, while China 
has gained small sections of territory these cannot in any meaningful way be said to have altered the
larger territorial status quo. It is worth repeating that status quo behavior does not mean the same as 
making large concessions, or ensuring that territorial settlements do not lead to the slightest 
territorial transfers. It means abstaining from using force to settle disputes in one's own favor, and 
thus peaceful settlements with some modifications of territorial control are not in any sense 
revisionist. In this sense, while it is true that China's scale down of original claims are not always as
significant as they may appear when presented as percentages it is also true that China's restraint 
from hardening its claims after its position vis-a-vis its neighbors improved significantly signals a 
priority in pursuing secure and fixed borders rather than territorial expansion.
A look at the disgruntlement in certain corridors over the settlements with the post-Soviet 
Union supports such an interpretation. While the lack of transparency in Chinese policymaking 
one state recognizes a piece of territory to be part of another state, altering that recognition almost always comes in 
the context of civil war or regime breakdown and is considered to be an extremely hostile act. … Recognition of 
territorial sovereignty is virtually impossible to withdraw.” John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian 
Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 52-53.
172 According to Srikanth Kondapalli, in the disputes with the Central Asian states “whether China actually gave up 
territory or made a substantial concession is a debatable question.” However, the same analyst admits that China 
“has been liberal in border dispute resolution.” Sudha Ramachandran, “China plays long game on border disputes.”
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makes it hard to know whether the resolutions reached with Russia and the Central Asian states 
enjoyed wide support or were controversial there is evidence to suggests that voices in Beijing were
not all joyful. Allen Carlson notes that in China “Elite analysis [of these settlements] was also 
limited, but it contained a persistent trace of dissatisfaction in the elite community with the 
flexibility in Beijing's policies on the northern boundary.” An article for internal publication, written
by a Chinese scholar, similarly criticized the eastern border agreement of 1991 “for giving away too
much historically Chinese territory to the Soviets at a time when the Soviet Union was at its last 
leg.”173 This scholar's perspective is an excellent example of what revisionism looks like; arguing 
that the opportunity presented by the opponent's weakened position should have been seized by 
claiming more of its territory. The fact that the Chinese leadership did not raise any new claims, but 
in fact compromised on several of the islands that would have gone to Beijing entirely had the 
thalweg principle been strictly applied is significant. Furthermore, some Chinese argued that the 
Soviet Union had appeared willing to accept the thalweg principle already in 1964, and that 
consequently China had not extracted any meaningful new concessions out of Russia, but had given
up the opportunity to reclaim lost territory and not even asked “for a few miles of land along the 
mouth of the Tumen to regain access to the Sea of Japan.”174
With a disintegrating Soviet Union and the emergence of smaller, landlocked Central Asian 
states on China's periphery, one would expect a China bent on territorial revisions to see the time as 
ripe for an assertive stance or a delaying strategy in hope of better future prospects for “righting 
past wrongs.” The fact that the Chinese leadership quite contrarily saw the weakness of these states 
as more of a threat to China's security than an opportunity to expand lends credence to Hypothesis 1
of this thesis. As Fravel notes, the instability and underdevelopment of Xinjiang and Tibet goes a 
long way in explaining China's approach to its Central Asian borders. Solidified borders and 
improved relations with the Central Asian states were seen as the best way to quell separatist 
movements in Xinjiang, both through these states' public opposition to separatism and in the longer 
term improved stability through economic development of China's west, in which cross-border trade
173 Allen Carlson, “Constructing the Dragon's Scales,” 284. Interestingly, Falun Gong affiliates have also been vocal 
critics of these settlements. Seeing China's willingness to negotiate on the basis of the “unequal treaties” as an 
unforgivable betrayal, one work states that “The Protocol that Jiang signed ceded more than 1 million square 
kilometers of precious land – an area equal in size to that of three northeastern China provinces combined or dozens
of Taiwans. Jiang also agreed to give Russia the exit point of the Tumen River, cutting off northeast China from the 
Sea of Japan. … To make matters even worse, the treacherous treaties Jiang signed practically ended the potential 
for further growth of China as a nation. The vast and fertile lands bequeathed from past generations, bountiful in 
forests and rich in minerals and oil, stood as important resources in the potential growth and development of 
China.” The Epoch Times, “The Lowlife Who Betrayed His Own Nation,” in Anything for Power: The Real Story 
of China’s Jiang Zemin (The Epoch Times, 2005), accessed December 4, 2013, 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-17/31330.html. Of course the Falun Gong is hardly mainstream in China, 
but it is reasonable to suspect that this line of thinking resonate with many nationalistically inclined Chinese.
174 Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes, 82.
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with the Central Asian states were seen as playing an important role.175 In other words, China's 
leadership prioritized securing and strengthening what it already possessed rather than the more 
risky gambit of holding open the door to future expansion by delaying a border settlement or 
attempting to use force to make sure that its original claims were fully met. 
2.2 Vietnam and Laos
2.2.1 Vietnam
Background
The relationship between Vietnam and China goes far back, and probably no Southeast Asian 
country has been more influenced by the latter than Vietnam.176 In 208 b.c., two years before the 
Qin Empire's fall, the Chinese general Zhao Tuo conquered the Kingdom Au Lac, in northern 
Vietnam. Seizing the opportunity Zhao established an independent “Nam Viet, Land of the Southern
Viet,” with himself serving as emperor, but this independence was to end a century later in 
annexation by the Han dynasty.177 Although Vietnamese rebellion against inclusion in the Chinese 
empire eventually succeeded, independence required maintaining a tributary relationship with 
China, “a relationship that would essentially continue until the nineteenth century.”178 
With the increasingly prominent French presence in Indochina it became clear that Paris was
little interested in recognizing any Chinese special rights in the area. Once France had brought 
Hanoi and Haiphong under its control it started pushing the Qing government to accommodate its 
interests in Annam, and the initial response from Beijing came through military means.179 Having 
been devastated in a naval battle the Qing dynasty found itself unable to protect its position in 
Vietnam. Faced with the new reality in Indochina two treaties were signed in 1887 and 1895, 
outlining the location of the border between the Qing empire and France's Tonkin protectorate.180 
175 Fravel, Secure Borders, 150-51.
176 David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 48
177 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 99.
178 Kang, East Asia Before the West, 38.
179 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 221.
180 “CONVENTION CONCERNING THE DELIMITATION OF THE BORDER BETWEEN CHINA AND 
TONKIN,” China's External Relations - A History, accessed January 03, 2014, 
http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/167;  “COMPLEMENTARY CONVENTION TO THE CONVENTION 
DELIMITING THE FRONTIER BETWEEN TONGKING AND CHINA OF JUNE 26, 1887,” China's External 
Relations - A History, accessed January 03, 2014, http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/169. The latter defines 
the China-Tonkin frontier as running “from the Red River to the Mekong,” so the China-Laos border was also 
covered by this convention. 
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Thus, these border agreements were written during the “century of humiliation” although the 
territory it assured would be kept south of China's borders had played a tributary role rather than 
being considered a part of China proper (see Appendix 1, Figure 3).
By 1956 both Vietnam and China recognized the existence of a dispute in areas along their 
1,281 kilometer long border, concerning 227 square kilometers spread over 116 sectors.181 There 
were several reasons for the dispute: First, many of the 333 boundary markers that demarcated the 
border had been damaged over the years. Second, the Sino-French conventions contained 
ambiguities that opened up to different interpretations of the delineation. Third, areas that according
to the Sino-French conventions were on the Chinese side of the border had come under France's 
control due to the chaotic state of affairs in China before the mid-20th century. The same would 
happen the other way around throughout the first and second Indochinese wars; certain border areas
on the Vietnamese side were administered by local Chinese officials, such that these came under 
effective Chinese control.182 Following the recognition of a dispute negotiations were held, which 
led to both sides expressing the understanding that the territorial status quo would not be altered by 
force, “but that both parties reserved the right to reconsider the border in the future.”183 
The wars in Vietnam, first with France and then the US, made a territorial settlement 
unlikely. In this period China clearly supported North Vietnam's cause. However, the “lips and 
teeth” relationship eventually started to show strains. By the mid-60s, while China still 
unequivocally supported Ho Chi Minh's government, disagreement over tactics and more 
importantly different views of Moscow had become more evident. Zhou Enlai urged prime minister 
Pham Van Dong in 1965 to refuse aid from the Soviet Union but Hanoi did not comply.184  With the 
improved relations between China and the US after Kissinger and Nixon's visits in 1971 and 1972, 
doubts about Beijing's commitment only grew in Hanoi, whereas China's perception of the Soviet 
Union as a larger threat than the US was strengthened.185
181 Fravel, Strong Borders, 331. Vietnam and China still have maritime disputes, but to keep with the organization of 
this thesis they are not treated in this section The issues concerning the South China Sea will be discussed later on.
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185 Ibid., 179-80. This was despite the fact that Chinese support to Vietnam increased after Nixon's visit (which may 
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Chinese support for Vietnam, both material and moral, continued throughout the war, until 
and beyond reunification. However, tensions were building up under the surface, and had been 
doing so for several years before Vietnam's reunification was a fact. Hanoi had started talking about
a “historical borderline” in 1974, and concretely pointed to a Chinese railway that allegedly came 
300 meters within Vietnamese historical territory. China pointed to the Sino-French agreements, 
which placed the railway within the Chinese side of the border.186 It was also reported that Vietnam 
had laid claim to 15 areas in Yunnan and Guangxi in the period 1975-77, and that Hanoi had altered 
demarcation markers in these areas to support such claims.187 When in April 1977 China 
communicated its wish to repair the railway section disputed by Vietnam, Hanoi agreed to this, but 
when the repair work was actually initiated Vietnam reportedly moved 500 troops to the area and in 
an attack wounded 51 Chinese workers.188
As became clear through negotiations starting in October 1977, Vietnam was in favor of a 
border settlement that strictly adhered the status quo as it had developed over time since the 
Sino-French agreements were signed, although a few modification could be discussed. Beijing 
suggested the Sino-French agreements serve as a guideline, but that it was necessary to do 
inspections in the relevant areas to uncover divergences between “treaty terms and the actual 
borderline” with an aim to reach a new agreement where current errors had been straightened out.189
These positions reflected how recent developments had affected each side: It seems “that there were
more Chinese territories under de facto Vietnamese jurisdiction than Vietnamese territories under 
Chinese administration” and therefore Hanoi was more interested in a freeze of the status quo than 
Beijing.190 Ultimately the negotiations did not lead anywhere, and came to a halt in June 1978.
Tensions kept growing in the following year. As a result of its worry that the ethnic Chinese 
people living in many of the disputed areas under Vietnam's control represented a threat to its claim,
Hanoi initiated a campaign to have them removed. By late 1978 the number of Chinese that had 
been ejected from Vietnamese territory totaled 200,000.191 This period saw frequent armed clashes 
between the two sides. With the expulsion of all ethnic Chinese (and others considered of 
potentially questionable loyalty) from the North Vietnamese leadership the open hostility between 
the two states only deepened. When in November 1978 a mutual defense treaty between Hanoi and 
Moscow was signed, and one month later Vietnam invaded Cambodia, removing the Chinese 
have been intended to signal that China had not forsaken its smaller neighbor, or perhaps reflected the fact that 
American bombings of Vietnam increased that year).
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backed Khmer Rouge from power, the stage was set for a showdown.192 Three months later China 
invaded northern Vietnam, ostensibly on the ground of their border dispute but more likely with the 
invasion of Cambodia and the larger issue of a perceived Soviet encirclement in the making as the 
most significant motivations.193
While the border issue between China and Vietnam had become more intense during the mid
to late 70s – with the number of border violations (by both sides) “jumping from 300 cases in 1974 
to 1800 cases in 1976,” – there is no evidence that Beijing used the opportunity presented by war 
with its southern neighbor to grab territory.194 As Chang notes, China did not “attempt to establish 
permanent control over those disputed areas that China had considered part of its territories or seize 
Vietnamese territory for bargaining purposes” although it could certainly have done so if it wanted 
to.195 Vietnam later accused China of having moved border markers during the war, and Beijing 
claimed that Hanoi had taken more territory after the war was concluded, but it is hard to say 
whether these accusations were truthful or not.196
Later developments
Only by the mid-1980s did a process toward normalization between Hanoi and Beijing begin.197 By 
1989 contacts had expanded to higher levels, even though tensions in the South China Sea had been 
strong the previous year.198 During a secret meeting in September 1991, Vietnam accepted the peace
plan that China (and the UN) wished to see implemented in Cambodia, and by November the next 
year normalization of relations was a fact.199 While the border question and territorial disputes had 
been delegated to the back seat during the normalization process (precisely to facilitate its success) 
the resumption of normal relations gave the necessary impetus for the parties to move on to 
negotiations concerning these matters. Less than a year after normalization expert-level talks over 
the disputes were initiated, and on October 19, 1993, an agreement setting out the principles for 
resolving the disputes concerning the land border and Gulf of Tonkin was reached.200 Through the 
agreement it was decided that the treaties previously reached between France and China would 
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serve as a foundation, and that they would “use the principle of 'give and take' to settle the 
disputes.”201 This, then, is another instance where China has been willing to negotiate on the basis 
of treaties it has formally opposed and branded “unequal.”
After the 1993 agreement, however, developments were slow. Fravel suggests that whereas 
Vietnam was interested in a comprehensive settlement covering both land and sea, China wanted to 
focus on the land border and Gulf of Tonkin and leave out the island disputes in the South China 
Sea.202 This differs from China's position in its disputes with Russia and India, where China initially
sought comprehensive settlements whereas its counterpart did not. This may be due to the fact that 
resolutions of the land border and Gulf of Tonkin were deemed easier to achieve, and that resolving 
these issues would have positive economic consequences (as Fravel points to as Beijing's rationale).
But it may also suggest that China was in less of a hurry to settle the (arguably much more 
complicated) disputes over the Spratlys and Paracels, and thought it would have a stronger 
bargaining position by dealing with each issue separately.
In 1998, with a self-imposed deadline agreed on by both sides, the settlement picked up 
pace. During Phan Van Khai's Beijing trip in October 1998 it was announced that the two states 
were determined to reach an agreement by the end of the century, in other words only a little over a 
year after the announcement was made.203 The deadline was barely met. On December 31, 1999, the
two sides signed “the Treaty of Land Border between China and Vietnam,” settling the land border 
dispute.204 Of the 227 square kilometers of disputed territory, China received “just over” 114 
whereas Vietnam received “just under” 113;205  in relative percentages approximately 50.2 and 49.8 
percent respectively. When it comes to the question of exactly how much of the disputed territory 
each party controlled prior to the final settlement, an answer remains elusive; it seems this 
information has not been publicized.206 However, in the area where Vietnam had claimed that 
Chinese railway went 300 meters into its territory the border was eventually “marked 148 meters 
north of the line claimed by China.”207 Perhaps the two sides decided to meet each other half way on
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this specific issue, but kept it low key.
The demarcation process was completed at the end of 2008, and while BBC reported on 
dissatisfaction among the Vietnamese public due to a lack of transparency in the process a former 
head of Vietnam's State Border Committee was quoted as saying that the previous agreements 
(between China and France) had been respected in the process, and that only “For some special 
areas the two sides may, through friendly negotiations, make proper readjustment in the spirit of 
sympathy and mutual compromise, equity and reasonableness.”208 
2.2.2 Laos
China's dispute with Laos was, relatively speaking, rather uncomplicated and limited. The two 
countries share a border of 423 kilometers. The 1895-treaty between China and France (mentioned 
above) also covered the Sino-Laotian border, but demarcation work had never been completed.209 
Guided mostly by drainage basins and watercourses, the border was for the most part considered to 
be relatively easy to delineate, although certain areas dominated by jungle and mountains provided 
more of a challenge. One area, inhabited by a “Sinicized ethnic minority” whose rebellion in the 
early twentieth century had only been quelled after three French attempts, was particularly 
problematic. One observer suggests this may have been the reason for the lack of proper border 
demarcation.210
Historically, Laos paid tribute to China for several centuries but was never completely 
dominated by it. Relations with Vietnam and particularly Thailand (Siam) played a larger role both 
in terms of cultural influence and threats of encroachment on Laotian territory.211 By 1960 the 
border shared by the PRC and Laos was recognized as disputed, with disagreement about the 
ownership of around 18 square kilometers of territory.212 This was at a time when Laos was plagued
by a civil war and severe spillover effects from the Vietnam war.213 The communist victors from the 
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Pathet Lao had been heavily reliant on support from North Vietnam (whereas China had hedged its 
bets by supporting both the royal government and the Pathet Lao), and when they established the 
Lao People's Democratic Republic in December 1975 it was therefore only natural to align with 
recently unified Vietnam.214 When China invaded Vietnam in 1979, Laos was caught between a 
desire to maintain relations with China and to avoid alienating Vietnam. It reacted by downgrading 
diplomatic relations with Beijing to the “chargé d'affaires level” (below the ambassadorial level, but
without breaking relations completely).215 
From this point on relations between Laos and China cooled. Pressured by the Soviet Union 
and Vietnam, Laos had Chinese road building projects stopped, joined in on denunciations of 
Beijing, and, taking a page from Vietnam's book, purged party members seen as pro-China from the 
Lao People's Revolutionary Party.216 China started supporting an anti-government resistance 
movement of the Hmong minority in Laos around this time (although in a more limited fashion than
Laos accused it of), and there were border skirmishes in the early 1980s.217 While these skirmishes 
reportedly occurred due to the undemarcated section of the border, they did not lead to any territory 
changing hands.218
Only from the mid-80s did the situation start to change. According to one observer the fact 
that Vietnam was “on the edge of bankruptcy” whereas China was starting to enjoy the fruits of its 
reform and opening up made the importance of good relations with China increase significantly for 
Laos.219 Party delegations between the two countries were exchanged in 1986 and 1987, border 
trade resumed shortly after, and by May 1988 ambassadors were stationed in the other's capital.220 In
October 1989, with Kaysone Phomvihane being the one of the first state leaders to visit China after 
the Tiananmen crackdown, normalization was a fact.221 
During Phomvihane's visit the two countries reached a temporary agreement, in which they 
avowed to maintain the Sino-French treaty as the basis for their shared border while working 
toward a final settlement of the dispute.222 This temporary agreement was strengthened the next year
through a provisional agreement, affirming the reliance on the Sino-French agreements of the 
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previous century in delimiting their border. Twelve months later, in August 1991, the two states had 
come to agree on all specifics, and in October that year a boundary treaty was signed. Demarcation 
was completed in 1993, and China and Laos divided the disputed 18 square kilometers “almost 
evenly.”223 Furthermore, the western and eastern border trijunctions (Laos-Myanmar-China and 
Laos-China-Vietnam) were established through treaties between the relevant countries in 1994 and 
2006 respectively.224
2.2.3 Assessing the disputes
As in China's disputes with Russia and the Central Asian states, the disagreements with Vietnam 
and Laos were solved through territorial settlements reached without any sort of military pressure. 
Compared to the disputes with Russia and the Central Asian states, the ones with Vietnam and Laos 
were of a more technical nature, where issues left over from incomplete or unsatisfactory 
delineation and demarcation work of the past needed to be straightened out. There was certainly no 
sign of China trying to reimpose its historical domination over Vietnam, nor did Beijing seize the 
opportunity presented by war and disorder in these states to extend its claims. Of course China also 
went through a turbulent period, with the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, for much of
the time when war preoccupied Hanoi. 
In terms of actual control, as noted, it is hard to establish precise facts, although in the case 
of the dispute between China and Vietnam, both sides held territories claimed by the other. The fact 
that the distribution of disputed territory came down to equal figures, with one square kilometer 
more going to China, and that the total of disputed territory was no more than 227 square 
kilometers, leads to the conclusion that the settlement was a reinforcement of the status quo. In the 
case of China's dispute with Laos, only 18 square kilometers were disputed, and if we take the 
suggestion that these were divided “almost evenly” literally this means that around nine square 
kilometers went to each side.
Here again, then, we simply do not find evidence of revisionism or stalling for time. Of 
course, as discussed in relation to the disputes with Russia and China's Central Asian neighbors, 
there is the question of the significance of the territory involved, and as Carlson has noted, the land 
border-dispute between China and Vietnam was “never an object of serious contention,”225 at least 
comparatively speaking, an assessment that holds true for the dispute between China and Laos as 
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well. Still, they are cases of Chinese disputes with weaker neighbors, where the de facto borders, at 
the time when the disputes were recognized, had been brought about by a colonial rival (in this case
France). The final settlements were largely solidifications of these treaties from the late nineteenth 
century, although this time without any unequal or imperial qualities. 
The reason why the disputed were not solved earlier appears to have had more to do with 
other factors shaping the relationships of the involved states, particularly the Indochina wars and the
Sino-Soviet competition, rather than any grand, irreconcilable ambitions of territorial revisions by 
either side. For our concern here it suffices to say that China did not claim large tracts of land from 
its neighbors and did not use their relative weakness to grab disputed territory, but instead settled 
with status quo-reinforcing agreements where neither side can be said to have gained or lost in any 
significant way.
2.3 India and Bhutan
2.3.1 India
Background
China and India share a border of some 3,488 kilometers, with two large areas of territory are at the 
heart of their dispute (see Appendix 1, Figure 4 and Figure 5).226 The western sector, Aksai Chin, 
makes up around 38,000 square kilometers of inhospitable, high-altitude terrain, and has been 
controlled by Beijing since its occupation of Tibet in 1951. The eastern sector, roughly 
corresponding to the Indian state Arunachal Pradesh (China refers to it as “South Tibet”), makes up 
around 90,000 square kilometers and has been administered by India since the 1940s.227 Each side 
claims the sector controlled by the other, but the exact claims are not known since “With the 
exception of the relatively minor 'Middle Sector,' China and India have yet to define their respective
boundary claims through a basic exchange of maps.”228
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Aksai Chin was once upon a time a secondary trade route, and had been used for grazing by 
wool traders. For the British, occupied with the task of creating space between its Indian possession 
and the encroaching Russian advances in Asia, the area came to be seen as holding potential 
strategic value as a buffer.229 Several border lines for the Ladakh region (part of the Indian state 
Jammu and Kashmir, to the west of Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin) were worked out and 
considered by the British. There is no clear answer as to which one was more authoritative and 
consequently uncertainty rules on the question of whether the British really claimed Aksai Chin as a
part of its Indian colony after the first world war.230 In any case, postcolonial India was less 
ambiguous about its claim. After having reviewed the border of Ladakh, New Dehli in 1953 decided
to claim Aksai Chin as a part of its territory, a claim built on the belief that the area “had been 
included within the jurisdiction of the pre-British Dogra government of Kashmir”.231
In the case of Arunachal Pradesh – which China claims is inside the “traditional, customary 
limit” Tibet used to administer  – the claimant and holder relationship is the inverse.232 Negotiations 
between India, Tibet (then enjoying relatively more autonomy) and China's central government took
place in Simla, where the McMahon line – which placed Arunachal Pradesh within India's boundary
– was presented to the delegates.233 The product of the negotiations was the Simla Convention, 
which the Chinese delegate initialed, according to Hoffman “most likely knowing that his 
government would repudiate it for other reasons.”234 The British and Tibetan representatives also 
initialed the Simla Convention, but met again later (without a Chinese delegate present) and signed 
a joint declaration binding the two parties (that is India and Tibet) to the convention.235 Thus the 
bone of contention that remains until this day: India claims that there is nothing more to discuss in 
the eastern sector, as Tibet signed the Simla Convention (and thus accepted the McMahon line); 
China maintains that Tibet did not have the authority to do so without the approval of Beijing 
(which rejected the convention). 
Following China's consolidation of its hold over Aksai Chin, India did not protest much, 
allegedly because the area was thought to hold few valuable resources, and because good relations 
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with China were deemed more important by New Delhi.236 By 1957 China had completed the 
building of a motorway through Aksai Chin, linking Xinjiang and Tibet. This was only one of 
several roads central to Mao's “advance while building roads” strategy, aimed at strengthening 
China's hold over Tibet, but it was easily the most significant.237 India, who in Garvers 
understanding may have had its hopes of continued relative Tibetan autonomy dashed by Chinese 
military presence and road-building, had been increasing troop deployments in border areas since 
the late 50s, and embarked upon its “forward policy” in 1961.238 
This policy was meant to keep the PLA from advancing further by establishing new Indian 
outposts closer and closer to Chinese positions, and greatly increased tensions between the two 
sides. Initially, Chinese forces pulled back when encountering these new Indian outposts, but as 
India kept going further into territory in the western sector that China hitherto had controlled, 
Beijing changed its tactics.239 After securing assurances that other powers would not be drawn into a
war between the two, and having failed in an attempt to reach out to India diplomatically, Mao 
announced a new directive whereby Chinese forces was to stop giving ground to India.240 Indian 
advances were undeterred in both sectors, and after having unsuccessfully attempted to get India 
into negotiations over a border settlement Beijing decided on a “large-scale attack” to send India a 
clear message.241 The stage was set for the border war of 1962, where China forced back Indian 
forces in both sectors and eventually crossed the boundary lines it was claiming. It thereafter pulled 
back northwards, twenty kilometers from what it claimed had been the Line of Actual Control 
(LAC) prior to India's forward policy.242 
Two years before the border war broke out Zhou Enlai had offered Nehru a deal that, if 
accepted, would have been a prime example of a consolidation of the status quo. Zhou had for some
time tried to make it clear that while China could not “acknowledge” the McMahon line, it would 
be willing to accept a demarcation based on it.243 In talks with Nehru, Zhou suggested that each side
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accept the “present realities in both sectors,” meaning that China would keep Aksai Chin while 
India would keep Arunachal Pradesh.244 New Delhi rejected the offer, and further talks between 
Zhou and Nehru did not lead to any progress.245 Whereas New Delhi required a Chinese withdrawal 
from Aksai Chin in order for negotiations to be held, Beijing felt it had made a significant 
concession by expressing its willingness to pursue negotiations based on the McMahon Line and by
dropping its claim to the eastern sector as long as India dropped its claim to the western sector.246
Relations between the two neighbors maintained their low standing in the years following 
the Zhou-Nehru talks. In 1979 and 1980 Deng Xiaoping repeated Zhou's earlier swap offer.247 India 
repeated its rejection of such an arrangement. However, in 1981 negotiations began at the 
vice-foreign ministerial level, offering at least the impression that the states were working to solve 
the dispute. Eight rounds were held, without much to show for it. In the first round the Chinese side 
allegedly made the swap offer once more. In the fourth round both sides agreed to normalize 
relations in other areas, and furthermore to discuss each sector individually (which India had 
wanted to do from the beginning). In the eighth round – following a confrontational stance in 
Sumdurong Chu in 1987 –248 both sides stressed the need to avoid military confrontation.249 
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In 1985, China appeared to have changed its position on the package deal. Reportedly, 
Beijing required that India cede the town of Tawang (in the eastern sector, close to the Indian border
with Bhutan, see Appendix 1, Figure 4) for the swap offer to be acceptable.250 As the package deal 
does not appear to have been offered since then it is unclear whether this requirement still applies. 
To be clear this addition did not represent a new claim of China's,251 and may have been a reflection 
of Beijing's frustration; an attempt to signal to New Delhi that it should not take it for granted that 
the package deal would forever be on the table in its original form. This was the same year China 
started to more actively press its claim to the eastern sector, which reportedly “stunned” New 
Delhi.252 As Beijiing's saw it, India was not willing to consider a consolidation of the territorial 
status quo even though from China's point of view the package deal implied that New Delhi would 
make the smaller concession, in that the disputed sector under its control was much larger than 
China's.253
Later developments
The eight rounds of negotiations did not substantially move the two sides closer to an agreement. 
Still, having experienced the swift escalation of tension during the Sumdurong Chu incident seems 
to have worked to ease subsequent relations somewhat. In 1988 Indira Gandhi visited Beijing, and a
“Joint Working Group” (JWG) was set up to resume border talks between the two states, starting 
with the first round in 1989. 
Some highlights merit mention: The fourth meeting of the JWG was “the first time that 
military officers held direct talks on reducing tensions along the border.”254 Between the fourth and 
was sincere in its offer.  Thus, both Garver and Fravel has treated the swap offer as genuine. Shyam Saran, a former 
Indian diplomat, gives the same impression. Garver, Protracted Contest, 101; Fravel, Strong Borders, 94; Shyam 
Saran, “India-China border dispute - Coping with asymmetry,” Business Standard, April 13, 2014, accessed May 5, 
2014, 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shyam-saran-india-china-border-dispute-coping-with-asymmetry
-114041300669_1.html.
250 Saran, “India-China border dispute.”
251 Tawang is a part of Arunachal Pradesh, and China briefly asserted its control over the town in the 1962 war, until 
pulling back behind the status quo ante Line of Actual Control. K. N. Raghavan, Dividing Lines: Contours of 
India-China Conflict (Mumbai: Platinum Press, 2012), Kindle edition, 254.
252 Garver, Protracted Contest, 104.
253 On the other hand it is also possible that Beijing has increasingly seen Tawang as a particularly important area for 
symbolic reasons, and thus was serious about no longer accepting a package deal without receiving this town. 
Tawang is where the 6th Dalai Lama was born, and reportedly Beijing suspects that when the current Dalai Lama 
has passed away his reincarnation will be announced to have taken place there, thus delegitimizing the “official” 
Dalai Lama that Beijing will select. Namrata Goswami, “China’s Territorial Claim on Arunachal Pradesh: Crafting 
an Indian Response,” IDSA Issue Brief, October 25, 2010, 5, accessed December 22, 2013, 
www.  idsa.in/issuebrief/ChinasTerritorialClaimonArunachalPradeshCraftinganIndianResponse  .
254 Fravel, Strong Borders, 169. According to Sali another significant development of the fourth round was that “JWG 
moved from 'Concepts' to 'specifics' and from 'ideas' to 'measures' with regard to stabilisation of the Line of Actual 
Control.” M. L. Sali, India-China Border Dispute: A Case Study of the Eastern Sector (New Delhi: A.P.H. 
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fifth rounds, in 1993, an agreement between the two sides on maintaining peace at the Line of 
Actual Control (LAC) was signed, and at the fifth meeting a draft agreement on “maintaining the 
status quo along the disputed frontier” was signed.255 The sixth round resulted in the opening of a 
new border trade point at Shipki La Pass.256 In 1996, the two sides signed an agreement on 
confidence-building measures and removed their forces from near proximity to Sumdurong Chu.257 
While the JWG seems to have been a successful process in terms of confidence-building 
measures, it has not fundamentally moved New Delhi and Beijing closer to a resolution of their 
dispute. The early to mid-90s seems to have been a high point of relations in the post-1962 era, but 
as Fravel notes, “because no agreement has been reached, it is quite difficult to determine whether 
compromise offers were made by either side.”258
Similarly, there has been little substantial progress since the turn of the century.  In 1998, 
after India's second round of nuclear tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee referred to an unnamed “overt 
nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 
1962,” to justify the action.259 Chinese commentators responded by accusing India of promoting a 
“China Threat Theory” to justify its own bid for regional hegemony.260  The most significant 
positive development since 1996 was the 2005 agreement to “to abide by and implement” the 1993 
and 1996 agreements, providing a framework consisting of 12 articles to guide the process.261 Since 
2005, the relationship seems to have worsened, to a large extent fitting the often used description of 
the Sino-Japanese relationship: Hot economics, cold politics.262 
Publishing Corporation, 1998), 117.
255 Fravel, Strong Borders, 169.
256 Sali, India-China Border Dispute, 118
257 Fravel, Strong Borders, 170.
258 Ibid.
259 “NUCLEAR ANXIETY; Indian's Letter to Clinton On the Nuclear Testing,” The New York Times, May 13, 1998, 
accessed December 18, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-nuclear-testing.html. 
The letter went on to say that “Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an 
atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has 
materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter 
neighbor we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years … [These] tests are limited in number and pose no 
danger to any country which has no inimical intentions towards India.” (My emphasis.)
260 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment , 149-51.
261 Possibly of some significance, Article VII stipulates that “in reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall 
safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.” This could be a benefit to India in the 
eastern sector. (Aksai Chin, on the other hand, is largely unpopulated.) On the other hand, it may be the case that 
terms such as “safeguard” and “due interest” are too flexible to provide much relief for New Delhi. “Text of 
India-China agreement,” The Hindu, April 11, 2005, accessed December 18, 2013, 
http://hindu.com/thehindu/nic/0041/indiachinatxt.htm.
262 In this regard it may be interesting to note that one authoritative account of Chinese foreign policy thinking 
suggests that India is commonly seen as a “smaller scale version of Japan” in China (the smaller scale referring to 
the threat it poses rather than geographical/demographic size). Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security 
Environment, 153. By 2009, China had overtaken the US as India's biggest trading partner. David M. Malone and 
Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation,” Survival 52, no. 1 (2010): 144.
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Border incursions and the Line of Actual Control
In the last few years a great number of media outlets have reported border transgressions across the 
Line of Actual Control by the Chinese side. The Indian government releases figures from time to 
time that are played up in the media, but there are many ambiguities surrounding this 
phenomenon.263 What sometimes goes unmentioned is that the two sides do not have a shared 
perception of where the LAC actually runs in several areas of the border.
Table 1: Chinese transgressions across the LAC (as perceived by India)
Time period Number of transgressions
2000 90a
2002  > 90b
Q1+Q2 2003  50b
2007 140a
2008 233c / 270d
2010 228e
2011 180f /213e
Q1 2012 64e
Q1 2013  > 100g
a Jonathan Holslag, “China, India and the Military Security Dilemma,” BICCS Asia Papers 3, no. 5 (2008): 7; b Sandeep Dikshit, “50 Chinese 
sorties across LAC this year,” The Hindu, July 26, 2003, accessed April 14, 2014, 
http://www.hindu.com/2003/07/26/stories/2003072603481100.htm; c Suman Sharma, “Army accessed China war-game plan, did not enhance 
security,” The Sunday Guardian, April 27, 2013, accessed January 08, 2014, 
http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/army-accessed-china-war-game-plan-did-not-enhance-security; d Brahma Chellaney, “Let facts speak for 
themselves on India-China border,” The Sunday Guardian, August 15, 2010, accessed May 05, 2014, 
http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/let-facts-speak-for-themselves-on-india-china-border; e Ajay Banerjee, “China violated LAC 505 times 
since Jan 2010,” The Tribune, May 16, 2012, accessed May 05, 2014, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20120517/main6.htm; f Namrata 
Goswami, “Chinese intrusions across the LAC,” IDSA Issue Brief, December 17, 2013, 2, accessed December 22, 2013, 
www.idsa.in/issuebrief/ChineseintrusionsacrosstheLAC_ngoswami_171213; g Jeff Smith, “Frontier Tension.”
Table 1 provides a list of transgressions made by China across the LAC as India perceives it, for 
263 I am grateful to Jeff M. Smith for clarifying this to me in a personal e-mail correspondence (May 6, 2014). 
According to him, “oftentimes the Indian parliament will ping the Defense Minister or Home Minister on the 
subject and they will report back official figures for the past year or the past several years.” Thus, the numbers are 
not released in a regular manner but appear every now and then. I have consulted a number of people who have 
written on the subject, and none of them were aware of any complete list of such incidents of figures for every year.
Both Bhadrakumar Melkulangara (April 14, 2014) and Namrata Goswami (May 6, 2014) suggested to me that 
publication of statistics related to transgressions/incursions are most likely kept to a minimum to avoid creating 
unnecessary controversies.
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those time periods I have been able to find figures for.264 The word “intrusions” is often used instead
of “transgressions” in media reports, but the Indian government makes an important (if somewhat 
blurry) distinction between the two. Thus, the Minister of State for Home Affairs was quoted as 
saying in 2012 that “There has been no intrusion along the India-China border. However, there are 
cases of transgression (by People’s Liberation Army, PLA) due to different perception of the 
LAC.”265 This distinction seems to boil down to a question of intentions (are these transgressions 
done to “breach of the sanctity of the border” or merely a reflection of the different perceptions of 
the LAC?) and can therefore appear arbitrary, but the fact that India is making it also shows that 
New Delhi is not interested in exaggerating the importance of these occurrences.266
Unfortunately, China does not report on similar transgressions by the Indian side, which 
makes it hard to say how frequent these are, but it is clear that China is not alone in crossing the 
LAC as perceived by the opposite side.267 For instance, one article from 2003, referring to 
anonymous sources from the Indian Army, suggests that “they would not tell how frequently the 
Indian troops were crossing into China beyond admitting: 'Our boys also do that sometimes. This 
should not be treated as a major issue.'”268 More recently, Yao Yunzhu, a Major General from 
China’s Academy of Military Sciences, was quoted stating that “If we make the calculation on our 
understanding of the LAC, maybe the Indian border troops have transgressed the line more than 
what the Chinese border troops have done.”269 While this is only anecdotal evidence, it does 
strongly suggest that transgressions are not a one-sided phenomenon.
The problem, then, is first and foremost that the two sides have different perceptions of the 
LAC. The 1996 agreement on confidence-building measures referred to above states that “the two 
sides agree to speed up the process [of] clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control. 
… They also agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment 
of the line of actual control as soon as possible.”270 In 2002, a media report suggested that India and 
264 I am aware of the incomplete state of this table. As hinted to in the above note, I have tried to fill the gaps, but these
are the only periods of time for which I have found figures. What is more, these are all from secondary sources and 
sometimes (2008 and 2011) not in agreement (although all claim to be based on official figures, except for the 
figures for 2002 and the first two quarters of 2003, where the source refers to a confidential document from the 
Indian Army). Thus, the list has obvious reliability limitations, and I do therefore not draw too many inferences 
from it. It is provided to show that such transgressions appear to have been a common occurrence in the last few 
years.
265 Banerjee, “China violated LAC 505 times since Jan 2010.”
266 Ibid.
267 Jeff Smith, “Frontier Tension.” This is of course true by definition as long as the two sides' perceptions overlap in 
certain areas and both patrol as far out as their line goes.
268 Dikshit, “50 Chinese sorties across LAC this year.”
269 Jeff Smith, “Frontier Tension.” In a personal e-mail correspondence (May 06, 2014) Smith informed me that in 
conversations with Chinese officials he had been informed that Indian transgressions were just as common as 
Chinese, and that none of the Indian political and military figures Smith had talked to refuted this claim (in fact 
some corroborated it).
270 “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of 
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China had agreed on a time frame for such a map exchange.271 Maps for the western sector would 
be exchanged by the end of that year, maps for the eastern sector by the end of 2003. It is not clear 
whether or not such an exchange actually happened, but as of 2013 the two sides were certainly no 
closer to a shared perception of where the line runs.272 
Indian historian A. G. Noorani has suggested that India did in fact present China with a 
sample map of its perceived LAC in the western sector, in June 2002, but that this map included 
under Indian control territory that Pakistan through a border treaty had agreed belongs to China. 
The map was thus outright rejected by Beijing.273 As this observer noted, “the map India presented 
wantonly created an issue of prestige for both sides,” and more importantly it blurred the distinction
between claim lines and lines of actual control.274
Reportedly, both sides recognize “as many as nine” areas along the border where perceptions
differ, and it appears that most of these are located in the western sector as the majority of 
transgressions have occurred here.275 One much reported incident of 2013 serves as an example. On 
April 15, around 50 Chinese troops set up tents some 30 kilometers south of Daulat Beg Oldi (see 
China November 29, 1996 (New Delhi),” accessed May 7, 2014, 
www.stimson.org/research-pages/confidence-building-measures-along-the-line-of-actual-control-in-the-india-china-
border-areas/.
271 Mohan Narayan and Anil K Joseph, “India, China agree on timeframe to clarify LAC,” Rediff, March 29, 2002, 
accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/mar/29china2.htm.
272 John Garver suggested to me that this reported agreement to exchange maps may have been oversold, and that to 
his knowledge such maps have not been exchanged between the two sides. Personal e-mail correspondence, May 7, 
2014.
273 A. G. Noorani, “Perseverance in peace process.”
274 The territory Pakistan dropped its claim to (the Trans-Karakoram Tract) had been administered by China as a part of
Xinjiang since 1963, and thus it was demonstrably false that New Delhi had “actual control” over it, as India in 
effect claimed through its map.“Kashmir profile,” BBC, January 29, 2014, accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-16069078. The territorial dispute between China and Pakistan was 
resolved long before the period of focus in this thesis, but it is worth briefly noting that of the territory in question 
in this dispute (which India claims Pakistan illegally ceded to China) China controlled the vast majority before the 
border agreement was reached in 1963. Of the (approximately) 8,806 square kilometers under dispute China 
controlled 7,251 and Pakistan 1,554 square kilometers. The end result of negotiations was that China ceded 1,942 
square kilometers to Pakistan, and kept 5,309 square kilometers of what it had already controlled. Thus, China 
ceded territory, whereas Pakistan received a share of what it had claimed but not controlled (and dropped its claim 
to the remainder). Fravel, Strong Borders, 116, 326.
275 Jeff Smith, “Frontier Tension.”; Holslag, “China, India and the Military Security Dilemma,” 7. One source suggests
that 90 percent of Chinese transgressions has occurred in the Ladakh region. This makes sense, as it seems China 
has generally treated the McMahon line in the east as the LAC there. As Zhou Enlai told Nehru when suggesting a 
deescalation along disputed areas in 1959, “the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and 
India each withdraw 20 kilometres at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east, and from the line up to 
which each side exercises actual control in the west ...” So whereas the two sides have a common reference point 
for the eastern sector (even if China has not formally stated that they consider the McMahon Line the LAC) no such
thing appears to exist to the western sector. That said, transgressions happen in the eastern sector too, although less 
frequently. P. Stobdan, “BDCA with China and its Implications for India,” IDSA Comment, October 29, 2013, 
accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/BDCAwithChinaanditsImplicationsforIndia_pstobdan_291013; “Premier Chou 
En-Lai's Letter to Prime Minister Nehru,” Marxists Internet Archive, accessed May 5, 2014, 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/india/sino-india-boundary-question/ch04.htm.
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Appendix 1, Figure 5).276 This reportedly happened 19 kilometers from the LAC (as perceived by 
India), but in an area where the divergence in LAC perceptions is thought to be particularly large.277 
In response, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police erected tents of its own 300 meter away from the 
Chinese, after unsuccessfully trying to make them leave. What made this incident stand out was the 
fact that the Chinese troops stayed put for several weeks.278 Only after five flag meetings did the 
two sides reach an understanding, on May 5, which led to the Chinese troops turning back.279
One obvious Chinese motivation for patrolling (and establishing a temporary presence in) 
these areas is to protest Indian activity (particularly related to building of infrastructure) close to 
areas of overlapping LAC-perceptions.280 Particularly worrying from China's point of view is 
“India's re-activation of the advanced landing grounds (ALGS) at Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), Fukche 
and Nyoma … The DBO airstrip, for instance, overlooks the strategic Karakoram Pass, while the 
Fukche ALG is barely five km from the LAC [as perceived by India].”281 Bunkers in these areas are 
another source of concern, as such permanent installations could be seen as attempts to establish 
firmer control of what is effectively “no man's land” at present. One of the requirements made by 
China in the flag meetings was therefore that New Delhi destroy some of the bunkers in Chumar 
(which it did).282
To be sure, an Indian focus on improving its capabilities and infrastructure in a strategically 
important area is not surprising, particularly in light of the long-standing Chinese advantage. 
Beijing, however, claims that India has been working much closer to these areas of unclear control 
276 Gaurav C. Sawant, “India is no pushover, we are not scared of China: Salman Khurshid,” India Today, April 26, 
2013, accessed January 7, 2014, 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-india-china-incursion-indo-china-border/1/267744.html.
277 Daulat Beg Oldi lies in the Depsang plains in Ladakh. I was informed by tibetologist and journalist Claude Arpi that
the perceived LAC between the two sides probably differs with between 20 and 30 kilometers in this area. 
(Personal e-mail correspondence, May 6, 2014.) A piece in The Telegraph also placed the location of the incident 
inside a zone of overlapping LAC-perceptions, although the article suggests that the divergence is only between 10 
and 12 kilometers. This article contains a very informative graphic of the perceived LACs, although no source for 
these lines are provided. Sujan Dutta, “Battle of tents and banners on border,” The Telegraph, April 26, 2013, 
accessed January 7, 2014, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130426/jsp/nation/story_16829604.jsp#.UsxlCapjDz5.
278 Namrata Goswami, “China's incursions show strategic blindness,” Asia Times, May 9, 2013, accessed April 3, 
2014, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-03-090513.html.
279 For a summery of the flag meetings, see Sheo Nandan Pandey and Hem Kusum, “In the Annals of Sino-Indian 
Relations: Contours across the PLA Intrusion Crises,” ISPSW Strategy Series, no. 240 (2013), accessed January 7, 
2014, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=167752.
280 Bharti Jain, “China sore with Indian bid to build infrastructure along LAC,” India Times, April 25, 2013, accessed 
May 7, 2014, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/and/nation/China-sore-with-Indian-bid-to-build-infrastructure-al
ong-LAC/articleshow/19719917.cms.
281 “Ladakh crisis not our creation: Govt,” Times of India, May 1, 2013, accessed May 7, 2014, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Ladakh-crisis-not-our-creation-Govt/articleshow/19812010.cms?
referral=PM.
282 “India destroyed bunkers in Chumar to resolve Ladakh row,” Defence News, May 8, 2013, accessed May 7, 2014, 
http://www.defencenews.in/defence-news-internal.aspx?id=BtdOdtMc3KY=.
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than China has done.283 According to an Indian analyst, Beijing has been promoting an agreement 
that would essentially freeze the current buildups around these areas, which understandably has 
been unpopular in New Delhi.284 For these reasons it seems likely that this transgression had more 
to do with protesting India's attempt to catch up with China than with trying to grab new territory. 
This is in line with both offensive and defensive realism, the latter because it assumes that states try 
to maintain their relative power position (thus they are typically not expansionist, but also do not 
want to see a power gap currently to their advantage closed). Of course it is not unlikely that China 
is also interested in keeping alive its claim to these areas which both sides argue fall under their 
control. But as China backed down and pulled out, establishing control over more territory does not 
seem to be an aspiration of the highest priority. No permanent installations (such as bunkers) appear
to have been left behind in these territories by China, and it is worth remembering that the great 
majority of transgressions are undramatic events, where “each side can offer the other's empty 
cigarette and noodle packets as evidence” without any severe changes to the facts on the ground 
happening.285
Some progress seems to have been made after the above mentioned incident. The two sides 
signed a “Border Defence Cooperation Agreement” in October 2013, after a meeting between 
China's Premier Li Keqiang and India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. In it, both sides pledge 
not to use force in face-to-face situations and to avoid tailing each other in areas where there is no 
shared understanding of the LAC. In the latter scenario each side may request a clarification from 
the other regarding the LAC they operate with.286 This is no bullet-proof guarantee that tensions will
disappear, but so far it seems to be a step in the right direction that may ease confrontations when 
transgressions do occur.
The bigger picture
The main question relevant to this thesis is whether China is behaving in a way that suggests it 
seeks to alter the territorial status quo in a significant way. Taking hold of the 90,000 square 
283 Jain, “China sore with Indian bid to build infrastructure along LAC.”According to Jeff Smith this Indian attempt to 
narrow the gap in capabilities and infrastructure in the border areas really only took off after 2006. Jeff M. Smith, 
“On Sino-Indian Border, Status-Quo Unacceptable,” The Diplomat, November 6, 2013, accessed May 7, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/on-sino-indian-border-status-quo-unacceptable/.
284 P. K. Anand, “Depsang Incident: The Border Issue and the Broader India-China Relationship Matrix,” Diplomacy 
and Foreign Affairs, s.a., accessed May 7, 2014, 
http://diplomacyandforeignaffairs.com/depsang-incident-the-border-issue-and-the-broader-india-china-relationship-
matrix/.
285  “India and China: A Himalayan rivalry,” The Economist, August 19, 2010, accessed May 07, 2014,  
http://www.economist.com/node/16843717.
286 “Border Defence Cooperation Agreement between India and China,” October 23, 2013, accessed January 7, 2014, 
http://pmindia.gov.in/press-details.php?nodeid=1726.
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kilometers it claims in the eastern sector would undoubtedly qualify as a significant change in itself,
and as a secondary byproduct such a territorial change of hands would render the remaining 
172,320 square kilometers (approximately) of Northeast India much harder to defend.287  The 
question then becomes whether China's claim to this area is merely a tactical ploy to improve its 
bargaining position in a future border settlement, or an expression of a true and fixed intention to 
reunify “southern Tibet” with its alleged motherland. 
We have already noted the difficulty of proving intentions. In this case some might object 
that there is nothing that really needs proving, as Beijing through its claim to the eastern sector 
displays unambiguous revisionist intentions. For instance, Chellaney suggests that Beijing only 
proves the uselessness of dialogue by “not hiding its intent to further redraw the Himalayan 
frontiers,” and that “the territorial status quo can be changed, on the scale sought by China, not by 
political talks but by further military conquest.”288 In this line of thinking Beijing could easily have 
displayed its satisfaction with the status quo by dropping its claim in the eastern sector, which it has 
not done. Chellaney emphasizes the fact that “China chooses to press claims on additional Indian 
territories,” allegedly part of a grand strategy to “hold off indefinitely on a border settlement … 
through an overt refusal to accept the territorial status quo.”289
However, it is useful to flip the coin. It is true that China would display a strong 
commitment to the status quo by dropping its claim to Arunachal Pradesh. It is also true, however, 
that India has not dropped its claim to Aksai Chin, and that New Delhi has on several occasions 
been presented with a swap offer which it has consistently refused to consider. In fact, in 2010 India
compared the significance of Tibet and Taiwan to China with the significance of Jammu & Kashmir
(which it claims Aksai Chin as a part of) to itself.290 If one steps into the shoes of a Chinese 
strategist it would seem foolish to drop a claim that arguably gives China an extra card to play (or a 
concession to make in return for an Indian quid pro quo) in future negotiations. In fact Chellaney 
implicitly supports the same logic when he laments the fact that India has been all too willing to 
recognize Tibet as a part of China.291 
Only if one believes New Delhi would have been so moved by a Chinese unilateral removal 
of its claim as to follow suit, and thus consolidate the status quo, would it make sense that a China 
287 Garver, Protracted Contest, 92.
288 Chellaney, “India's Intractable Border Dispute with China,” 52.
289 Ibid., 51.
290 Francine R. Frankel, “The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean.” Journal of 
International Affairs 64, no. 2 (2011): 4.
291 Chellaney writes that “Whatever leverage India still had on the Tibet issue was surrendered in 2003 when it shifted 
its position from Tibet being an 'autonomous' region within China to it being 'part of the territory of the People's 
Republic of China.'” The implication being that India could possibly have found itself in a stronger bargaining 
position had it not so easily given in to China's request for assurances on its position on Tibet. “India's Intractable 
Border Dispute with China,” 52.
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satisfied with the present territorial distribution should do so. From Beijing's vantage point there is 
of course the possibility, probably deemed much more likely, that New Delhi would stand firm on 
its claim, in which case China's dropped claim would have proved ill-fated. Neither offensive or 
defensive realism would expect such gambling, and there is not anything ipso facto revisionist 
about not being willing to drop a claim in a dispute that encompasses several areas. 
Thus, we cannot conclude that China is behaving as a revisionist power in the Sino-Indian 
dispute by the fact that it has not dropped its claim in the eastern sector, just as we could not 
conclude that India is behaving as a revisionist power by its unwillingness to drop its claim to the 
western sector, if that was our focus here.292 China has kept its claim in the eastern sector alive 
through such actions as its (failed) 2009 bid to keep Asian Development Bank from granting India 
support for a large development plan (part of which is to go to a flood management program in 
Arunachal Pradesh) and protesting visits to Arunachal Pradesh by the Indian president.293 But these 
are diplomatic tools of statecraft, and unlike military means they are not taken to signal revisionism 
as we have defined it in this thesis.
The same uncertainty holds when it comes to the significance of transgressions. While exact 
Chinese claims in the western sector are not known, it is possible that Beijing is interested in 
asserting control over certain strategic areas here as well. According to a story in The Sunday 
Guardian, the Indian Army came in possession of a Chinese war-game plan which makes it clear 
that the PLA is worried about its weakness in the “Sub Sector North”, of which Daulat Beg Oldi (30
kilometers away from where China made its incursion in April 2013) is the northernmost point. The
author of the article suggests that this may have been the reason for Chinese incursions close to 
Aksai Chin; control of Daulat Beg Oldi would rob India of its best route if it should try to take hold 
of Aksai Chin by force.294 
While this has not been substantiated by other sources (or a formal claim by China), it is 
certainly logical that Beijing is interested in reducing strategic vulnerabilities as much as possible. 
But until such possible aspirations are manifested in actual behavior we cannot take their mere 
plausibility as evidence of revisionism, and the fact that transgressions are conducted by both sides 
(although unfortunately available data are limited and of questionable reliability) complicates the 
picture. Should China start setting up permanent installations in territory it does not control this 
292 Of course, theoretically, there is nothing to suggest that a dispute will always be between one challenger to and one 
defender of the status quo. Both sides may well behave as revisionist or status quo powers.
293 Pranab Dhal Samanta, “India-China face-off worsens over ADB loan for Arunachal,” The Indian Express, May 15, 
2009, accessed December 23, 2013, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indiachina-faceoff-worsens-over-adb-loan-for-arunachal/459910/; Ankit 
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would be a new development that might signal a more unambiguous attempt to alter the facts on the
ground. And while transgressions receive a lot of attention, understandable considering that small 
events can quickly escalate out of control, it is worth repeating that no shots have been fired 
between the two sides for almost five decades.295 
Interestingly, Indian media reported in late November, 2013, that New Delhi had begun to 
seriously contemplate the swap deal.296 Allegedly, Indian foreign ministry documents revealed that 
New Delhi was signaling a willingness to drop its western sector claim as long as China renounced 
its claim to the eastern sector. If such a proposal was to come to fruition it would serve as a much 
better test of whether China is still committed to a consolidation of the current territorial 
distribution than anything history has offered since Deng last proposed the same package deal. 
Indeed, it would be the first clear evidence of an Indian acceptance of the territorial status quo and 
put the onus more clearly on Beijing if it should choose to refuse such an offer.
2.3.2 Bhutan
China and Bhutan share a border of 470 kilometers, and Bhutan is the only state except for India 
that China still has an unresolved land-border dispute with.297 It would be an understatement to say 
that these two neighbors of China are merely related, for India, after independence, soon took over 
the task its British rulers had formerly performed: that of controlling the external relations of the 
small Himalayan kingdom.298 To this day Bhutan does not maintain diplomatic relations with any of
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and while it arguably moved toward a 
more independent control of its foreign policy through its 1971 admittance as a UN member state 
(supported by New Delhi), India still plays an important role in Thimphu's foreign policy making.299
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One of the problems confounding the China-Bhutan dispute is the lack of any previous 
delineation to use as a reference point to negotiate from. The disputed areas have typically 
functioned as pasture lands, used by Tibetans and Bhutanese alike. As Mathou notes, the border 
between Tibet and Bhutan “had never been demarcated in the past. Officials and local people had a 
clear understanding of territory limits only for areas adjacent to major pass [sic] traditionally used 
by traders. The rest of the frontier was largely unknown and nobody has expressed any interest for 
the demarcation of territorial jurisdictions prior to 1959.”300 Thus we are dealing with another 
Chinese claim grounded in its possession of Tibet, and with the Chinese crackdown on that region 
in 1959 Bhutan increasingly came to worry about its own fate. The fact that Mao allegedly had 
referred to Tibet as a palm with five fingers, of which Bhutan was one, did not ease such 
concerns.301 Neither did Chinese incursions, beginning in 1962 (the same year as the Sino-Indian 
war) and continuing intermittently until the mid-80s, when border negotiations started.302
It should be note that at this stage outside observers still know very little about the details of 
the border negotiations between Bhutan and China.303 Negotiations began in 1984, with the first five
rounds spent reaching common ground on “guiding principles” for further negotiations. With the 
sixth round in 1989 “substantive talks” had started.304 Allegedly the territory under dispute initially 
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totaled “more than 1,000 square kilometers” in the western sector of the border between China and 
Bhutan, but in 1996 it was stated that “there are essentially only three areas in the western sector 
which are still under negotiation” making up a total of 269 square kilometers.305 Apparently, 
between the outset of negotiations (when the two sides disputed over 1,000 square kilometers in the 
west) and this 1996 report, a further 495 square kilometers of territory in the north were claimed by 
both sides, but it was stated in 1992 that “the Chinese side have more or less agreed to concede 
these areas to Bhutan.”306  The “more or less” is key here, because it soon became clear that China 
was not dropping its claim to these northern areas gratuitous, but instead wanted a swap deal 
whereby Beijing removed its claim to these 495 square kilometers in return for Thimphu dropping 
its claim to the remaining 269 square kilometers of disputed territory in the west.307
In 1998 came what has so far been the most significant result of the negotiations, the 
“Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Sino-Bhutan Border Areas.” 
Among other things the agreement states that “prior to the ultimate solution of the boundary issues, 
peace and tranquility along the border should be maintained and the status quo of the boundary 
prior to March 1959 should be upheld,” and “both sides agreed to settle this issue through friendly 
consultations.”308 From Bhutan's point of view this was a welcome achievement in that it now gave 
Thimphu a specific agreement to point to when protesting Chinese activities such as logging and 
road-building in areas under dispute.309 
In 2000, Bhutan extended its claim line in the western sector.310 Six years later it appeared 
the total area of Bhutan had been reduced by 18 percent, from 47,000 square kilometers to 38,394 
square kilometers.311 The area that had allegedly become Chinese consisted of mountainous (and 
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apparently uninhabited) territory in the north. Almost nothing is known to the public about this 
affair, in fact the only official reference that seems to be available in the public realm is an 
explanation by Bhutan's Secretary for International Boundaries which suggests that the older 
Bhutanese map was in fact erroneous, and that this had been discovered after “a team of army, 
surveyors and people who were well versed with the border areas were deputed to verify ... the 
border areas.”312 The new map was adjusted for this mistake. However, the fact that this “new map” 
had only been discovered in 2006 is indeed strange. According to the Secretary for International 
Boundaries, it had been presented to the National Assembly already in 1989, and had also been the 
given to the Chinese government.313 Thus, this large chunk of territory, which included Kula Kangri 
(previously considered the highest mountain in Bhutan) had not been a part of the territorial 
dispute.314
The most recent available (official) figures for the size of the disputed areas are from 2009, 
when the Secretary for International Boundaries specified that:
… China first offered Luling valley of 186 Sq. Km in 1989. In 1990 they further offered 77 Sq. Km 
up to Charithang Chhu. During technical discussions in 2005 they again offered 110 Sq. Km. We do 
not know where the line will fall as the Chinese maps and our maps are different in scale, names of 
places, rivers, passes and ridges are also different. Moreover, they said that the disputed area is 1300 
Sq. Km whereas our disputed area works out to be 1128 Sq. Km. Therefore, we have proposed that 
joint field technical visit be discussed during the 19th Round of Boundary Talks.315
However, even if the exact territory under dispute is not known (or even agreed upon by the parties 
involved), it appears the package deal is still on offer.316 Furthermore, a technical survey in the 
northern sector was conducted jointly in early September 2013 (apparently the only significant 
result of the 21st round of negotiations in August the same year), although it has not yet been 
reported whether or not this survey successfully led to an agreement on the exact size of the 
territory under dispute.317
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It seems clear that for China the western sector is considered much more strategically 
important than the northern areas. This is reflected in the proposed package deal, where China is 
willing to give up the (larger) northern sector if Bhutan agrees to let it have the (smaller) western 
sector (see Appendix 1, Figure 6).318
The significance of the western sector lies in its proximity to the Chumbi Valley, at the 
(western) intersection between Bhutan, India and China. Described by one observer as “the single 
most strategically important piece of real estate in the entire Himalayan region,” this valley extends 
downward from Tibet toward the Siliguri corridor, the “chicken neck” (only 25 kilometers wide at 
its narrowest) that connects the rest of India to its northeastern section.319 The connection is not 
direct (Chumbi Valley borders India's Sikkim, not the Siliguri corridor), but incorporation of these 
territories under Chinese control would strengthen Beijing's position.320 China has controlled the 
Chumbi Valley since the early 50s, but reportedly Beijing would like more maneuvering space there
to facilitate troop deployments. As the situation stands right now, “Indian control and defense of 
Sikkim and Bhutan means that a PLA advance through the Chumbi Valley would be subject to 
Indian observation, artillery , bombardment, and flank attack.”321 Thus, according to one observer, 
“The Chinese strategy of claiming areas in western Bhutan is to widen [the valley's] shoulders to 
facilitate military manoeuvres ...”322 In a worst case scenario for strategy planners in New Delhi, 
China would better be able to attack its Achilles heel in Siliguri by controlling these areas.323 
That is not to say that China by incorporating this sector could unchallenged slice its way 
through southwestern Bhutan and enter the Siliguri corridor. New Delhi also maintains a presence 
in western Bhutan with the Indian Military Training Team headquartered in the Haa district (see 
Appendix 1, Figure 6),  which according to one observer “both trains the Bhutanese Army and 
keeps a watch on PLA activities nearby.”324 So while China would better its position by controlling 
this area, it would not by itself be a game changer should a military conflict with India erupt. Nor is 
it to say that China's interest is purely offensive. The Chumbi Valley can be traveled both ways; it 
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320 The distance between the Yadong (in Chumbi Valley) and Siliguri is approximately 100 kilometers.
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was Britain's chosen route when it occupied Shigatze (Tibet) in 1904.325 By controlling the western 
sector China would also improve its defensive abilities should another state move troops through 
the Chumbi Valley.
Chinese pressure and overall assessment
The lack of delineation and demarcation has brought its share of problems to the areas under 
dispute. These can be categorized as those that appear uncontrolled by the government (relating to 
activities of the local population) and those where the state is more clearly involved. To the first 
category belongs the complaints by Bhutan that Tibetan herdsmen and harvesters have been using 
Bhutanese areas for grazing and collecting Cordyceps (valuable fungi used for medicinal purposes).
These problems seem to have been most common in the border areas of the Trashi Yangtse district 
(in northeastern Bhutan, see appendix 1, Figure 6), where there does not appear to be any disputed 
territory between the two states. Much of this problem probably comes down to the lack of 
demarcation.326
The second category is more serious. As with the case of the Sino-Indian dispute, border 
transgressions by soldiers have been a problem here as well. In this case available data are even 
more lacking, the only figures that appear to be available in the public realm are a reported 21 
transgressions in 2008 and 17 in 2009 by PLA troops.327 Unsurprisingly, all of these occurred in the 
western sector and involved Chinese soldiers patrolling as far as up to an outpost of the Royal 
Bhutan Army (RBA) in Lharigang, Charithang Valley. A second problem belonging to this category
is Chinese road construction in disputed areas. By 2006 there were reportedly six roads that worried
Bhutan, two of them leading up to the disputed areas and the other four going into disputed 
territory. Patrols by the RBA had frequently run into Chinese road builders and soldiers who, when 
notified of their breach of the 1998 agreement, “always claimed that firstly they were constructing 
the roads in their own territory and not on Bhutanese land, secondly they were building roads for 
the benefit of the local Tibetans and lastly the road constructions were being carried out on the 
instructions of their government.”328 After several protests by Bhutan, China stopped these 
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activities, but in 2008 proceeded to build 900 meters more of motor road in disputed areas. Bhutan 
again protested, after which China once more halted road construction.329 As of the time of writing 
there has been no more reports of road building in disputed areas.
Bhutan's Secretary for International Boundaries interpreted China's road building activities 
as aimed at speeding up the talks and reaching a settlement, but it seems clear that China is adamant
that such a settlement must include its ownership over the disputed areas in the west. Reportedly 
some of the road constructed is in an area located above the very same Charithang Valley where the
PLA has been patrolling.330 So while the number of Chinese transgressions appears relatively small 
(as compared to those in areas disputed with India), and the road building has been stopped after 
Thimphu's lodging of protests, China appears to be the more proactive party involved in this 
dispute. While Beijing has been offering concessions and is willing to drop its claims to the 
northern sector altogether, this comes coupled with pressure in the western areas, both through 
temporary incursions by the PLA and road building in disputed areas, the latter particularly 
worrying as it is a way of changing the facts on the (disputed) ground. While I feel it necessary to 
repeat the caveat that the information available for drawing strong inferences regarding this dispute 
is very limited, it does appear from the available material that Beijing has been trying to create a 
sense of urgency in Thimphu; to signal that it is in Bhutan's own interest to reach a deal as soon as 
possible, perhaps by accepting the package offer. However, it should also be noted that so far no 
violence has been used by either side.
Thus, what can be said with some confidence is that China in this dispute has been seeking 
to secure a rather small (in absolute terms) sector of territory that is strategically significant in 
improving its position relative to India. Fears of a Chinese wish to swallow its small neighbor are 
thus overblown,331 suggestions that it wants to improve its strategic position vis-a-vis India are not.
Smith suggests the that two sides may be approaching a settlement, and quotes the Chinese 
head delegate as stating in 2010 that “the majority of the work is completed. What's left is minor.”332
However, a similar remark was made a decade earlier (prior to the setback in 2002), then also by the
head of the Chinese delegation: “the boundary issue has, by and large, been resolved.”333 In 2012 
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Wen Jiabao, meeting the Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley for the first time, remarked 
that China was “willing to complete border demarcation with Bhutan at an early date,” apparently 
the highest level assurance that a settlement is on the horizon.334 It remains to be seen whether these 
are merely platitudes of expressed goodwill and – if an agreement is reached –  who ends up 
conceding which parts of their claim.
2.3.3 Assessing the disputes
As noted, at the time of writing this thesis India and Bhutan are (with the exception of North Korea)
the only states with which Beijing still has unresolved land border disputes. The two disputes share 
certain characteristics, in that the urgency of both were exacerbated after China's invasion of Tibet 
and that one of the countries (Bhutan) has been highly reliant on the other (India) in matters of 
foreign policy.
Of the states under consideration here Bhutan is the only that does not have any prior border 
delineation with China to use as a reference. On the one hand, since the territorial status quo in the 
other cases could be traced back to actions of China's imperial adversaries one would perhaps think 
the lack any such “unequal treaties” would have benefited the resolution of this territorial dispute. 
On the other hand, such previous delineation can be very helpful in providing a clear reference 
point for negotiations, and as we have seen China has been willing to approach treaties it has 
formally denounced as illegitimate in a pragmatic way. Thus, to some extent the absence of 
anything other than a customary and sometimes unclear border between Tibet and Bhutan 
contributed to the emergence of this dispute.
So far, China has dropped its claim to the majority of the original disputed territory close to 
its western border with Bhutan. And while precise information about the disputed territories is 
lacking, it appears China has repeatedly made an offer of a “package deal” whereby it renounces its 
claims to the norther sector as long as Bhutan drops its claim to the 269 square kilometers disputed 
in the west. On the face of it this dispute thus resembles several of the other we have considered; 
China appears willing to settle for an agreement that would grant it only a portion of its original 
claim. 
However, there are certain differences, most importantly the road construction that, although
limited, has contributed to changing the facts on the ground. It appears both China and India see the 
western sector in the China-Bhutan dispute as strategically significant, and this is most likely why a 
2013, http://www.kuenselonline.com/bhutan-and-china-hold-annual-talks/.
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resolution has yet to be reached, as Bhutan has to take Indian considerations into account when 
conducting its foreign policy. China has not used force, but it has arguably put pressure on Bhutan 
through PLA transgressions (although data limitations does not permit a conclusive judgment) even 
if the absolute numbers appear to be limited. While it appears that this case could possibly fit with 
limited aims revisionism on China's part, the evidence at the current stage remains inconclusive. 
What can be ruled out, however, is any sort of grand territorial revisionist aims, since China has 
already dropped parts of its claim and signaled a willingness to drop the majority of what remains, 
so long as it gets what it considers a strategic area in the west.
As for the Sino-Indian dispute, suggestions that China has been displaying revisionist 
behavior by its insistence on maintaining its claim to Arunachal Pradesh are unconvincing when the
issue is seen in context. Up until now only China has displayed a willingness to settle the dispute in 
a way that would freeze the status quo, through the proposed package deal whereby China keeps 
Aksai Chin and India keeps Arunachal Pradesh. It is true that three decades has passed since the last
time this solution was proposed (as far as we know), and that China in 1985 claimed that for the 
package deal to still be acceptable it would need to include Tawang as a Chinese area. But it is 
uncertain whether or not this was intended as anything more than a way of putting pressure on 
India, after New Delhi's consistent refusal of the swap offer. 
Since then the risk of tensions escalating out of control, as happened in 1962 and to a lesser 
(non-violent) extent in 1987, has been reduced through confidence-building measures and 
agreements on maintaining the LAC. Transgressions have for the most part been undramatic events,
and China has so far not built permanent structures inside what India considers its side of the LAC. 
Were it to start doing so this would have been a sign of an intention to change the facts on the 
ground, and indeed clearer proof that it may have further ambitions inside the Ladakh region. But so
far Beijing has has kept to temporary patrolling mostly of short duration and distance. The April 
2013 incident was an exception in this regard, but also ended with Chinese withdrawal after India 
agreed to destroy a number of permanent installations it had built in a disputed area. Thus, China's 
behavior in its dispute with India up until now does not appear revisionist. Its transgressions are 
consistent with a strategy of maintaining its claim and putting pressure on New Delhi to move 
toward negotiation.
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3. Disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea
3.1 Background
Both the South China Sea and East China sea are partially enclosed seas connected to the Pacific 
Ocean. The former borders eight states (China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam), connects the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and contains 
a number of islands, rocks, reefs and shoals,335 as has become common knowledge through the 
ongoing disputes over sovereignty and rights. The East China Sea lies to the north of the South 
China Sea and is bordered by four states (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China). The most 
noteworthy dispute of this sea relates to the sovereignty over the islands known as Senkaku (Japan),
Diaoyu (China), Diaoyutai (Taiwan) or Pinnacle (English name) Islands (see Appendix 1, Figure 
7).336 These are claimed by Japan (which has administered them continuously since 1972), China 
and Taiwan. In addition, China and Japan are involved in a EEZ-dispute; the East China Sea is no 
more than 360 nautical miles at its widest which presents challenges when the disputants base their 
EEZ-claims on different principles. Japan argues the two states should use an equidistance line to 
determine their respective EEZs' border, whereas China favors using “national prolongation 
principles” to settle the border, which would make its EEZ go further east (and consequently cause 
Japan's to retract).337 
China also has an EEZ-dispute with South Korea, and the two states both claim sovereignty 
over “a submerged rock in the western East China Sea” on which the latter disputant has 
constructed an observation station.338 These disputes will not be covered in this thesis due to 
considerations of space, and because generally speaking they have been less volatile than the 
maritime disputes with Japan and Southeast Asian states (and the submerged rock itself appears to 
be of little strategic value).
In the South China Sea, the most prominent disputes concern two archipelagos: Paracel 
Islands and Spratly Islands (see Appendix 1, Figure 8).339 The Paracels are known as Xisha Qundao 
in Chinese and Hoang Sa in Vietnamese, and are claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan. The 
335 Hereafter the word “features” will be used to as an umbrella term for these types of sea territory.
336 Hereafter referred to as the Senkaku Islands or Senkakus, with no intention of favoring Japan's claim
337 June Teufel Dreyer, “Sino-Japanese Territorial and Maritime Disputes,” in Beijing's Power and China's Borders: 
Twenty Neighbors in Asia, ed. Bruce A. Elleman et al. (Armonk: New York, 2013), 81, 83. Both of these views are 
compatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Japan refers to article 57 
whereas China refers to article 76.
338 Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea dispute: context, claims, issues, and possible solutions,” Asian Perspective 
31, no. 1 (2007): 134.
339 These names, instead of their native varieties, will be used to refer to the archipelagos.
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archipelago consists of two groups of features, the northeastern Amphitrite group the southwestern 
Crescent group. Since 1974 China has controlled this archipelago in its entirety. The Spratlys are 
known as Nansha Qundao in Chinese, Truong Sa in Vietnamese, Kapuluan ng Kalayaan in Filipino 
and Kepulauan Spratly in Malay. The are claimed in their entirety by China, Vietnam and Taiwan, 
while the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have claims only to some of the features of the 
archipelago. 
Most of the features that make up the Paracels and Spratlys seem to have been given limited 
attention throughout much of history, an assessment that also fits the Senkaku Islands. As one 
observer noted regarding the Spratlys and the historically exaggerated arguments of its claimants, 
“The talk of defending every inch of sacred territory held since time immemorial rings hollow 
against the reality that the few stray fishermen and merchants who struggled ashore there 
considered it a great misfortune to have done so.”340 
But whereas historical references to the Spratlys are few (and vague), China's usage of the 
more proximate areas of the sea goes way back, probably to around 53 CE.341 The seems have 
reflected an economic rationale: The Spratlys are far away from the Chinese mainland, and since 
trade ships sailed close to coast to ensure access to supplies of fresh water and food, and “was not 
so much 'destination-oriented' as given to 'tramping' from port to port in a system of exchange,” 
adventures far into the high seas made little sense.342 In the early stages China's usage was far from 
exclusive, “the sea route connecting T'ien-chu (India) and Fu-nan (Cambodia) with Canton … was 
well established by the first century, but was dominated by non-Chinese seamen for many centuries 
thereafter.” China's shipping activities only took off after the ninth century, before which “most of 
the shipping in the region … was Malay, Cambodian, Indonesian, Persian or Indian.”343 However, 
for half a millennium, between the tenth and fifteenth century, the characterization of the South 
China Sea as a “Chinese lake” largely reflected reality.344 Then came a reversal of China's maritime 
advantage, brought about by policies of the late Ming dynasty, concomitant with the dawn of a 
European presence in the waters of East Asia.
The history that follows is one of European sea primacy in Asia and serves to illustrate that 
to reduce the South China Sea to its islands, reefs and shoals would be to miss the forest for the 
trees. Just as important is probably the fact that throughout history those that controlled the sea had 
340 Brantly Womack, “The Spratlys: From Dangerous Grounds to Apple of Discord,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A 
Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 (2011): 375.
341 Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York: Methuen, 1982), 10, 68. 
342 Ibid., 23.
343 Ibid., 11. The same story of numerous users is true regarding fishing in the sea. Peter Dutton, “Three Disputes and 
Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 (2011): 59.
344 Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 22.
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a regional launching pad for invasion at their disposal. In China's case, according to one observer, it 
had “prior to 1949 … suffered 470 invasions from the sea, including seventy large-scale invasions, 
such as those during the Opium Wars.”345 By the time of the Opium Wars the South China Sea had 
already been dominated by Britain and France for half a century. This domination would gradually 
be challenged by Japan.
Japan's spoils brought about through its victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 
included “The island of Formosa [Taiwan], together with all islands appertaining or belonging to 
the said island of Formosa,” another territorial loss from the “century of humiliation” in Chinese 
history.346 The position taken by China (and Taiwan) is that up until then the Senkaku Islands were a
part of Taiwan, marking the boundary between it and the Ryukyu Islands.347 Japan for its part claims
the Senkakus had the status of terra nullius when Japan discovered them in 1884.348 Thus, as the 
argument goes, the fact that they were only incorporated into the Japanese empire in January 1895, 
while the Sino-Japanese war was still ongoing, was coincidental.
After Japan's victory over China, Paris' increasingly started to worry that Tokyo would assert
itself more forcefully in the South China Sea. This led France, although hesitant, in 1930 to assert 
control over a number of the Spratlys, with implicit support from London and strong opposition by 
Tokyo.349 Japan gradually started establishing a presence both on Spratlys and Paracels, and with 
Europe preoccupied by events closer to home Japan in February 1939 occupied China's Hainan 
Island, put forth claims to the Paracels and Spratlys, and occupied more of the land features of these
archipelagos.350 France and Britain protested, but did not consider the matter important enough to 
take away focus from the European developments that would lead to the outbreak of World War II 
in September the same year.351
The two peace treaties signed after Japan's defeat in the Second World War that are relevant 
to the ongoing dispute over the Spratlys and Paracels – the San Fransisco Peace treaty of 1951 and 
the Treaty of Taipei of 1952 (between the Republic of China and Japan) – are unclear as far as 
345 Guangqian Peng, “China’s Maritime Rights and Interests,” in Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China 
Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons, ed. Peter Dutton (Newport: U.S. Naval War
College, 2010), 16.
346 “TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI, 1895,” China's External Relations - A History, accessed March 27, 2014, 
http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/182.
347 China and Taiwan furthermore emphasize historical evidence of both usage and naming prior to Japan's 
incorporation of the islands. Seokwoo Lee, “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the 
Senkaku Islands,” Boundary & Territory Briefings 3, no. 7 (2002): 2.
348 Ibid., 10.
349 Geoffrey Till, “The South China Sea dispute: An international history,” in Security and International Politics in the 
South China Sea: Towards a cooperative management regime, ed. Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (New York : 
Routledge, 2009), 28-29.
350 Reportedly Japan made the islands a part of Taiwan (which, as noted, it had gained through the  Treaty of 
Shimonoseki).Chang, The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, 17.
351 Till, “The South China Sea dispute,” 29-30.
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transfer of ownership is concerned, merely noting that Japan renounces its claims to the listed 
territory.352 As far as the Senkaku Islands were concerned, they had been administered as a part of 
Okinawa Prefecture, and thus came under Washington's administration after the war.
3.2 Developments in the Cold War era
South China Sea. After the Second World War the US came to dominate the sea, a situation that 
has largely remained to this day.353 But whereas the US unquestionably was the strongest naval 
power in the region it did not, unlike Britain and France earlier, make claims to land features in the 
area on behalf of itself or others. Instead regional states gradually started to assert their claims.
Prior to the early 1970s most of the claimed features of the South China Sea sea remained 
unoccupied. However, the Republic of China (the first actor to occupy a feature) established a 
presence on Woody Island (the largest of the Paracels and one of the islands in the Amphitrite 
group) already in January 1947. Chiang Kai-Shek's men left again in 1950, shortly after having fled 
mainland China, and the victorious PRC occupied the same island five years later. In 1956 ROC 
(hereafter referred to as Taiwan) established a permanent presence on Itu Aba, the largest of the 
Spratlys.354 At the end of the 1950s South Vietnam had begun evicting Chinese fishermen from the 
Crescent group in the Paracels in a bid to establish control over this area of the archipelago.355 This 
control, however, does not appear to have been very strong. Saigon had the more pressing matter of 
its war with communist North Vietnam to occupy its attention. 
A more dramatic encounter between the PRC and South Vietnam occurred in 1974. In 1970 
and 1971 the Philippines had occupied five Spratly features. Two years later South Vietnam 
occupied six features from the same island group, and in September 1973 Saigon proceeded to 
announce that henceforth its province Phuoc Tuy would exercise jurisdiction over eleven of the 
Spratlys.356 All this came in the context of the discovery of oil reserves and a stronger focus on 
maritime rights. At a time when it did not occupy any of the Spratlys, Beijing intended to strengthen
its hold over the Paracels, where it already had a presence.357 Simultaneously, China issued 
352 See Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, 77-81.
353 Stein Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” Modern Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2006): 
20.
354 Geoffrey Till, “The South China Sea dispute,” 31. Apparently the ROC had occupied Itu Aba previously too (after 
Woody Island, but before leaving mainland China), and pulled out simultaneously as from Woody Island.
355 M. Taylor Fravel, “China's Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (2011): 297. 
According to Chang this included attempts to scare away fishermen by sending gunboats to the area, and even 
kidnapping. The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, 22.
356 Fravel, Strong Borders, 278; Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National
Development (St Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1998), 73.
357 Fravel, Strong Borders, 277-78.
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diplomatic protests against occupations in the Spratlys and lodged (for the first time) a claim to 
maritime resources grounded in its territorial claims.358 An increasingly tense situation, where China
increased its presence and both sides conducted patrolling around the Paracels, culminated in 
clashes on January 19, 1974. A battle was fought in the morning, after which South Vietnamese 
forces pulled back. The same afternoon China's marine was ordered to take possession of three 
islands in the Crescent group, before then under control of Saigon.359 The result was a complete 
Chinese control over the Paracels, which remains to this day. Incidentally, North Vietnam appears to
have changed its position on the island disputes around this time. It had on occasions in 1956 and 
1958 given China support for its claim to the Spratlys and Parcels, but appears to have become 
more hesitant once South Vietnam started asserting its claim these island groups more forcefully.360 
Thus, Hanoi did not offer Beijing any moral support when South Vietnam evicted Chinese 
fishermen from the Paracels, nor did it do so on any occasion related to the dispute later. After 
China took control over all of the Parcels in 1974, North Vietnam “implicitly withdrew its previous 
recognition of Chinese claims to the islands” by pointing out the two sides should settle their 
dispute peacefully.361
In the Spratlys, China remained the odd man out in a company where most claimants had 
taken possession of features. China's position was weak compared to Vietnam (now unified), the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan, since “unchallenged occupation is nine-tenths of the law” when 
it comes to demonstrating effective control.362 It would take more than a decade after the clash with 
Vietnam over the Paracels before the Chinese leadership decided to turn things around in the 
Spratlys. By that time, however, all of the features that were not partially or fully submerged during 
high tide were already occupied by other claimants.363
In 1987, Chinese leaders decided to secure a presence in the Spratlys by taking hold of nine 
of the features that remained unoccupied.364 Beijing started out by taking possession of Fiery Cross 
Reef in January 1988.365 Once China's move became clear to Vietnam, Hanoi responded by hurrying
358 Ibid., 280.
359 Ibid., 282-83.
360 Chang, The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute, 20-22.
361 Ibid., 25.
362 Womack, “The Spratlys,” 374.
363 Fravel, Strong Borders, 288. This relates to whether or not the features can be classified as islands under UNCLOS,
and thus the maritime rights they may be entitled to. Only islands are entitled to an EEZ. According to Article 121 
of UNCLOS, “An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high 
tide,” and “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf.” United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, “PART 
VIII: REGIME OF ISLANDS.”
364 Fravel, “China's Strategy in the South China Sea,” 298.
365 Fravel, Strong Borders, 293. By late February construction had begun on this feature of an observation station and 
base.
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to occupy five features nearby in an attempt to “form a perimeter around Fiery Cross.”366 
Confrontations and more occupations ensued. The first one to turn violent occurred on March 
13-14. The two sides do not agree on who reached the contested feature, Johnson Reef, first. Both 
sides had ships nearby and men placed on the reef, and both sides were to expel the other. What 
started as a shoving match swiftly turned into a battle once a shot had been fired, and the Chinese 
side (significantly outgunning the Vietnamese) ended it in less than thirty minutes, with 74 
Vietnamese casualties.367
Having defeated Vietnam on Johnson Reef, Chinese commanders  requested permission to 
evict Vietnamese forces from other features in the Spratlys, but they were turned down by the 
Central Military Commission.368 In the sense that China was now merely one among several 
claimants to occupy features in the Spratlys, 1988 was more of a limited than complete victory; 
China had established a presence but only as one of several states, and with none of the largest 
features of the island group under its control. And in the end Beijing had only seized six of the nine 
features the original plan called for.369 China had thus established a presence in the Spratlys, but it 
remained limited.
East China Sea. Following the discovery of what looked to be promising oil reserves in the
area in 1969, tensions over the Senkaku Islands had been building.370 In December 1970 and 
February 1971 respectively China and Taiwan asserted claims to the islands publicly.371 The issue 
was particularly pertinent because the expected termination of US occupation of Okinawa 
Prefecture was on the horizon.372 This termination came about in 1972 through the Okinawa 
Reversion Agreement, with the US effectively washing its hands of the dispute by arguing that they 
merely restored administrative control of the Senkaku Islands to Japan and did not take a position 
on the question of sovereignty, the same position it has maintained ever since.373
While the return of the Senkakus to Japanese administration was a most unwelcome 
development from China's point of view, Beijing was in this period more interested in improving its
relations with Japan than in turning the island dispute into an issue endangering the bilateral 
relationship. On September 29, 1972, a little more than a year after Japan had been shocked by the 
366 Ibid., 294.
367 Ibid., 295.
368 Ibid., 296.
369 Fravel, “China's Strategy in the South China Sea,” 298.
370 Dreyer, “Sino-Japanese Territorial and Maritime Disputes,” 85.
371 Lee, “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands,” 7.
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announcement of Nixon's upcoming visit to China, normalization between Tokyo and Beijing was a
fact.374 Zhou Enlai reportedly suggested leaving out the Senkakus from the negotiations over 
normalization so as to ensure its success.375 China took the same position with Japan in the 
negotiations over a peace treaty, starting in the mid 70s and eventually concluded on August 12, 
1978.376 However, in mid-April the same year, four months before the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, China confronted Tokyo 
on the Senkaku dispute by sending a flotilla of about a hundred fishing ships to areas around the 
disputed islands, more than half of them reportedly armed.377 On the face of it this action appears 
highly inconsistent with the insistence on keeping the issue low-key and away from the then 
ongoing peace negotiations with Japan. It may be that this was seen in Beijing as a necessary 
reminder that China had not given up its claim; an example of coercive diplomacy whereby China 
challenged Japan's consolidation of effective control over the islands, as the Japanese government in
a Diet-session of the previous month had responded to a question by saying China's claim was 
“useless” and that nothing regarding the status of the Senkakus needed to be discussed. Japan 
protested the presence of Chinese fishing boats but did not respond with force. The Chinese vessels 
eventually left the area and Beijing later provided the unconvincing claim that the incident had been
an accident.378 In July the same year Japanese rightists erected a lighthouse on one of the Senkakus, 
which appears to have been the first instance of a structure being built on one of the islands by a 
nationalist group.379
3.3 Later developments
South China Sea. In the atmosphere that followed China's establishment of a presence in the 
Spratlys in 1988, other claimants continued occupation of features in the archipelago. For China's 
part, its occupation of Mischief Reef in 1994 received a lot of attention. Only in February 1995 did 
the Philippines discover that Beijing had been doing construction work on the reef the year 
before.380 A protest was lodged by Manila, to which China responded that the purpose of the 
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construction work was only to offer shelter to the Chinese fishermen operating in the area.381 
In May 1995, Manila sent a ship with press photographers (and two naval ships for 
protection) to Mischief Reef, to which China protested diplomatically. Later a Chinese boat 
reportedly “cut across the bow” of one of the naval ships.382 After the Philippine ship called in for 
reinforcement two Chinese naval vessels reached the scene, eventually leading to a withdrawal by 
the Philippines.383 In June the same year Manila destroyed a number of Chinese sovereignty 
markers on features in the Spratlys.
Even in this atmosphere of tension there were signs of restraint from those involved. In 1995
China and the Philippines agreed on at code of conduct, pledging to avoid use of force in settling 
their dispute (over the sea features in general, not only Mischief Reef).384 No more features in the 
Spratlys have been occupied by China since 1994, or by any other state since 1998 (Malaysia) and 
1999 (Vietnam). The distribution of occupied features in the Spratlys since then has for China, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam been 7, 5, 8, 1 and 27 respectively.385
The first significant step toward deescalation in the South China Sea came with the 
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” (DoC) signed in 2002 by the 
ASEAN states and China.386 In it all signatories pledged to avoid occupying more features and to 
avoid using the threat of, or actual, force. In this respect China's signing of the declaration can be 
seen as a major development in its approach, because up until then Beijing had insisted that its 
disputes in the South China Sea were to be handled on a bilateral basis without outside 
interference.387 However, it should be noted that this agreement “was envisaged not as a conflict 
resolution mechanism but as a conflict management device,” meaning that it aimed to improve the 
general atmosphere between the disputants and avoid conflicts from escalating, rather than reaching
a permanent settlement of the disputes.388 Furthermore, China successfully worked to keep the DoC 
from including the Paracels, to avoid a clause that would freeze infrastructure building on the 
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features, and (along with Malaysia) to make it a “declaration” instead of a “code.”389 Still, it was a 
first step toward a demilitarization of the South China Sea disputes, even if it was of limited effect. 
One year later China, as the first non-ASEAN state to do so, signed the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, renouncing the use of force in dispute settlement.390
East China Sea. The dispute over the Senkaku Islands started bubbling up again in the 
mid-90s. Since the peace treaty between China and Japan had been signed in 1978 tensions had 
generally been low, occasional problems did not get out of control and Deng Xiaoping's suggestion 
that dispute settlement be postponed indefinitely (the “shelving solution”) held sway.391 But in 
1992, when China passed its “Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone” where it reaffirms its sovereignty over the Senkakus (as well as Spratlys and 
Paracels), Tokyo started to claim publicly that there had never been an agreement to shelve the 
dispute, and that in fact there was no dispute over the Senkakus that needed to be addressed.392 By 
the mid-90s Chinese exploration vessels had become a common sight in the area.393 In July 1996, 
rightists from the Japan Youth Federation built a new lighthouse on one of the Senkakus. In August 
the same group set up a war memorial, and in September they were permitted to do repair work on 
the newly erected lighthouse. Demonstrations were held in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also in 
China (where the government had previously tried to keep a lid on anti-Japanese protests).394 Later 
in September a Hong Kong activist drowned in waters close to the Senkakus, trying to swim from a 
boat to one of the islands.395 With tension running high Japanese journalists kept pushing for an 
official statement regarding how Washington would respond, should China take the islands by 
force. The US Defense Department finally provided an assurance that the defense treaty with Japan 
covered the Senkakus (after the State Department having first suggested it did not).396 In a positive 
development, 1997 saw the conclusion of a fisheries agreement between Japan and China, in 
negotiations of which the two sides agreed not to impose their own national law in areas close to the
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Senkakus.397 Yet the problem of Chinese military and research vessels operating in proximity to the 
islands did not abate.398
In 2004 tensions arose again, when a group of Chinese activists entered one of the Senkakus 
in March, and for the first time Japan arrested them. However, while the arrest did cause anger in 
Beijing, as it served to demonstrate Japanese effective control, Tokyo reportedly intervened swiftly 
with the local government to make sure the seven activists were not prosecuted as this would have 
raised tension further.399 Reportedly, in talks behind-the-scenes after this incident China agreed to 
keep activists heading for the Senkakus from leaving its shores in return for a Japanese assurance 
that it would continue avoiding prosecution of Chinese activists in Japanese courts, although both 
governments have denied the existence of any such understanding.400 
The following years saw new tension related to oil and gas field development. This is 
connected to the overlapping EEZ claims of China and Japan, as both are interested in the resources
located close to the theoretical equidistance line (which, as noted, Japan has proposed to use to 
delineate the border of their EEZs). In September 2005, a Chinese destroyer reportedly aimed at a 
Japanese patrol plane operating close to the Chunxiao gas field.401 This field had been discovered by
China in 1995, and while Beijing had started development only on its side of the theoretical 
equidistance line, it came so near it that it was likely to pump up resources on the other side of the 
line (Japan's) in the process.402
However, after eleven rounds of negotiations between 2004 and 2008 a “principled 
consensus” was reached in June 2008, whereby gas fields in the overlapping EEZ area was to be 
jointly developed by the two states, so as to contribute to the stated longer term goal of turning the 
East China Sea into a “sea of peace, cooperation and friendship.”403 Since the relevant area is close 
to the equidistance line between the two countries Chinese leaders faced criticism at home for what 
was seen as an implicit acceptance of Japan's preferred principle for settling the EEZ-dispute.404 
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404 Dreyer, “Sino-Japanese Territorial and Maritime Disputes,” 92. Beijing denied that the principled consensus 
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However, Japan arguably made a concession by agreeing that Chinese law should apply to the area 
and in the sense that most of the area to be jointly developed is on the Japanese side of the 
equidistance line.405 In any case this initiative soon petered out, with no implementation in sight. 
In December 2008, China conducted “irregular patrol activities” close to the Senkakus, 
probably as a way to assert its claim to the islands. This was understandably seen in Japan as an 
escalation since the patrolling is conducted by the China Marine Surveillance, a maritime law 
enforcement agency which carries a stronger signal of jurisdictional rights, and went into the 
territorial waters of the islands.406 As evidenced by Appendix 2, Figure 1, there were two reported 
instances of Chinese vessels entering the territorial waters (0-12 nautical miles away from shore) of 
the Senkakus and two within the contiguous zone (12-24 nautical miles away from shore) in 
December 2008. Thereafter, no more patrols within these areas were reported until September 2010 
(discussed below).
Summarizing the developments of the 90s and 2000s, the situation in the South China Sea 
seemed to generally improve from the late 90s and onward. China's occupation of Mischief Reef 
marked a low point but was not followed by other occupations in the Spratlys by Beijing. Instead, 
by reaching a code of conduct with the Philippines and a declaration of conduct with ASEAN, as 
well as signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, Beijing in this period appears to have been 
more focused on reassuring its neighbors and possibly even moving toward a multilateral approach. 
In the East China Sea there were periodic frictions, and as the issue increasingly became intertwined
with nationalist sentiment both governments found themselves in a more complex situation, but 
even here there were signs that both sides were interested in keeping things as they were (evidenced
by Japan's decision to not prosecute the Chinese group that landed on the Senkakus, and if true the 
mutual understanding reached after the 2004 incident). Oil and gas development remained a thorny 
issue, however.
In the following period a number of incidents in these seas were to escalate tension further. 
Before we take a closer look at the most important incidents of this period it is useful to first deal 
with two controversial issues:  The nine-dash line that features on Chinese maps of the South China 
Sea and China's position (and resultant behavior) regarding EEZs and rights.
3.4 The South China Sea and China's nine-dash line
Up until now we have dealt mostly with the territorial features of the sea. This is the most tangible 
405 Ibid.
406 Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China,” 30.
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part of the conflict: China, like Taiwan and Vietnam, claims all of the Paracels and Spratlys; the 
Philippines claims 53 of the Spratlys; Malaysia claims 12 of the Spratlys; and Brunei 1 of the 
Spratlys.407 Furthermore, China, the Philippines and Taiwan claim the Scarborough Shoal. As Fravel
points out, the contents of China's claim has been consistent since they was put forward in 1951 
(sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys) and 1958 (maritime rights derived from ownership of 
these island groups).408 
But as we already noted, the South China Sea is more than its disputed features. Often, 
particularly in the media, one will encounter the claim that China lays claim to “most of the South 
China Sea,” referring to the waters that constitutes it in addition to the disputed archipelagos.409 
Most commonly a reference to a nine-dashed line found on Chinese maps is marshaled as evidence 
to support this claim. The origin of this map is not entirely clear, but most observers suggest it was 
first published by the ROC government in 1947. Interestingly, Austin writes that he was told by an 
“authoritative PRC source” that the line had been drawn in the 1930s by a mid-ranking Nationalist 
official and may subsequently have taken “a life of its own.”410 Another source traces its origin back
to 1914.411 What it is important to note, however, is that this line was not created by the PRC but in 
fact was inherited from the ROC. In other words this is not an example of China's claim expanding 
as its power expands (which could have been the case if the line had been a recent creation of the 
PRC) but rather a cartographical artifact whose original meaning is unknown.
This ambiguity surrounding this line would have disappeared if China (and Taiwan) had 
been willing to clarify exactly what we are to make of it, which so far it has not.412 It can be seen 
both as a marker of sovereignty, meaning that China claims everything within it (i.e. the waters 
being “historic waters,” in effect turning the South China Sea into Chinese territorial waters), or less
ominously as a marker within which China claims a number of land features.413 
407 Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” 34; Clive Schofield, “Dangerous ground: a geopolitical 
overview of the South China Sea,” in Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a 
cooperative management regime, ed. Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (Oxon: Routledge, 2009): 11.
408 Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” 41. In 1992 and 1998 these claims were “codified in a series of
laws regarding territorial seas and EEZs.”
409 For instance, a recent article states that “China claims most of the South China Sea. The Philippines, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Brunei and Taiwan also claim parts of those waters.” It is surprising, and perhaps revealing, that the 
author suggests a qualitative difference in the claims of China and Taiwan, especially considering that the line often
used to back up the suggestion that China claims “most of” the South China Sea was first (and is still) used by the 
ROC. Doina Chiacu, “China's U.S. ambassador plays down tensions after Hagel trip,” Reuters, April 11, 2014, 
accessed April 18, 2014, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/uk-usa-china-diplomacy-idUKBREA3A04520140411.
410 Austin, China's Ocean Frontier, 14, (fn. 6).
411 Peter Kien-Hong Yu, “The Chinese (Broken) U-shaped Line in the South China Sea: Points, Lines, and Zones,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 25, no. 3 (2003): 407.
412 On how this could be done, see for instance Robert Beckman, “South China Sea: How China Could Clarify its 
Claims,” RSIS Commentaries, no. 116 (2010): 1-2.
413 Storey, “China's Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in the South China Sea,” 54.
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Some see the inclusion of the map in a note verbale, given by China to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 2009, as reason to worry.414 While the note did not refer 
to the line, it did say that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China 
Sea and the adjacent waters...”415 The worry was that by “adjacent waters” Beijing was referring to 
all of the water contained within the line, but then again “adjacent waters” could just as well refer to
the 12-mile territorial waters the features (that are not fully submerged during high tide) are entitled 
to, and EEZs in the case of those features qualifying as islands under UNCLOS. 
There was reportedly a statement made by a senior colonel of the PLA in July 2010 that 
“China has indisputable sovereignty of the South Sea,” but it is far from clear that this represents 
the government view, or even a claim to all of the sea.416 In fact, at a press conference in early 2012,
Hong Lei, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said that “At the core of the South China 
Sea dispute are the territorial sovereignty dispute over some of the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and the 
demarcation dispute over part of the waters of the South China Sea. What should be pointed out is 
that neither China nor any other country lays claim to the entire South China Sea.”417
Without a Chinese clarification we ultimately cannot know exactly what the nine-dash line 
represents today, or even whether China's leadership has reached a definitive interpretation itself. 
The nine-dash line may also be an instance of deliberate ambiguity, allowing Beijing to improve its 
bargaining position and make apparent concessions in the future. However, the fact that China has 
drawn straight baselines around the Paracels does suggest that it does not regard all the waters 
within the nine-dash line as historical waters. As Dzurek explains:
… the delimitation of straight baselines around the Paracel Islands is logically inconsistent with any 
purported claim to historical waters within the irregular, tongue-shaped [nine-dash] line found on 
Chinese maps. Some commentators maintain that this line is a historic waters claim, but historic 
waters have the status of either internal waters or territorial sea. A straight baseline divides internal 
waters from territorial sea. Moreover, the 1992 PRC Law on the Territorial Sea specifies that China's 
territorial sea extends 12nm (22.2km) from its baseline. Therefore, the new PRC baseline delimits its
414 The note verbale itself did not represent an expansion of China's claim. China (and the Philippines) submitted 
objections to a joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS). The Vietnam-Malaysia submission requested extended continental shelf rights into waters around the 
Spratlys. China and the Philippines objected in order to rendered this submission moot, since the CLCS is not 
mandated to deal with disputed areas. It was, however, the first time China submitted the nine-dash map as 
documentation to an international organization. Womack, “The Spratlys,” 379; Storey, “China's Bilateral and 
Multilateral Diplomacy,” 54.
415 Quoted in ibid., my emphasis.
416 John Pomfret, “Beijing claims 'indisputable sovereignty' over South China Sea,” Washington Post, July 31, 2010, 
accessed April 18, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR2010073005664.html.
417 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular 
Press Conference on February 29, 2012,” March 1, 2012, accessed March 26, 2014, 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t910855.htm, my emphasis.
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claim to internal waters within the Paracel baseline and territorial sea up to 12nm from that 
baseline.418 
Some observers have noted that two dashes were removed from the line in 1953 (in the Gulf of 
Tonkin), suggesting that other adjustments are not out of the question.419 This does not guarantee 
that Beijing considers the line open to negotiation, but the conclusion that the nine-dash line 
represents a fixed and sure claim to all the waters within it is as of yet not supported by behavior or 
authoritative statements. Conversely the drawing of straight baselines around the Paracels suggests 
that the opposite may be more likely, and that the claim that China intends to treat all or the vast 
majority of the South China Sea as its own territorial waters is very much overblown at this stage.420
3.5 Beijing's interpretation of Exclusive Economic Zones and coastal state rights
Another source of concern, which has been the immediate reason for some of the incidents 
involving China and the US, is the different interpretations offered by Beijing and Washington of 
what sort of rights UNCLOS grants a coastal state within its own EEZ.421
Simply put, China argues that UNCLOS does not allow states to conduct military 
intelligence-gathering (on the sea or in the air) within another state's EEZ without prior consent. 
This is based on the UNCLOS provision that a coastal state has “sovereign rights to resources and 
… jurisdiction over several activities, including 'maritime scientific research',” in its EEZ, and the 
understanding that intelligence gathering and other naval activities (other than innocent 
(continuous) passage) is not in the spirit of UNCLOS's emphasis on “peaceful purposes.”422 This 
has been the position of China since the UNCLOS negotiations in the 1970s.423 Conversely, the US 
418 Daniel J. Dzurek, “The People's Republic of China Straight Baseline Claim,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin
4, no. 2 (1996): 85.
419 Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” 42. The original ROC map contained 11 dashes, subsequently 
reduced to nine.
420 Interestingly, the Philippines has challenged China by submitting an arbitration case to UNCLOS regarding the 
legality of China's nine-dash line. As the time of writing the case is still pending. Greg Torode, “Philippines South 
China Sea legal case against China gathers pace,” Reuters, September 27, 2013, accessed April 22, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/27/us-china-philippines-idUSBRE98Q0BX20130927.
421 As noted briefly in Chapter 1 (fn. 78), this may appear to be an aspect of the “rules of the game,” which is not in 
focus in this thesis. However, this difference of interpretation regarding EEZs directly impinges on China's 
territorial issues in the South China Sea, because some of the features there may be entitled to such zones. Thus, 
ignoring it in our discussion would leave us with an incomplete understanding of the bigger picture of these 
territorial disputes and their potential regional implications.
422 Peter Dutton, “Introduction,” in Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and 
International Law in the Maritime Commons, ed. Peter Dutton (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2010), 7; Jing 
Geng, “The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone Under UNCLOS,” Merkourios 
28, no. 74 (2012): 26. 
423 Alan M. Wachman, “Playing by or Playing with the Rules of UNCLOS?” in Military Activities in the EEZ: A 
U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons, ed. Peter Dutton (Newport: 
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argues that intelligence gathering does not fall outside the scope of peaceful purposes, and that 
China's classification of survey activities as “equivalent to marine scientific research (MSR) … 
[and] therefore subject to coastal-state jurisdiction are misplaced and have no foundation in 
international law.”424 The legal aspect of the dispute falls outside our concern here, we are more 
interested in how it has translated into actual behavior, but it is true that most countries take the 
position of the US.425 The most relevant question to address here is whether China by acting in 
accordance with its own interpretation of EEZs and rights is altering the status quo of its near seas. 
Incidents involving China and the US will be recounted below.
On April 1, 2001, an American EP-3 surveillance aircraft, operating around 70 miles off 
China's Hainan Island, was monitored by two Chinese fighter jets. One of them flew dangerously 
close to the US airplane and a crash occurred in which the Chinese pilot was (presumably) sent to 
his death and the US aircraft seriously damaged, making an emergency landing on Hainan Island. 
The American crew was detained and a diplomatic crisis ensued. China first insisted on an apology 
and a termination by the US of such reconnaissance missions close to its coast, but eventually the 
second demand was withdrawn and only an apology requested. The crisis was solved, and the 
American crew allowed to return home, after Beijing received a letter from the US ambassador, 
expressing regret that the Chinese pilot had died and that the US aircraft had entered Chinese 
airspace without prior permission.426
A second major incident occurred in March 2009. A statement was released by the Pentagon
on March 8, saying that Chinese ships the day before had “shadowed and aggressively maneuvered 
in dangerously close proximity” to the USNS Impeccable, an ocean surveillance ship that had been 
gathering data around 75 miles off Hainan Island.427 The crew of Impeccable had resorted to fire 
hoses to fend off the ships, but was blocked by two vessels forcing it to a halt. One of the Chinese 
vessels also tried to tear off a tow-line from the ship using a grappling hook.428 Washington, when 
protesting the Chinese vessels' behavior, was promptly reminded that the Impeccable had been 
U.S. Naval War College, 2010), 115.
424 Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone: U.S.
Views,” in Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the 
Maritime Commons, ed. Peter Dutton (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2010), 23.
425 Noticable countries to agree with China on this matter are India and Brazil. Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South 
China Sea,” 35.
426 Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 178.
427 Chris Buckley, “China says U.S. naval ship broke the law,” Reuters, March 10, 2009, accessed March 20, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/10/us-usa-china-idUSPEK9458120090310.
428 “Pentagon says Chinese vessels harassed U.S. ship,” CNN Politics, March 9, 2009, accessed March 20, 2014, 
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operating in China's EEZ going against both (China's interpretation of) international law and 
Chinese domestic laws. The next day the US sent USNS Impeccable back to the area, this time 
under the protection of a guided-missile destroyer, to protest China's behavior.429 In this sense the 
incident resembled one from 2001, when on March 23 the hydrographic survey ship USNS 
Bowditch had been ordered to leave China's EEZ and complied, then to return under armed 
guardianship some days later.430 According to one source the USNS Bowditch was again directed to 
leave the same area in September 2002, and in March 2003 it was intentionally crashed into by 
Chinese fishing boats.431
Reportedly, other instances of “harassment,” albeit less drastic, had been going on in the 
days leading up to the Impeccable-incident. One in the Yellow Sea, where a Chinese patrol vessel 
fixed a high-intensity spotlight at the USNS Victorious and crossed its bow without warning, 
another where a Chinese aircraft “conducted 12 fly-bys” of the same ship. The USNS Impeccable 
had also had its bow crossed and been buzzed by a Chinese aircraft a few days prior to the March 8 
incident.432 Thus, in 2009 there were a number of incidents within China's EEZ over a relatively 
short period of time, caused by the fact that both Washington and Beijing were adhering to their 
own interpretation of the relevant rules, as had also been the case in 2001. 
Finally, an incident occurred in late 2013, during the first journey of China's only aircraft 
carrier, Liaoning. From the outset the group of five Chinese ships (Liaoning, two destroyers and 
two missile frigates) had been followed by an unwelcome observer, the guided missile cruiser USS 
Cowpens. On December 5, after nine days at sea, the incident occurred during a time when the 
Chinese fleet held naval exercises. One of the Chinese ships instructed Cowpens to leave the area, 
to which the latter responded that the Chinese ship had no authority over it since they were in 
international waters. A Chinese ship then crossed the bow of Cowpens at close distance forcing it to 
stop abruptly.433 China's initial response was to say that the USS Cowpens had come within the 
fleet's “inner defense layer,” thereby causing the incident.434 The incident was, however, resolved 
429 Raul Pedrozo, “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 3 
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without further problems, and both sides subsequently downplayed its seriousness.435
However, while this last incident also occurred within China's EEZ, it was not connected to 
the issue of EEZ rights and intelligence-gathering. Rather it appears to have been about navigational
issues, with China arguing that the Cowpens was interfering with military exercises that had been 
announced in advance. Sam Bateman has corroborated this view, arguing that the US position “is 
open to question - it is not routine for navies to operate in close proximity to each other, particularly
if one has issued an appropriate navigational warning about the exercise.”436 Thus, neither the US or
China handled this as an issue traceable to their diverging views of EEZs and rights.
The other incidents, however, are connected to how the two sides disagree on what sort of 
activities can be conducted inside foreign EEZs. They make it safe to assume that China is not 
about to turn around on the question of EEZs and rights. China has already been enforcing its own 
interpretation (much as the US has) and seems likely to keep doing so. In those instances where 
American intelligence-gathering vessels have returned later under armed guardianship China has 
not yet raised the stakes by attempting to reexpell them, but this is not the same as accepting a US 
(intelligence gathering or monitoring) presence within its EEZ. In terms of whether or not this 
affects freedom of navigation, however, it is useful to contextualize it.
Since the end of World War II the US has been the dominant sea power of the world. One 
noted scholar has highlighted the importance of command of the global commons in sustaining US 
hegemony,  defining it as such: “Command means that the United States gets vastly more military 
use out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to 
others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny 
them to the United States.”437 From this point of view the US maneuverability in the waters of East 
Asia would be challenged if China decided (and was able) to effectively turn its near seas into a 
no-go zone for warships without prior permission from Beijing. While not a threat to the status quo 
of land territory, it would arguably affect the status quo of the regional “sea territory.”
The “if” here, however, is huge. China does not disagree with the right of innocent passage, 
24, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20131218/105815.shtml.
435 Luis Ramirez, “Pentagon Downplays  Near-Collision in South China Sea,” Voice of America, December 16, 2013, 
accessed March 24, 2014, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/pentagon-downplays-south-china-sea-near-collision-cowpens-liaoning/1811768.h
tml; Christopher Bodeen, “After sea incident, China praises ties with US,” Associated Press, December 18, 2013, 
accessed March 24, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/after-sea-incident-china-praises-ties-us. It was not 
immediately clear whether or not this incident actually took place within China's EEZ or not, but I was informed by
M. Taylor Fravel in a personal e-mail correspondence (March 24, 2014) that coordinates showing the areas where 
Liaoning was exercising had been published by Xinhua, and that these were “well within China's EEZ.”
436 Sam Bateman, “The USS Cowpens Incident: Adding to Strategic Mistrust,” RSIS Commentaries, no. 234 (2013): 2. 
437 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 
28, no. 1 (2003): 8.
83
only with the US definition of the concept.438 While China has shown through statements and 
behavior that it opposes military intelligence gathering in it's EEZ it has not displayed an opposition
to continuous passage of ships, be they military or civilian, outside of its territorial waters. And as it
relates to maritime trade the “threat to freedom of navigation” narrative becomes even more 
unconvincing. As one observer put it, “the fundamental contradiction in the logic of the argument is 
that the world’s largest maritime trade juggernaut is very unlikely to threaten navigational freedoms 
as its economy is extremely reliant on those freedoms. … to suggest that this disagreement [over 
EEZ jurisdiction] threatens the regional or global maritime trading system is absurd.”439
The implication we can derive from China's behavior in the EEZ-incidents so far is that 
Beijing is likely to continue taking action against ships spying on it inside its EEZs, not that it will 
pose a threat to normal navigation. Since China claims that the Spratlys have EEZ entitlements,440 it 
may at some point start enforcing its interpretation there as well, but this would require that it first 
assert control of the larger features of the archipelago, and those already have occupants.441 On the 
other hand, it is not unlikely that China would take advantage of the fact that Taiwan controls the 
largest of the Spratlys (Itu Aba), and claim that as Taiwan is a part of China so is the land features in
the South China Sea under Taipei's effective control. This is in line with the fact that Beijing has 
sought cooperation with Taipei over the South China Sea disputes, and that China does not oppose 
Taiwan's building of structures on Itu Aba.442 However, even if China does at some point take over 
the largest of the Spratly Islands (or claim that it already controls Itu Aba through Taiwan) and 
asserts itself in a claimed EEZ it is unlikely that this to any substantial degree would have severe 
implications for current sea lines of communication (SLOCs) because most of these run far from the
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Spratlys.443
The “threat to freedom of navigation” story seems largely to boil down to an anxiousness 
about China's improved capabilities and ongoing naval modernization. The fact that China may at 
some point have the capabilities to deny others access to its near seas and perhaps assert control of 
strategic choke points such as the Malacca and Lombok straits is by itself deemed threatening and 
an unwelcome development, because Beijing's intentions (as those of any actor) are uncertain and 
may change. Such speculation is understandable, but cannot be taken as evidence that its position 
today is revisionist. That would be to make revisionism and improved capabilities one and the same
thing, which they are not. Likewise, the fact that Beijing in 2012, reportedly for the first time, 
conducted reconnaissance missions in American EEZs points to tit-for-tat retaliation, not 
revisionism.444 On the other hand, beyond the “threat to freedom of navigation” narrative, a more 
limited version suggesting that China will increasingly enforce its interpretation of EEZ rights as it 
improves its capabilities seems well supported by the events of the last decade.
3.6 Recent incidents
South China Sea. A number of incidents have occurred between the claimants to land features and 
maritime rights in the sea. Most of these have been related to the commercial exploitation of 
resources. In most cases involving China, Beijing has been exercising jurisdiction over what it 
claims as its own in response to other states fishing or conducting oil exploration. However, because
usage and control relates to ownership the rationale behind exercising jurisdiction is broader than a 
merely economical one.
In supervising fishing activities China has been exercising jurisdiction in disputed areas 
primarily through patroling by the South Sea Region Fisheries Administration Bureau and 
imposition of an annual fishing ban (which it demands other states subject themselves to as well).445
On the matter of oil exploration by other states, China mostly uses its Marine Surveillance Force to 
patrol and assert its claims.446 
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The incidents involving fishing boats are too numerous and the information available far to 
sparse to allow detailed accounts of all. A Vietnamese figure (given by an official of the Quang 
Ngai People's Committee) suggests that “a total of 63 Vietnamese fishing boats and 725 fishermen 
had been detained by China” between 2005 and October 2010.447 According to Fravel, official 
numbers for more recent years are unavailable, but there appears to have been much fewer incidents
related to fishing vessels at the end of 2010 and throughout 2011.448 To be fair, China is not alone in
exercising such jurisdiction in the South China Sea. There have been a number of such incidents 
where other states have been doing the enforcement, some involving the detention of Chinese 
fishermen. Precise data appears to be lacking, but one Chinese source (published in 2010) suggests 
that the number of incidents in the South China Sea where Chinese fishing vessels have been “fired 
upon, detained or driven away” since 1989 counted “more than 300.”449 The reason why China does
not emphasize the incidents where it is on the receiving end of the enforcements may be that it 
wishes to avoid criticism at home for not standing up for its own. This would be consistent with its 
approach to incursions in the Sino-Indian dispute, where we noted that China does not report cases 
of Indian transgressions. In both cases this has the side effect of creating the image internationally 
that China is alone in unilaterally asserting its claims and rights, and thus obscures what may be 
closer to an action-reaction dynamic.
Incidents related to oil exploration have been far fewer in numbers than incidents related to 
fishing, but have received more attention as they have typically been further away from the Paracels
(which China has controlled since 1974), and sometimes involve multinational companies. On 
March 2, 2011, an oil survey ship hired by London-based Forum Energy Plc. (working on behalf of 
the Philippines), was approached close to the disputed Reed Tablemouth (see Appendix 1, Figure 8)
by two Chinese vessels, demanding its leave from the area.450 The Philippines protested China's 
behavior and assembled patrol ships and a surveillance plane, but by the time these reached the area
the Chinese vessels had apparently chased away the survey ship and left the scene. On March 4 the 
survey vessel returned, this time guarded by the Philippine coast guard.451
447 “Vietnam demands unconditional release of fishermen held by China,” Than Nien News, October 8, 2010, accessed 
April 19, 2014, 
http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam-demands-unconditional-release-of-fishermen-held-by-china-14809
.html.
448 Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” 38.
449 Referred to in Ibid.In one case from 2009, Vietnamese ships were said to have fired upon Chinese boats, with three 
Chinese injuries. Ibid., 36, 38.
450 A report by U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggests that while “the region around the Spratly 
Islands... [has] virtually no proved or probable oil reserves... the Spratly Island territory may contain significant 
deposits of undiscovered hydrocarbons. … Evidence suggests that most of these resources are likely located in the 
contested Reed Bank” U.S. Energy Information Administration, “South China Sea,” Analysis Briefs February 7, 
2013, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs. It should be mentioned, 
however, that figures for oil reserves around the Spratlys are widely divergent.
451 “Philippine oil survey gets escort amid China spat,” SpaceDaily.com, March 4, 2011, accessed March 21, 2014, 
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In May the same year PetroVietnam had one of its exploration vessels harassed by Chinese 
vessels, with an exploration cable being cut, in disputed waters around 120 miles off Vietnam's 
coast.452 Less than a month later a similar incident occurred, although Hanoi and Beijing adhere to 
different versions of it. According to Vietnam a Chinese fishing boat willingly rammed the 
exploration cables of one of PetroVietnam's vessels, cutting it off. According to China, the fishing 
net of the boat had become tangled with the exploration cable of the Vietnamese vessel by accident 
when the latter was chasing it away, thus in this version the cutting of the cable came about due to 
the Vietnamese ship's recklessness.453 On November 30, 2012, another incident occurred that ended 
with an exploration cable of a Vietnamese vessel being cut. This happened at around 20 miles to the
west (Vietnamese side) of the median line between China's Hainan Island and Vietnam.454  
However, this time PetroVietnam acknowledged that the cutting was likely to have been an 
accident.455
I have not been able to find any complete list over oil exploration and drilling activities in 
disputed waters, but it is worth noting that Chinese harassment of Vietnamese survey and drilling 
activities appear to be the exception rather than the rule. According to one observer Vietnam had by 
2012 signed 60 contracts giving exploration and development rights to foreign companies, and 
while it is understandable that those instances where China has intervened have received more 
coverage it is important to keep in mind the that many projects have gone through undisturbed.456 
Furthermore, China has not been able to intimidate its smaller neighbors from going through with 
exploration activities in disputed areas.457 It should also be mentioned that Vietnam on one occasion 
in 2007 attempted to stop Chinese surveying activities close to the Paracels. Hanoi dispatched naval
vessels for this purpose (something China has not done in its interferences of other claimants' 
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Philippine_oil_survey_gets_escort_amid_China_spat_999.html; Randy Fabi and
Manuel Mogato, “Insight: Conflict looms in South China Sea oil rush,” Reuters, February 28, 2012, accessed 
March 21, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/28/us-china-spratlys-philippines-idUSTRE81R03420120228.
452 Ben Bland and Kathrin Hille, “Vietnam and China oil clashes intensify,” Financial Times, May 29, 2011, accessed 
March 21, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4d3badc0-8867-11e0-a1c3-00144feabdc0.html.
453 “Sea spat raises China-Vietnam tensions,” EnergyDaily.com, June 10, 2011, accessed March 21, 2014, 
http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Sea_spat_raises_China-Vietnam_tensions_999.html.
454 The boundary for this area outside the Gulf of Tonkin remains to be settled between China and Vietnam. Huy 
Duong and Van Pham, “Trouble outside the Gulf of Tonkin ,” cogitASIA, December 14, 2012, accessed March 22, 
2014, http://cogitasia.com/trouble-outside-the-gulf-of-tonkin/.
455 “PetroVietnam CEO Says Chinese Ships Cut Cables ‘By Accident’,” Bloomberg News, December 4, 2012, accessed
March 22, 2014, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-04/petrovietnam-ceo-says-chinese-ships-cut-cables-by-accident-1-.html.
456 Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry,” The 
Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2012): 141. How many of these contacts covered areas in disputed waters goes 
unspecified, but as the author discusses this in the context of the disputes and Chines reactions it seems likely that 
many of them do.
457 Daniel Ten Kate, “South China Sea Oil Rush Risks Clashes as U.S. Emboldens Vietnam on Claims,” Bloomberg, 
May 27, 2011, accessed March 22, 2014, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-26/s-china-sea-oil-rush-risks-clashes-as-u-s-emboldens-vietnam.html.
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activities), which resulted in a standoff with Chinese coast guard vessels.458
On April 8, 2012, eight Chinese fishing vessels were spotted in the vicinity of the disputed 
Scarborough Shoal (some 125 miles off the coast of the Philippines, claimed by China and Taiwan 
as well) by Philippine navy aircraft. Manila took prompt action by sending its warship BRP 
Gregorio del Pilar to the scene. Upon inspection, the Chinese fishing vessels were found to contain 
large amounts of poached seafood. Before an arrest could be made, however, two Chinese civilian 
survey ships showed up and blocked the entrance of the lagoon (within which the Chinese fishing 
vessels were anchored). A standoff ensued with the arrival of a second Philippine ship (this time a 
coast guard vessel) and a Chinese law enforcement ship.459 However, by April 13 most of the ships 
had left the area, with only one Chinese survey vessel and a Philippine coast guard vessel at the 
scene.460 After this the standoff continued for weeks, and at some point later a number of Chinese 
boats again started fishing in the proximity of the Scarborough Shoal. On May 22 Manila said the 
number was 96 ships, whereas Beijing maintained that only around 20 Chinese fishing vessels were
operating in the area.461
According to the New York Times a low-key negotiation, mediated by Washington, was 
started some time in May 2012. This led to an understanding whereby both sides were to pull their 
vessels out of the area. However, China put up a rope that effectively sealed off the lagoon where 
the fishing had taken place, and left behind three ships to make sure the Philippines did not remove 
it and access the lagoon.462 Another account suggests that the deal broke down in June, and thus no 
understanding was reached.463 In any case, the end result was Chinese control over the shoal and a 
pullback by the Filipino vessels. By 2014, China had according to Voltaire Gazmin, Defense 
Secretary of the Philippines, allowed Philippine fishermen to use the area again, although Chinese 
458 Scott Bentley, “Vietnam and China: A Dangerous Incident,” The Diplomat, February 12, 2014, accessed May 20, 
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/vietnam-and-china-a-dangerous-incident/.
459 Tina G. Santos, “PH, Chinese naval vessels in Scarborough Shoal standoff,” INQUIRER.net,  April 11, 2012, 
accessed March 22, 2014,  
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/32341/ph-chinese-naval-vessels-in-scarborough-shoal-standoff; “Philippines 
shuffles ships in maritime standoff with China,” CNN, April 12, 2012, accessed March 22, 2014, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/12/world/asia/philippines-china-naval-standoff/index.html?iref=allsearch&iid=EL.
460 DJ Yap, “Fishing boats gone from shoal but one Chinese ship remains,” INQUIRER.net, April 14, 2012, accessed 
March 22, 2014, 
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/33127/fishing-boats-gone-from-shoal-but-one-chinese-ship-remains.
461 Tania Branigan and Jonathan Watts, “Philippines accuses China of deploying ships in Scarborough shoal,” The 
Guardian, May 23, 2012, accessed March 22, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/23/philippines-china-ships-scarborough-shoal.
462 Jane Perlez and Steven Lee Myers, “In Beijing, Clinton Will Push for Talks Over Disputed Islands,” The New York 
Times, September 3, 2012, accessed March 22, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/asia/in-beijing-clinton-to-discuss-island-disputes.html?_r=0.
463 M. Taylor Fravel, “Threading the Needle: East Asia's Territorial Disputes and Great Power Relations,” Paper 
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coast guard vessels were still in place.464
East China Sea. Starting in 2010, tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku 
Islands increased significantly. In September 2010, the captain of a Chinese fishing vessel (one of 
more than a hundred in the area at the time) operating 15 kilometers away from the island Kubajima
(one of the Senkakus) rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels that had attempted to expel his 
boat from the area.465 The Chinese crew was arrested, reportedly the first time such measures had 
been taken by the Japanese coast guard against Chinese fishermen.466 China demanded all the men 
and the fishing vessel be released, and Japan partly accommodated this by releasing all but the 
captain of the ship on September 13. Sanctions and cancellations of meetings were used by China to
protest Japan's continued custody of the Chinese captain, and on September 24 Japan released him 
too.467 In the aftermath of this episode patrolling of the waters close to the Senkakus by Chinese 
maritime law enforcement vessels resurfaced, having been avoided since the first four occurrences 
in December 2008 (see Apendix 2, Figure 1). However, China did not go beyond the Senkakus' 
contiguous zone and thus avoided entering their territorial waters. The increased patrolling was 
done to “protect Chinese fishermen,”468 but of course had the added benefit of signaling jurisdiction 
over the area and challenge Japan's effective control.469 In October the same year China suggested 
joint development of resources around the islands, which Japan refused.470 At the end of the same 
month China announced that patrolling vessels would henceforth be permanently deployed in the 
area.471
In September 2012 the Sino-Japanese relationship again took a plunge when the Japanese 
government nationalized three of the Senkakus. The backdrop of this episode was a gambit started 
in April 2012 by Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara to purchase the islands from their private 
464 Alexis Romero, “Pinoy fishermen defy new Chinese fishing rules in Panatag Shoal,” The Philippine Star, January 
26, 2014, accessed March 22, 2014, 
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/01/26/1283092/pinoy-fishermen-defy-new-chinese-fishing-rules-panatag-s
hoal.
465 Tanaka Sakai, “Rekindling China-Japan Conflict: The Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands Clash,” The Asia-Pacific Journal,
39-3-10 (September 27, 2010), accessed April 19, 2014, http://  www.  japanfocus.org/-Tanaka-Sakai/3418  . On 
whether the ramming was intentional or not, Drifte convincingly argues that it most likely was. Yet, it was an 
initiative of his own, not likely to have had any government support as the captain had his license revoked when he 
returned to China. Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China,” 30-31; 
Midford, “Sino-Japanese Conflict and Reconciliation in the East China Sea,” 10 (fn. 4).
466 Sakai, “Rekindling China-Japan Conflict.” It was also, however, the first time a Chinese fishing vessel jammed 
Japanese coast guard ships, and thus an unprecedented case.
467 Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China,” 31.
468 Sakai, “Rekindling China-Japan Conflict.”
469 It may also be that Beijing employed its coastguard to control its own fishermen, and ensure that they did not create
a new incident carrying the danger of Japanese prosecution. It does not appear that Chinese fishing vessels have 
entered the territorial waters of the Senkakus since the September 2010 incident.
470 “China seeks, Japan nixes joint resource development near Senkakus,” Kyodo News, October 22, 2010, accessed 
April 20, 2014, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/China+seeks,
+Japan+nixes+joint+resource+development+near+Senkakus.-a0240405733.
471 Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China,” 34.
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owners, on behalf of the Tokyo metropolitan government.472 In one interpretation of these events, 
Ishihara's actions presented the national government of Japan with a dilemma: the fact that Ishihara 
is a hard-line nationalist politician and was likely to use a successful purchase by the Tokyo 
metropolitan government to goad Beijing suggested that the national government ought to try to 
acquire the ownership of these islands themselves, but on the other hand doing so would also 
clearly anger Beijing, because nationalization would be seen as a change to the status quo of the 
disputed territory in Japan's favor.473 Japanese policymakers may have reached the conclusion that 
buying and nationalizing the islands was the likely to do the least damage, and thus proceeded to do
so, outbidding Ishihara. The contract between the national government and the theretofore owner of 
the three islands was signed on September 11, 2012.474 
Protests and warnings from China had been expressed since April but became stronger once 
it became clear that the Japanese national government intended to buy the islands. Attempts to 
assure Beijing that it should prefer nationalization to an acquisition of the islands by “right-wing 
activists” were in the words of Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun “like asking China to choose 
from two doses of poison.”475 In the aftermath of the successful purchase widespread protests 
occurred throughout China, ceremonial events between the two countries were canceled, economic 
sanctions were imposed, and Chinese patrolling around the islands increased to unprecedented 
levels (see Appendix 2, Figure 1).476 From September 2012 and through December 2013 not a single
month went by without Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels entering the territorial waters of 
the Senkaku Islands.
Taiwan also reacted to the Noda administration's purchase, by sending around 50 fishing 
vessels, escorted by eight surveillance ships, to the territorial waters around the Senkakus in late 
September 2012. When confronted by the Japanese coast guard one of the Taiwanese captains 
replied that they were in Taiwanese waters, and a water canon fight followed.477
472 “Tokyo governor seeks to buy islands disputed with China,” Reuters, April 17, 2012, accessed April 20, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/17/us-japan-china-islands-idUSBRE83G0C020120417. The Japense names 
for these islands are Uotsurijima, Kita Kojima and Minami Kojima, three of four islands that were privately owned.
They had previously been leased to the Japanese national government, with an upcoming expiration in March 2013.
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473 “Ukeru Magosaki: Continuing to table Senkaku issue is to Japan's advantage,” Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 2012, 
accessed April 20, 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201207110064; Peter Lee, “Comedy of 
errors in East China Sea,” Asia Times, June 20, 2012, accessed April 20, 2014, 
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474 Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China,” 36.
475 Ke Ren, “China Voice: Japan should face up to past, present wrongdoing,” Xinhua, 29 October 2012, accessed April
20, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-10/29/c_131938015.htm. Indeed, some Chinese 
suspected that Ishihara was secretly working together with the national government, and that the right-wing “threat”
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A year later, on September 9, 2013, a Chinese drone flew close to the islands, although 
according to officials from Japan's Ministry of Defense the unmanned aircraft did not enter 
Japanese airspace.478 Japan announced that it would henceforth shoot down any foreign drone 
venturing into its airspace, to which China responded by saying it had “never infringed on other 
countries' airspace,” and that such a move by Tokyo (in Chinese claimed airspace) would be 
considered an act of war.479
On November 23 the same year, Beijing made headlines by announcing the establishment of
an Air Identification Zone (ADIZ) for the East China Sea within which it requires foreign airplanes 
to provide identification and other information to China (see Appendix 1, Figure 9).480 It included 
the Senkaku Islands. While there is nothing in international law to govern ADIZs, and several other 
states have such zones, China's imposition was widely regarded as connected to the dispute over the
Senkakus and criticized for covering disputed territory which Beijing does not control.481 The US 
protested by sending two bombers into the zone without providing the required information, and 
while some Japanese commercial airlines initially followed China's requirements they were 
reportedly soon convinced by Tokyo to stop doing so.482 By the end of November, the US, Japan 
and South Korea had all challenged the Beijing by sending planes through its ADIZ without 
providing the requested information, with no Chinese response to the actions.483 
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3.7 Assessing the disputes
Our period of focus here is from 1989 through 2013. At the outset of this period, China had already 
established control over all of the Paracel Islands (1974) and six of the Spratly Islands (1988). It 
had a claim to the remainder of the Spratlys, as well as the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. 
By the end of 2013 China had occupied one more of the Spratlys, Mischief Reef (1994). 
Furthermore, it seems safe to say that China has gained effective control over Scarborough Shoal 
(which, although much closer to the Philippines than to the three other claimants, did not previously
have a permanent presence by any state),484 even though Philippine fishermen have reportedly been 
allowed to resume their activities there. While the incident that eventually led to this effective 
control was brought about by the effort of the Philippines to arrest Chinese fishermen with its navy, 
and thus does not appear to have been planned by Beijing, China seized the opportunity to establish 
a presence there. China did not use its navy but instead relied on coast guard vessels, so this change 
was not brought about through military means or lethal force. On the other hand, China's coast 
guard vessels are armed, and thus it would be an understatement to suggest that no element of 
coercion was involved, even if this was a response to the presence of the Philippine naval vessel. 
Sanctions also played a role, and the Philippines may have realized that the asymmetrical economic 
dependence between the two countries was too much in China's favor, leading Manila to back 
down.485 Thus, the Scarborough incident led to a change in the status quo of that shoal, brought 
about through the presence of coast guard vessels and economic pressure, but without military 
force.
In the Senkaku Islands, China has started regular patrols through territorial waters, thus 
posing the first direct challenge to Japan's effective control over the island group and in that way 
484 M. Taylor Fravel, “China's Island Strategy: 'Redefine the Status Quo.',” The Diplomat, November 01, 2012, 
accessed April 21, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-status-quo/.
485 China imposed stricter controls on Philippine bananas, and for a while appears to have stopped purchases 
altogheter, during the Scarborough Shoal crisis. Ostensibly this has to do with safety regulations, but it was widely 
regarded as a punishment (much like what happened with Norwegian salmon after the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010). I
have not found exact numbers on how hard China's sanctions hit the Philippines, but one source stated during this 
period that “It's estimated that as many as 200,000 people will lose their livelihood if China continues to restrict 
imports [of bananas].” According to World Bank numbers, in 2012, 32 percentage of the Philippines' population 
worked in agriculture and exports accounted for 30.8 percentage of GDP. (The agricultural sector altogether 
accounted for 11.8 percentage of the GDP in 2012.) Considering the fact that bananas are a major export article and 
that the Chinese market is the largest for the Philippines' banana export, it is unsurprising that such sanctions could 
significantly hurt the economy. Kesha West, “Banana crisis blamed on Philippines-China dispute,” Australia 
Network News, June 29, 2012, accessed April 22, 2014, 
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challenging the status quo there.486 Starting in December 2008, this activity really only took off after
September 2012. It seems reasonable to qualify this by pointing out that many of the tension-raising
events were brought about by Japan, the most obvious example being the legal procedures the 
prosecutors went through to put the Chinese captain on trial and the national government's purchase
of three theretofore privately owned Senkakus. As noted Japan and China had up until 2010 treated 
the waters around the Senkakus as if they were high seas, with Tokyo avoiding the application of 
domestic laws there. The fact that Japan in September 2010 appeared to be moving from only 
maintaining physical control to the actual application of national laws to these islands and their 
territorial seas worried Beijing, although in the end it was able to successfully disrupt the 
proceedings.487 Nationalization of the three islands in September 2012 were similarly seen as a 
threating change in Beijing.
However, it remains the case that these changes only worked to strengthen the reality of 
Japanese control, and while they were understandably considered steps in the wrong direction in 
China, they were nonetheless steps along the same path on which the situation had been since the 
US returned administration of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. In other words, while nationalization and 
application of national law may have been perceived as game changers by China it only enhanced a 
situation that had already existed for several decades. 
China clearly seems intent on challenging the status quo of these islands, and it may even to 
some extent have successfully done so, in that the Japanese position that there is no dispute to 
negotiate over seems less viable than ever. The imposition of an ADIZ was the latest Chinese move 
to assert its claim before the end of 2013, but it remains to be seen how much it will really change. 
It is also true that all other states neighboring the East China Sea (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) 
already had such zones. Japan's at its closest is only 81 miles away from China's coast and thus 
extends over China's EEZ.488
Regular patrolling in the South China Sea has similarly occurred since around 2005, 
“although the frequency and type of ship involved are largely unknown.”489 However, it is not clear 
whether or how often these South China Sea patrols has entered territorial waters of features held by
486 Fravel and Johnston recently reported that between October 2013 and April 2014 there has been a “substantial 
decline” of such paroling, although they are careful not to infer too much from it. (Their findings are based on the 
same Japan Coast Guard data as Appendix 2, Figure 1 in this thesis.) M. Taylor Fravel and Alastair Iain Johnston, 
“Chinese signaling in the East China Sea?” The Monkey Cage (Washington Post Blog), April 12, 2014, accessed 
April 22, 2014, 
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other claimants (I have not found any evidence of this), and patrolling international waters does not 
by itself constitute an indicator of revisionism. On the other hand, China has clearly been asserting 
its claims in the South China Sea by expelling fishermen and obstructing surveying activities of 
other claimants. As far as the fishing activities of Vietnam close to the Paracels goes, China is 
demonstrating its effective control of this archipelago (the status quo since 1974) by expelling and 
detaining Vietnamese fishermen operating close to it, and thus maintaining, not challenging, the 
status quo there.
By interfering with surveying activities of other claimants in disputed areas China does not 
control, Beijing has clearly raised tensions. By the end of 2013, “cable cutting” incidents had 
reportedly occurred three times (twice in 2011, once in 2012) in waters claimed by both Vietnam 
and China, but on the last occasion (November 2012) PetroVietnam stated that it had likely been 
accidental. Furthermore, on one occasion a Forum Energy survey vessel was chased away from the 
disputed Reed Tablemouth, although it returned later (protected by the Philippine coast guard) 
without a similar reaction from Beijing. While it is true that China has been assertive in these 
incidents it is also true that such actions can be seen as responses to provocations by the other party 
(see Appendix 2, Table 1). Fravel suggests that in the South China Sea, “China views its actions as 
responding to the assertiveness of other states that challenge Chinese claims.”490 Of course such a 
self-perception of defensive motivations is hardly unique,491 but it appears that China by the end of 
2013 had not conducted any development of disputed areas.492
As far as agreements are concerned, China did sign the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, an initiative that was later revived by the agreement 
between ASEAN and China on implementation guidelines for the declaration in June 2011.493 
Furthermore, in 2012 ASEAN released a document entitled “Six-Point Principles on the South 
China Sea,” and China later agreed to hold consultations with ASEAN regarding a Code of 
Conduct.494 Regarding China's bilateral issues with Vietnam an agreement (on principles for 
resolving these maritime issues) was reached in October 2011, and in October 2013 the two sides 
490 Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” 41.
491 For instance, some of the other disputants may consider time to be in China's favor and thus conclude that actions 
such as surveying and development of disputed areas may be less risky now than in the future.
492 As of writing this (May 2014) China has for the first time started drilling in disputed waters, in between the 
Paracels and Vietnam's coast. The full implications of this unfortunately cannot be dealt with here, as it falls outside
the period in focus, but it is undoubtedly a significant move by Beijing. For a coverage including detailed maps of 
the location of the deep sea drilling rig, see Ernest Z. Bower and Gregory B. Poling, “China-Vietnam Tensions High
over Drilling Rig in Disputed Waters,” CSIS Critical Questions, May 7, 2014, accessed May 20, 2014, 
http://csis.org/publication/critical-questions-china-vietnam-tensions-high-over-drilling-rig-disputed-waters.
493 Fravel, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” 44.
494 Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” SAIS Review 33, no. 2 
(2013): 77-81.
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agreed to establish a working group to discuss the possibility of joint exploration.495 Yet at this stage
the parties have not been able to move beyond general agreements. China for its part remains 
adamant that the disputes must be solved bilaterally by the countries involved, which would make 
sense in the Paracels but less so in the Spratlys, where the numerous claimants complicate the 
picture.496
Thus, China has in our time period of consideration marginally altered the status quo of the 
Spratlys by occupying the Mischief Reef, it has significantly challenged Japan's claim to effective 
control over the Senkakus, and it has established a degree of control (no structures are built there 
yet) over the disputed Scarborough Shoal. As far as resources go, China has on occasions dealt 
assertively with such activities by others, though not by employing its navy, but this has not 
succeeded in deterring these states from continuing their activities (as can also be seen in Appendix 
2, Figure 1). As defined in this thesis, China's behavior in both the Senkakus, Spratlys and 
Scarborough are consistent with a limited-aims revisionism. It is true that China has not relied on 
military means, but it has employed armed coast guard vessels which is also a form (albeit less 
serious) of coercion. That being said, it must be emphasized that those actions that qualify as 
limited-aims revisionism here have strong tit-for-tat dynamics. In the Spratlys it is worth repeating 
that China still occupies fewer of the land features than Vietnam and the Philippines do (the 
numbers for these states being 7, 27 and 8 respectively), and that the state that last occupied a 
Spratly was Vietnam (1999).  The occupation of Scarborough Shoal only happened after the 
Philippines sent a navy vessel to deal with Chinese fishermen in the area. The interference with 
exploration activities conducted by Vietnam and the Philippines were in response to these activities 
being carried out in disputed waters. And the dramatic increase of Chinese patrolling in the 
territorial waters of the Senkakus happened after the last three privately owned islands were 
nationalized. This does not absolve China from responsibility, but it does suggest that the picture is 
more complicated than it appears at first glance.
Finally, as regards China's behavior in its EEZs, we have seen that it has challenged the US 
on its right to conduct intelligence gathering there, and remains likely to keep doing so. For the time
being there is no evidence that China is posing a threat to freedom of navigation as it usually 
understood (continuous passage), even by naval ships.
495 “China and Vietnam agree principles for resolving maritime disputes,” IBRU Boundary News, October 13, 2011, 
accessed May 20, 2014, https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=12969; Teddy Ng, “China, 
Vietnam to set up group to explore disputed South China Sea,” South China Morning Post, October 14, 2013, 
accessed May 15, 2014, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1331106/china-vietnam-set-group-explore-disputed-south-china-sea.
496 Thayer, “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” 77.
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4. Conclusions
This thesis has investigated China's behavior in land-border disputes and maritime disputes 
unresolved as of 1989. It has done so in an attempt to answer the research question, “Is China today 
behaving more like a status quo power or a revisionist power?” based on the logic that how a state 
deals with territorial disputes is an important indicator of its intentions, although without suggesting
that this necessarily translates into how it will approach the less tangible systemic level “rules of the
game.” Hypothesis 1 of this thesis has been that “China is behaving more like a regional status quo 
power,” whereas Hypothesis 2 has been that “China is behaving more like a regional revisionist 
power.”
Of the eight land-border disputes we have considered only two remain unresolved today. In 
the other six, settlements have been reached peacefully with China in each instance settling for 
substantially less than it originally laid claim to (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Summary of land-border disputes and post-settlement distributions of territory.
Land border disputesa
Other disputant Disputed territory (km2) China's final share (km2) Share in percentage
Russia (after 1991) 1,045 / 1,245 563 / 664 53.8 / 53.3
Kazakhstan 2,240 762 34
Kyrgyzstan 3,656 1,208 33
Tajikistan 28,430 1,192 4.2
Vietnam 227 114 50.2
Laos 18 ~9 ~50
India ~130,000 N/A N/A
Bhutan 764-1,300 N/A N/A
a The sources for the figures can be found in the corresponding sections of the thesis. These are approximate 
numbers (as emphasized throughout). For Russia the two different figures are due to different size estimates for 
the river islands. For Laos I have not found specific figures for the post-settlement distribution, and rely on the 
suggestion that they were divided “almost evenly” (see the section on the dispute).The figure for disputed 
territory between China and Bhutan is given as an interval because of the uncertainty regarding how much 
territory is actually involved. The first number corresponds to the “package deal” whereas the second is what 
China allegedly suggested was under dispute in 2009.
In the resolved disputes China received half or more of the disputed territory in three cases: Russia, 
Vietnam and Laos, but two of these concerned small sections of territory (Vietnam and Laos), and 
the largest Chinese share in percentage terms (Russia) was no higher than 54 percent. In the dispute 
with Tajikistan – arguably where China's original claim was most grandiose in relative terms, 
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encompassing a fifth of Tajikistan's territory – Beijing settled for less than 5 percent of what it had 
claimed. Thus, none of the disputes that were settled between China and its land border neighbors 
showed revisionist behavior by Beijing. Instead, the overall impression is that China has been 
interested in securing and consolidating its borders, not in pursuing maximalist and inflexible 
claims, expanding its claims when its neighbors have been weak or employing its military to 
pressure its neighbors into accommodating its claims.
There are two land-border disputes that remain to be settled, those with India and Bhutan, 
the latter intimately connected to the first both geographically and politically. It would be 
problematic to suggest that the lack of a settlement with India can be explained by Chinese 
revisionist behavior. So far in this dispute only Beijing has signaled a willingness to consolidate the 
current territorial distribution through an agreement that freezes the status quo, a proposal that was 
raised at least three times prior to 1985. The package deal has not been reported to have resurfaced 
in negotiations since then, but this does not mean that it is off the table, even though China in the 
mid-80s started to emphasize that a package deal would need to transfer the symbolically important 
Tawang region to China. Whether or not this requirement is absolute and still stands, or was put 
forward in order to signal to New Delhi that the package deal in its original shape may not always 
be on the table, is hard to say. The same ambiguity holds for the border transgressions, where we 
have noted that data are limited. The crux of the matter remains the diverging perceptions of where 
the Line of Actual Control runs. From what is known the great majority of transgressions are 
undramatic, and while some have raised tension, such as the one close to Daulat Beg Oldi in April 
2013, they have always ended with a Chinese withdrawal and thus far not included the building of 
any permanent structures by China. 
Thus the Sino-Indian dispute in our time period of consideration remains a case where 
violence or threat of violence has been avoided, and confidence-building measures reached in order 
to keep it that way. It has not seen much progress in the last few years, however, and describing the 
situation as a deadlock where both sides are waiting for the other to compromise appears 
reasonable. It is hard to say whether the main reason is to be found in the remnants of strategic 
distrust from the 1962 border war, the domestic costs of compromise (perhaps particularly in 
India),497 or the fact that for India giving up Aksai Chin is seen as detrimental to its territorial 
dispute with Pakistan whereas for China, Arunachal Pradesh (and Tawang in particular) has 
symbolic value in relation to Tibet. It remains to be seen whether the package deal resurfaces, and if
does whether or not both sides are willing to consolidate the territorial status quo.
497 As Susan Shirk has noted, China plays a much larger role in Indian public debate than vice versa. Shirk, 
“One-Sided Rivalry: China's Perceptions and Policies toward India.”
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As for the dispute between China and Bhutan, it is the only one of the land-border disputes 
where the description of Chinese behavior as limited-aims revisionist appears appropriate. From the
available information we know that China has downsized its claims, and that it has presented 
Bhutan with a package offer which would grant Beijing the 269 square kilometers in the west that it
presumably considers to be the most salient area of the dispute. Where we see signs of limited 
revisionism is in the Chinese activities in the disputed western sector, more specifically the 
construction of roads which are permanent structures that are contributing, even if in a limited way, 
to altering the facts on the ground in Beijing's favor. 
China's interest in this area can be considered both offensive and defensive, as it would 
improve its ability both to move troops through the strategic Chumbi Valley and to defend against 
foreign troops moving toward Tibet from the same valley. The disputed territory in the west is 
contiguous to the Chumbi Valley, but does not directly border India, and thus its incorporation into 
China would be more of a strategic improvement than a game changer. The fact that India and 
China have not solved their dispute, and the memories of 1962, may contribute to increasing the 
value China sees in this area (and the value India sees in keeping it from China's control). The 
assessment of China's behavior in its dispute with Bhutan as a possible exception to its otherwise 
status quo behavior in land-border disputes comes with the caveat that this is also the dispute of 
which the least is known to the outside world, including exactly which territories it encompasses 
and what sort of concessions have been made so far. This does not mean that it should be 
discounted, but at the same time any conclusion reached about it at the current stage will have a 
veneer of uncertainty. It should therefore not overshadow the more general trend of status 
quo-reinforcing land-border settlements.
Moving to the maritime disputes we have seen that since 1989 China has occupied another 
of the Spratly Islands (Mischief Reef) and Scarborough Shoal. To secure the latter Beijing used 
coercion in the form of armed coast guard vessels that refused to leave the area. It is true that China 
was responding to the Philippines' deployment of a naval ship, but it also true that whereas Manila 
backed down China did not, and ever since Beijing has controlled the shoal (although it has so far 
left it undeveloped). In the Paracels, Beijing has maintained the effective control it has had since 
1974. China's position here has some similarities to Japan's in the Senkaku Islands, in that it 
exercises effective control and does not recognize the existence of a dispute, although an important 
difference is that China also has bases and population in the Paracels whereas Japan has left the 
Senkakus undeveloped and unpopulated.
Beijing has mostly relied on its coast guard to secure its maritime interests, rather than 
(more provocatively) employing its navy. This was also the case on the four occasions when China 
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interrupted oil exploration and surveying conducted by Vietnam and the Philippines in disputed 
waters. This interruption does not qualify as revisionism as defined in this thesis, for such 
responses, while provocative and potentially escalating, are attempts to avoid a change in the status 
quo of these waters (as exploration and development could be seen as ways of exercising control 
over the areas). On the other hand, if China both took action to stop other claimants from exploring 
and developing oil and gas reserves and also started such activities in disputed areas itself, this 
would be clearer revisionist behavior. The unprecedented events that started in May 2014 (China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation deploying an oil rig to disputed waters between the Paracels and 
the coast of Vietnam) fall outside the time frame of this thesis but are undoubtedly a significant 
development that warrants close observation and further study.
In the East China Sea, Beijing is challenging Japan's effective control over the Senkaku 
Islands. While there were tensions throughout much of the period under consideration here, 2010 
marked a significant change. Before that incidents were largely handled cooperatively by both 
governments; Japan did not apply domestic law to the islands (avoided prosecution of Chinese 
activists in Japanese courts) and China, while expressing an opposition to the status quo publicly, 
limited its actual challenges to it. Beijing thus saw Japan's initial insistence on prosecuting the 
Chinese captain under Japanese law as a worrying development, as it threatened to change the 
situation from one where Japan only maintained effective control to one where it would also 
exercise Japanese law; in other words a step from de facto to de jure control over the Senkakus. 
After September 2012, in response to Tokyo's purchase of three privately owned islands, Chinese 
patrolling really took off, and in every month since then Chinese coast guard vessels have entered 
the territorial waters of the islands. This has undoubtedly challenged Japan's effective control, 
although Beijing has not been able to achieve its goal of getting an admission from Japan that there 
is indeed a territorial dispute over these islands.
In the sense that Beijing has built permanent structures on Mischief Reef, employed 
coercion to establish a presence on the Scarborough Shoal and challenged Japan's effective control 
over the Senkakus, China has been behaving in a way consistent with limited-aims revisionism. 
However, we have also seen that there have been tit-for-tat dynamics at work in all these disputes, 
and to the extent that the limited-aims revisionist label fits China it is arguably of a more reactive 
than proactive kind. In other words, China has not shied away from occupying features and 
assembling its coast guard to further its aims, but at the same time has done so mostly in situations 
where it has found itself challenged by its counterpart.
This raises the question of how one should classify behavior that is consistent with both 
limited-aims revisionism and action reaction dynamics. As we have noted there is nothing to 
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suggest that a dispute will always be between one challenger and one (or several in the case of 
multilateral disputes) defendant. In the South China Sea the situation may be one where several 
claimants could qualify as limited-aims revisionists, although an adequate treatment of the behavior 
and motives of all the actors involved falls outside the scope of this thesis. While in the Senkakus 
Japan can also be said to represent a challenge to the status quo, in the sense that it wishes to go 
from de facto to de jure control of the islands, it is clearly China that represents the challenge to the 
status quo of effective control. So while we see an action reaction dynamic involved here as well, 
China's limited-aims revisionism is less ambiguous in the case of the Senkaku Islands. In the 
Paracels, as noted, China has been maintaining the status quo and can thus not be described as 
acting in a revisionist manner.
Going back to the research question and hypotheses, the findings of this thesis are more in 
line with Hypothesis 1, that China is behaving more like a regional status quo power. This is 
particularly true for the land-border disputes, where six out of eight have been resolved in ways that
did not substantially alter the territorial status quo or involve revisionist behavior. To put this is 
context, Paul Huth found in his study of 129 territorial disputes between 1950 and 1990 that “In a 
majority of cases (seventy-six, or 59 percent) ... challengers were not willing to compromise on 
their territorial claims.”498 On the other hand we have cases of possible limited-aims revisionism in 
China's dispute with Bhutan, in the dispute over the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal, and in the 
dispute over the Senkaku Islands. But to the extent that these cases fit the limited-aims revisionist 
label we must keep in mind that China's behavior here has mostly been reactive, and the sort of 
coercion they have seen has not yet included military means. Thus, only in a limited sense do they 
lend support to Hypothesis 2.
There are several possible explanations for why China's land-border disputes for the most 
part appear to have been easier to solve the the maritime disputes. One is that the territories in 
question in these disputes are considered less strategically significant. This can be connected to the 
idea that China already has a sufficiently large land buffer to protect its heartland from potential 
overland aggression, whereas it has insufficient strategic depth in its near seas.499 Another 
possibility is that maritime disputes are by nature more complex as they involve both territory, 
maritime resources, overlapping EEZs, and sometimes three or more claimants. This is particularly 
true as far as economic resources such as oil and gas are concerned, in that all claimants are 
interested in extracting such resources, and this has been the trigger for many of the incidents that 
have occurred. A third possibility is that the maritime disputes, particularly over the Senkakus, are 
498 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 141.
499 See Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China's Rise,” 517-18.
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more closely intertwined with nationalism, and has therefore proven harder to solve. These are 
sketches that ought to be studier further, and they are not mutually exclusive.
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Appendix 1: Maps
Russia and Central Asia
Figure 1: Map of the eastern sector (prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union). (Public domain. 
Original map courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.)
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Figure 2: Map of the western sector (prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union). (Public domain. 
Original map courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.)
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Vietnam
Figure 3: Map of China-Vietnam border in 1988 (prior to the settlement). (Public domain. Original 
map courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.)
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India and Bhutan
Figure 4: Map of the eastern sector. (Public domain. Original map courtesy of the University of 
Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.)
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Figure 5: Map of the western sector. (Public domain. Original map courtesy of the University of 
Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.)
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Figure 6: Map of Bhutan (2012), including (striped) areas of dispute with China. (Public domain. 
Original map courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin. 
Modified by author (cropped to allow for more detail).)
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East China Sea and South China Sea
Figure 7: Map with the location of the Senkaku Islands marked (showing distances between other 
territories). (Licensed under Creative Commons. Wikimedia, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Senkaku_Diaoyu_Tiaoyu_Islands.png.)
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Figure 8: Map of the South China Sea featuring China's nine-dash line. (Note that this is an older 
map, with Hong Kong marked as a British colony.) (Public domain. Original map courtesy of the 
University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.)
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Figure 9: Official map of China's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, released by the 
The Ministry of National Defense of the Government of the People's Republic of China on 
November 23, 2013 (http://eng.mod.gov.cn/HomePicture/2013-11/23/content_4476177.htm).
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Charts and
tables
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Table 1: Actions taken by other claimants in the South China Sea
Date Action
2006-2007 Vietnam increases offshore petroleum 
exploration projects in waters claimed
by China.
January 2007 The Fourth Plenum of the Vietnam Communist 
Party’s Central Committee
adopts a resolution mandating the development 
of a national ‘Maritime
Strategy Towards the Year 2020.’ The strategy 
envisions that maritime
industries, especially fishing and petroleum, 
would account for 55 percent of
GDP in 2020, up from 48 percent in 2005.
April 2007 Vietnam elevates Tr ng Saườ  (Spratly Island) to 
the level of a “township” under the Tr ng Sa ườ
District.
November 2007 The Philippine legislature begins debate on an 
archipelagic baselines law, which includes 53 
features from the Spratlys as part of the 
Philippine archipelago.
June 2008 The 2004 joint seismic survey agreement with 
the Philippines and Vietnam expires, dashing 
China’s hopes for “joint development” (Deng 
Xiaoping’s guideline for managing these 
disputes).
February 2009 The Philippine legislature passes an archipelagic
baseline law that includes claims to some of the 
Spratlys. The bill is signed into law in March 
2009.
March 2009 Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi makes a 
public visit to Swallow Reef, a feature in the 
South China occupied by Malaysia, to 
demonstrate Malaysia’s own claim.
November 2009 Vietnam’s foreign ministry hosts a large 
international academic conference on the South 
China Sea to launch its campaign to 
“internationalize” the dispute.
December 2009 The number of Vietnamese fishing vessels 
sheltering in the Paracel Islands, controlled by 
China since 1974, increases (many are detained 
by China).
January 2010 Vietnam assumes the rotating chairmanship of 
ASEAN and begins a public effort to build 
consensus within ASEAN on the South China 
Sea.
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March 2010 The Vietnamese prime minister makes a public 
visit to one of the Vietnamese-held Spratly 
Islands to demonstrate Vietnam’s claim.
April 2010 Approximately 20 Vietnamese fishing and coast 
guard vessels surround a Chinese Fisheries 
Administration patrol vessel.
July 2010 The United States and 11 other countries express
concern about the situation in the South China 
Sea during the annual meeting of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum.
November 2010 Vietnam’s foreign ministry hosts a second 
international academic conference on the South 
China Sea.
February 2011 The Philippines begins a seismic survey in the 
waters near Reed Bank.
April 2011 The Philippines submits a note verbale to the 
UN contesting China’s claims from its May 
2009 note to the UN.
March 2011 Vietnam begins seismic surveys in waters 
claimed by China.
June 2011 Five legislators from the Philippines visit Thitu 
Island
June 2011 Vietnam holds live-fire naval exercises in the 
South China Sea.
October 2011 ExxonMobil, working with a license from 
Vietnam, announces hydrocarbon findings after 
drilling in waters claimed by China.a
July 2012 Vietnam renews the license of Indian company 
ONCG to conduct exploration activities in an 
area also claimed by China.b
July 2012 The Philippines auctions off three areas also 
claimed by China for exploration.c 
November 2013 Vietnam and India sign deal for development 
and exploration projects in waters claimed by 
China after bilateral government talks.d 
Entries up until and including June 2011 are adapted (with no alterations) from Michael D. Swaine and M. 
Taylor Fravel, “China's Assertive Behavior—Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership 
Monitor, no. 35 (2011): 15-16. The last four entries include only major, energy-related events after June 
2011.
a Ben Bland, Leslie Hook and Sheila McNulty, “US gas find off Vietnam adds to China tension,” Financial Times, October 26, 2011, accessed May 20, 2014, 
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e5674186-ffe5-11e0-ba79-00144feabdc0.html; b Rakesh Sharma “ONGC to Continue Exploration in South China Sea,” The Wall Street Journal,
July 19, 2012, accessed May 20, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444464304577536182763155666; c “Philippines to auction South China 
Sea exploration blocks,” BBC, July 31, 2012, accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-19058699; d “India, Vietnam ink pact to expand oil exploration 
in South China Sea,” Livemint, November 20, 2013, accessed May 20, 2014, 
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/F9w30ydAHiFGRSNe8oKPEK/India-Vietnam-ink-pact-to-expand-oil-exploration-in-South-C.html.
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